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Schopenhauer and Kant's Transcendental Idealism

ACADEMIC DISSERTATION
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Schopenhauer and Kant’s Transcendental Idealism

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ABSTRACT

In my dissertation, titled “Schopenhauer and Kant’s Transcendental Idealism”, I concentrate on the Kantian legacy in Schopenhauer’s philosophy. I do not propose to give an overall account of the relation between Kant’s and Schopenhauer’s philosophies. Instead, I focus on certain epistemological and metaphysical questions: the construction and the nature of a subject’s cognition, and its relation to the world as the thing in itself.

The main questions of the study are: 1) the role of Kantian transcendental idealism in Schopenhauer’s theory, and 2) the controversy between the so-called “two-world” doctrine and the “two-aspect” doctrine, referred in Kant-scholarship as that between the “two-world” view and the “two-aspect” view. I argue that Schopenhauer’s philosophy is in important respects congruent with Kant’s transcendental idealism. Schopenhauer evinces a version of formal idealism, and pays attention to the transcendental constraints on knowledge. However, unlike Kant, Schopenhauer proposes contentual claims of the world as it is in itself. Schopenhauer’s identification of the thing in itself with will exceeds the Kantian limitations of metaphysical knowledge.

Schopenhauer is clearly opposed to the “two-world” doctrine. His critique of the distinct thing in itself, which has a causal effect upon the subject of cognition, strikes at the very core of that doctrine. Instead, Schopenhauer evinces a version of the “two-aspect” doctrine. He speaks of representation and will as the two sides/aspects of one and the same empirical objects, describes the method of the consideration of objects in analytic terms, and evinces the idea of a non-causal understanding of the material basis of experience.

I also consider two complementary issues in Schopenhauer’s philosophy. With respect to the method of philosophy, I show that Schopenhauer is critical of the so-called Kantian transcendental arguments, and that his own method can be described as ‘phenomenological’. I also suggest that Schopenhauer’s so-called naturalization of the a priori forms of cognition as brain phenomena does not amount to any strong form of ‘naturalism’, but to a second-order, empirical description of the transcendental forms of cognition.
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1. Introduction

In recent decades a certain amount of studies on Schopenhauer (1788-1860) have appeared in English.¹ To start with, there are some general accounts. Patrick Gardiner's *Schopenhauer* (1967), D.W. Hamlyn's *Schopenhauer* (1980), and Julian Young’s *Schopenhauer* (2005) take account of all the major aspects in Schopenhauer's philosophy: the theory of cognition, metaphysics, aesthetics, and ethics. Bryan Magee's *The Philosophy of Schopenhauer* (1983, second edition 1997) does the same, but it also studies Schopenhauer’s philosophy in a wider sense, considering, for example, Schopenhauer’s influence on various artists. Christopher Janaway's *Self and World in Schopenhauer's Philosophy* (1989) is perhaps the most insightful general study of Schopenhauer’s philosophy. Starting from Kant’s theory it takes a wide account of many pivotal questions and problems in Schopenhauer’s philosophy. This is also the book that has most influenced my own studies on Schopenhauer. Besides these general presentations there are some works concentrating on specific topics in Schopenhauer's philosophy. F. C. White's *On Schopenhauer's Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason* (1992) explores Schopenhauer's early (1813) dissertation of that name. John E. Atwell's *Schopenhauer: The Human Character* (1990) considers Schopenhauer's conceptions of action, ethics, and human character. Another book by Atwell, *Schopenhauer on the Character of the World: The Metaphysics of Will* (1995), concentrates on the metaphysical side of Schopenhauer's philosophy. Julian Young’s *Willing and Unwilling: A Study in the Philosophy of Arthur Schopenhauer* (1987) studies various parts of Schopenhauer’s philosophy, also paying attention to their relation to Immanuel Kant’s (1724-1804) metaphysics. Gerard Mannion's *Schopenhauer, Religion and Morality: The Humble Path to Ethics* (2003) examines the relationship of Schopenhauer's thought to morality and religion, paying attention to topics like atheism, pessimism, and the relation of Schopenhauer’s thought to Kant’s ethics. A historical and intellectual perspective on Schopenhauer’s life and works can be attained from Rüdiger Safranski’s *Schopenhauer and the Wild Years of Philosophy* (1989) and Arthur Hübscher’s *The Philosophy of Schopenhauer in its Intellectual Context: Thinker Against the Tide* (1989). Besides these monographs, there are some collections of articles on Schopenhauer. These include Michael Fox's (ed.) *Schopenhauer:  

¹ There is a long tradition of Schopenhauer studies in German. The most distinguished readers of this scholarship include Arthur Hübscher (1897-1985), and Rudolf Malter (1937-1994). Hübscher is the editor of *Schopenhauer: Sämtliche Werke*, 7 vols (Wiesbaden: F.A. Brockhaus, 4th edition, 1988), and, along with Malter, a former president of the *Schopenhauer-Gesellschaft* (founded in 1911). The yearbook of the *Schopenhauer-Gesellschaft (Schopenhauer-Jahrbuch)* has appeared since 1912.
The present study is a study of Schopenhauer’s relation to Kant.² It is clear that Schopenhauer perceives a close connection between Kant and himself. Schopenhauer notes that since nothing has been done in philosophy between Kant and him, he must take his departure directly from Kant (W1, 563;416). As Kant’s greatest merits Schopenhauer mentions three things: the distinction between appearances and the thing in itself, the demonstration of the metaphysical status of morality, and the overthrow of scholastic philosophy (W1, 564-574;417-425). I do not propose to give a full account of all the affinities and differences between Kant’s and Schopenhauer’s philosophies. Instead, I will restrict my approach to certain epistemological and metaphysical questions: I will examine the construction and the nature of a subject's cognition, and its relation to the world as the thing in itself (das Ding an sich).³ I will refer to the other parts of Schopenhauer's philosophy (ethics, and aesthetics) only occasionally, in order to clarify the consideration of the main questions of the study.

The main questions of the study are: 1) the role of Kantian transcendental idealism in Schopenhauer’s theory, and 2) the controversy between the so-called "two-world" view and the "two-aspect" view.⁴ I give a specifically limited understanding of Kant’s transcendental idealism. I understand transcendental idealism, primarily, as a doctrine, which makes a distinction between the formal and the material parts of cognition and thereby differentiates

² My interest in Schopenhauer began in the nineties with Schopenhauer’s “Criticism of the Kantian Philosophy” in the first volume of The World as Will and Representation (1819). At that time I was especially puzzled by the question of the nature of Kant's transcendental idealism, and the problems Schopenhauer saw in it. Afterwards, I found interesting the so-called “two-aspect” view of Kant’s philosophy (see below). It seemed to focus on somewhat similar issues that Schopenhauer had paid attention to. It is this close relation to Kant that fascinated me in Schopenhauer’s philosophy. The present study is an attempt to shed light on the Kantian legacy in Schopenhauer’s philosophy.

³ While Kant mainly uses the plural expression ‘the things in themselves’ (die Dinge an sich selbst) Schopenhauer regularly uses the singular expression ‘the thing in itself’ (das Ding an Sich). This is based on Schopenhauer’s claim that the pluralism of empirical world cannot reach the essence of the thing in itself. In this study, I will use both Schopenhauer’s singular and Kant’s plural expressions, depending on the context. I contend that both of these expressions are as consistent or as inconsistent: both refer to that part of the world which does not strictly allow either a plural or a singular expression.

⁴ This controversy has become common in Kant scholarship, especially since the publication of Henry Allison’s Kant’s Transcendental Idealism: An Interpretation and Defense (1983). Allison is the most famous proponent of the "two-aspect" view, while Paul Guyer is his harshest critic (see, for example, Allison 1983 and Guyer 1998).
itself from what I will call material idealism (see below), and which evinces the idea of the constraints on knowledge.\(^5\) Besides this, I consider the distinction between appearances and the things in themselves with respect to the above-mentioned “two-world” view and the “two-aspect” view. For the purposes of this study, I, however, give new names to these views. I will talk about the “two-world/aspect” interpretation, when it is specifically a question of an interpretation of Kant’s transcendental idealism. Besides this, I will talk about the “two-world/aspect” doctrine, when it is a question of any philosophical theory applying the idea of two aspects to the distinction between appearances and the things in themselves. Hence, in assessing Schopenhauer’s philosophy I will use the doctrine-talk. Notably, the consideration of the controversy between the “two-world” doctrine and the “two-aspect” doctrine has not so far taken as the main theme in Schopenhauer commentaries. On my behalf, I hold that this point of view brings forth important heuristic tools for understanding Schopenhauer’s philosophy.

As noted, Kant’s transcendental idealism differs from what I call material idealism. By material idealism I understand a philosophical theory which regards the subject as an independently existing metaphysical entity (for example, substance, action etc.), and maintains that the subject’s cognition originates both materially and formally in this subject.\(^6\) The philosophies of J. G. Fichte (1762-1814) and F.W.J. Schelling (1775-1854) may be taken as examples of material idealism. Both of these philosophers take subject (in its ‘absolute’ sense) as the basis of the subject’s cognition, and of the world. Contrary to this, Kant's transcendental idealism is a philosophical theory, which regards subject only as a formal condition of cognition. In transcendental idealism, the formal part of cognition is given by the subject, while the material part of cognition is given from outside the subject - that is, by the things in themselves. Since it is also held that our cognition and knowledge are dependent on the formal - that is, transcendental - conditions of cognition, we can never have knowledge without these conditions of cognition. All our knowledge claims must (in one way or another)

\(^5\) In transcendental idealism, the transcendental conditions of cognition, which restrict a certain kind of (metaphysical) knowledge, also make another kind of (theoretical) knowledge possible. I fully acknowledge the importance of this constitutive aspect of transcendental idealism, and will consider it, especially with Schopenhauer, in some detail. However, my main interest is still focused on the restrictive side of the transcendental conditions of cognition.

\(^6\) My definition of material idealism differs from some alternative understandings of it, for example, an understanding of it as idealism held by George Berkeley (1685-1753), according to whom material objects consist of nothing but ideas, whether in the mind of God or of the representing subject (A Dictionary of Philosophy; editorial consultant Antony Flew, p. 160). In my understanding of material idealism there is no place for anything besides the subject (for example, there is no place for a Berkeleian God).
be restricted through a subjective - that is, transcendental - point of view. Hence Kant’s various demands for philosophy: knowledge proper must be limited to the level of experience, the meaning and validity of epistemic concepts must be limited to the level of experience (for example, ‘subject’ and ‘object’ must be understood as relational concepts), absolute metaphysics must be rejected, and traditionally transcendent claims must be replaced by various kinds of regulative judgments.

Kant’s distinction between **appearances** (*Erscheinungen*) and the **things in themselves** is also results from the transcendental constraints on knowledge. According to the “two-world” interpretation, Kant's concept of the thing in itself refers to the distinct and unknown basis of experience. In this interpretation, the things in themselves have a causal effect upon the subject, which gives rise to its cognition of objects – that is, representations (*Vorstellungen*). Usually the proponents of the “two-world” interpretation are keen to point out that this setting up of a causal relation between the things in themselves and the subject of cognition gives rise to the so-called problem of affection. That is, that there is a contradiction between the acknowledgement of a causal relation between the things in themselves and appearances and Kant’s restriction of knowledge to the level of appearances. In referring to distinct things in themselves as the basis of cognition, Kant brakes his own constraints on knowledge. Besides this commonly discussed problem in the “two-world” interpretation, I will introduce yet another, more specific, difficulty in it. Namely, that Kant occasionally speaks of things in themselves as ‘objects’, though he elsewhere puts restrictions on epistemic concepts (like ‘object’).

The “two-aspect” interpretation aims to correct the (acclaimed) errors of the "two-world" interpretation. According to the “two-aspect” interpretation, Kant's expression ‘*die Dinge an sich*’ does not refer to the distinct and causally effective things in themselves.

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7 By ‘epistemic concept’ I refer to concepts used in the context of knowledge proper - that is, with respect of philosophical or scientific knowledge that is restricted to the level of experience (see more below, p. 17)

8 According to Howard Caygill, Kant’s regulative principles and ideas contribute to the orientation of the understanding without claiming to constitute an object, nor to contribute directly to knowledge (A Kant Dictionary, 130). These regulative principles include the ideas of reason (*Vernunft*) (the world, the soul, and God), the analogical metaphysical judgments, and the reflective judgments in teleological and aesthetic contexts.

9 When I refer to the ‘distinct’ things in themselves, I understand the distinctness in question as distinctness from appearances. In this respect, I also speak of the ‘independently existing’ things in themselves.

10 In the “two-world” interpretation, objects are identified with subject’s mental states or ‘representations’ (see below, Chapter 3.1)

Instead, it refers to a certain kind of consideration of things\textsuperscript{12}: the consideration of things without their transcendently-constituted properties. Analogously, ‘appearance’ refers to the consideration of things as objects of cognition: the consideration of things with their transcendently-constituted properties. It is important to note that the “two-aspect” interpretation also admits a reference to things in themselves as the metaphysical (material) basis of appearances. However, contrary to the “two-world” interpretation, it denies that this reference leads to the problem of causal affection by the things in themselves. In the “two-aspect” interpretation, the things in themselves are supposed not to act as the cause of appearances but to ‘ground’ appearances. This ‘grounding’ is understood in some manner devoid of any empirical and causal understanding of the relation between a ground and a consequent.

I will argue that Schopenhauer’s philosophy is in important respects congruent with Kant’s transcendental idealism. To start with, Schopenhauer does not evince a version of material idealism. He does not regard the subject as a metaphysical entity and claim that the cognition originates both materially and formally in the subject. Instead, Schopenhauer’s theory of cognition is a Kantian construct. He makes the distinction between the material and the formal parts of cognition, and denotes the formal part to the subject and the material part to the thing in itself. Kant’s idea of restricting knowledge to the level of appearances is also clearly apparent in Schopenhauer’s theory of cognition. Schopenhauer’s considerations of the validity of the principle of sufficient reason, the constitution of cognition, the sphere of knowledge proper, and the qualifications of the meaning and validity of epistemic concepts (most importantly, ‘subject’ and ‘object’) bring forth Kantian constraints on knowledge. However, Schopenhauer differs from Kant in not (fully) accepting the idea of the restrictions of metaphysical knowledge.\textsuperscript{13} Though Schopenhauer makes certain reservations to his metaphysics, he nevertheless evinces contentual claims of the world as it is in itself. Schopenhauer’s identification of the thing in itself with will (\textit{Wille}) exceeds the Kantian limitations of metaphysical knowledge.

With respect to the “two-world”/“two-aspect” doctrines, we may note the following. Schopenhauer abandons the “two-world” idea of distinct things in themselves, which have a causal effect upon the subject, but accepts the identification of objects with representations

\textsuperscript{12} In Chapters 3.2 and 5.5, I will discuss what the ‘thing’ is that is considered in the “two-aspect” interpretation/doctrine. Meanwhile, it may be thought of as an ordinary empirical object.

\textsuperscript{13} I will refer to any kind of metaphysical conceptions as ‘metaphysical knowledge’, regardless if Kant and Schopenhauer actually use any German equivalents for ‘knowledge’ in respect of metaphysics.
He comes close to the “two-aspect” doctrine as presented in connection with Kant (the “two-aspect” interpretation, Chapter 3.2) in his views on the method of acquiring knowledge of the thing in itself, the idea of two aspects to one and the same objects/world, and the idea of a non-causal understanding of the material basis of experience (the problem of affection). However, as stated, Schopenhauer’s position differs from the “two–aspect” doctrine as presented in connection with Kant in identifying objects with representations, but also in evincing metaphysically contentual claims of the world as it is in itself. Yet I hold that Schopenhauer’s position agrees with what I take as the basic feature of the “two-aspect” doctrine: the understanding of the distinction between appearances and the thing in itself as that between two aspects on the same objects. In this respect, it is also interesting to note that, in his interpretation of Kant, Schopenhauer supports the “two-world” interpretation.

In addition to the two above-mentioned main questions of the study (the question of the role of Kantian transcendental idealism in Schopenhauer’s philosophy, and the controversy between the "two-world" doctrine and the "two-aspect" doctrine) I will take a look at two complementary issues in Schopenhauer's philosophy. First, with respect to the method of philosophy, I will consider Schopenhauer’s critical attitude towards the so-called Kantian transcendental arguments, and his own ‘phenomenological’ method of philosophy. Second, I will suggest that Schopenhauer’s so-called naturalization of the a priori forms of cognition as brain phenomena does not amount to any strong form of ‘naturalism’, but to a second-order, empirical description of the transcendental forms of cognition.

The study is divided into six main chapters. First, I will present the most important technical terms of the study (Chapter 2). Second, I will examine Kant's philosophy, including the "two-world" interpretation and the “two-aspect” interpretation (Chapter 3). Third, I will study Schopenhauer’s theory of cognition (Chapter 4). Fourth, I will study Schopenhauer’s metaphysics of will as the thing in itself (Chapter 5). Fifth, I will consider the two complementary issues in Schopenhauer's philosophy: the method of philosophy, and the naturalization of the a priori forms of cognition (Chapter 6). Sixth, I will conclude the study (Chapter 7).
2. On terminology

In the following, I will present the most the important technical terms of the study. Unless otherwise stated, I will use the terms in the same sense for both Kant and Schopenhauer.

To start with, there is the concept of transcendental (transzendental). I will understand this term on the basis of Kant’s determination of it. Kant writes:

“...the word ‘transcendental’...does not signify something passing beyond all experience but something that indeed precedes it (a priori), but that is intended simply to make knowledge of experience possible.”

I use the concept of transcendental in three related contexts. First, I use it to refer to those subjective, a priori conditions of cognition, which give form to empirical objects, and make knowledge of these objects possible. For Kant, these conditions include the two forms of intuition (Anschauung), space and time, and the twelve categories of understanding (Verstand). For Schopenhauer the transcendental conditions of cognition are reduced to the two Kantian forms of intuition (space and time), and to one law of understanding, causality (Kausalität). Since we can have knowledge of objects only through these a priori conditions of cognition, we can have knowledge of them only as appearances. Second, I use the concept of transcendental with respect to the method of philosophical consideration. By ‘transcendental philosophy’ - or ‘transcendentalism’ – I refer to a philosophical consideration, which takes notice of the transcendental conditions of cognition, and, on this account, recognizes the idea of the constraints on knowledge. Third, as stated (p. 9-10), by ‘transcendental idealism’ I understand a philosophical doctrine which makes the distinction between appearances and the things in themselves, asserts that empirical cognition is conditioned formally by the transcendental conditions of cognition and materially by the things in themselves, and evinces the idea of the constraints on knowledge.

I will also understand the concept of transcendent (transzendent), as well as its counter-concept immanent (immanent) on the basis of Kant’s determinations of them. Kant writes:

14 “... das Wort: transscendental ... bedeutet nicht etwas, das über alle Erfahrung hinausgeht, sondern was vor ihr (a priori) zwar vorhergeht, aber doch zu nichts Mehrerem bestimmt ist, als lediglich Erfahrungserkenntnis möglich zu machen.” (P, 373, footnote)
"We will call the principles whose application stays wholly and completely within the limits of possible experience immanent, but those that would fly beyond these boundaries transcendent principles."\(^{15}\)

Kant makes his determinations of the concepts of immanent and transcendent within a general transcendental point of view. The concept of immanent refers to that level of the world which has its basis in the transcendental conditions of cognition (appearances). The concept of transcendent refers beyond this level of the world (the things in themselves).\(^{16}\)

As has been seen, on the basis of the limitation of knowledge proper to the level of experience, there arises the distinction between appearances (Erscheinungen) or phenomena vs. the things in themselves (die Dinge an sich selbst) and/or noumena.\(^{17}\) Kant writes:

“…the transcendental concept of appearances in space…is a critical reminder that absolutely nothing that is intuited in space is a thing in itself…what we call outer objects are nothing other than mere representations of our sensibility…but whose true correlate, i.e., the thing in itself, is not and cannot be cognized through them…”\(^{18}\)

The concept of an appearance refers to the empirical objects/world. The concept of the thing in itself refers, in one way or another, beyond the empirical world. It refers to the

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\(^{15}\) “Wir wollen die Grundsätze deren Anwendung sich ganz und gar in den Schranken möglicher Erfahrung hält, immanente, diejenigen aber, welche diese Grenzen überfliegen sollen, transzendenten Grundsätze nennen.” (KrV, A295-6/B352)

\(^{16}\) Sometimes Kant also uses the concept of transcendental in connection with things in themselves. This is apparent, for example, in his distinction between two sorts of judgments, which exceed the limits of experience. Kant notes that the so-called transcendental use - or misuse - of categories is a mistake of the faculty of judgment when it is not properly checked by criticism, and thus reaches out beyond the boundaries of experience. Instead, in the use of transcendent principles we are incited to tear down all the boundaries, and to lay claim to a new territory that recognizes no demarcations anywhere (KrV, A 296/B352.) I will not make use of this specific distinction between the two kinds of judgments exceeding the limits of experience. Instead, I will refer both to the transcendental use (misuse) of the categories of understanding and to the use of the genuinely transcendent principles with the concept of transcendent.

\(^{17}\) It has been argued that there are notable differences in Kant's use of the concepts of the thing in itself and noumenon (see, for example, Gerd Buchdahl 1989, Markku Leppäkoski 1993). Since Schopenhauer does not use the concept of noumenon in his philosophy, I will, with a couple of exceptions, use only the concept of the thing in itself in this study.

\(^{18}\) “…ist der transzendentale Begriff der Erscheinungen im Raume eine kritische Erinnerung, daß überhaupt nichts, was im Raume angeschaut wird, eine Sache an sich…sei…was wir äußere Gegenstände nennen, nichts anderes als bloße Vorstellungen unserer Sinnlichkeit sind…deren wahres Korrelatum aber, d.i. das Ding an sich selbst, dadurch gar nicht erkannt wird, noch erkannt werden kann…” (KrV, A30/B45)
metaphysical basis of empirical objects, as well as to transcendence in general. Kant and Schopenhauer agree with the basic distinction between appearances and the thing in itself. Both contend that a demarcation must be made between what is knowable and what is unknowable. However, as noted, Schopenhauer’s identification of the thing in itself with will retracts him from the total unknowability of the thing in itself.

In respect of a subject’s experience of empirical objects, Kant uses the German term ‘Erkenntnis’. I will follow the translation of this term by some recent scholars as ‘cognition’ (see, for example, Markku Leppäkoski 1993,267; Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood, 1998,760). However, certain difficulties arise with this translation in connection with Schopenhauer. Though Schopenhauer also uses the concept of Erkenntnis he often refers to the subject’s cognition of empirical objects with the concept of Anschauung. As such, the concept of Anschauung might call for a translation as ‘intuition’. But since Schopenhauer also includes an intellectual aspect in human cognition (see below, Chapter 4.2) this translation is misleading. The concept of intuition does not straightforwardly contain the idea of the intellectual side of cognition. In this respect, in order to make plain the intellectual nature of Anschauung, we might want to translate this concept as ‘intellectual intuition’. However, this translation might give rise to some erroneous analogies with the ‘intellectual intuition’ (Intellektuelle Anschauung) of the post-Kantian idealists like Fichte, Schelling, and G.W.F. Hegel (1770-1831). Contrary to this post-Kantian movement, Schopenhauer does not relate his idea of the intellectual nature of intuition to the cognition of the metaphysical reality of the world (see below, Chapters 4.2 and 5.3). Finally, we might follow E.F.J. Payne’s translation of Schopenhauer’s works, and refer to Schopenhauer’s ‘Anschauung’ by ‘perception’ (Payne 1969, viii-ix). As such, this is a proper translation, and will be used in direct Schopenhauer quotations. However, in the main text of the study, I will refer to Schopenhauer’s concept of human cognition of empirical objects by the term ‘cognition’. This is done for the sake of a common language and convenience with respect to Kant’s terminology.

The concept of representation (Vorstellung) must also be considered in this connection. Kant’s use of this concept is wide and variable. According to Howard Caygill, Kant’s concept of Vorstellung is used in respect of all such different things as, for example, sensations (Empfindung, sensatio), cognitions (Erkenntnis, cognitio), as well as the famous ‘I think’ (A Kant Dictionary, 355-356; KrV, A320/B376). I will not consider these various uses

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19 As will be seen, Schopenhauer often attaches the concept of intellectuality (Intellektualität) in connection to the concept of Anschauung (Chapter 4.2).
of the concept of representation by Kant. Instead, I will follow the common use of this term in Kant scholarship, and understand representations as the subject’s mental states or contents of consciousness. Notably, Kant’s contention of the relation between representations (mental states) and empirical objects is a matter of controversy in Kant scholarship, and will not be settled in this study. However, the different accounts of the “two-world” interpretation and the “two-aspect” interpretation of this matter will be taken under consideration. A further difficulty in assessing the nature of Kantian objects comes from the fact that he uses different terms in respect of objects - that is, Gegenstand, Objekt, and Ding. Generally, it may be said that Kant uses the concepts of Gegenstand and Objekt in respect of empirical objects, and the concept of Ding in respect of things in themselves. For Schopenhauer, the question of representations and their relation to empirical objects is more straightforward. Schopenhauer identifies objects with representations (mental states) (see below, Chapter 4.2), and his primary concept for empirical objects is Objekt (though he also uses the concept of Gegenstand).

Finally, in order to make the distinction between knowledge proper (knowledge in a narrow sense) and knowledge in a broader sense, I have chosen to make a distinction between the terms ‘theoretical’ or ‘epistemic’, and ‘non-theoretical’ or ‘non-epistemic’. I will use the term ‘theoretical’/‘epistemic’ to refer to philosophical or scientific knowledge that is restricted to the level of experience, and can be called knowledge proper. In contrast to this, I will use the term ‘non-theoretical’/‘non-epistemic’ to refer to knowledge that exceeds the level of experience, and amounts to metaphysical knowledge. In transcendental idealism, theoretical/epistemic knowledge is based, in one way or another, on the transcendental conditions of cognition and stays within the limits of possible experience, while non-theoretical/non-epistemic knowledge exceeds the limits of possible experience.

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20 On this question, see A Kant Dictionary, p. 304-306.
3. Kant’s transcendental idealism

With respect to Kant’s transcendental idealism, I will focus on three, in my account, central aspects of it: 1) a difference from material idealism, 2) the constraints on knowledge in respect of epistemic considerations and epistemic concepts, 3) a new approach to the traditional metaphysical matters. All these different sides of Kant’s theory are, in their own way, expressions of the general idea of the limitations of knowledge.

First, as noted, Kant’s transcendental idealism differs from material idealism, according to which the subject is an independently existing metaphysical entity, which, both materially and formally, gives rise to the subject’s cognition. Or, perhaps more precisely, in material idealism the very distinction between the formal and the material part of cognition is omitted. The philosophies of Fichte and Schelling are examples of this. Both of them rejected Kant’s distinction between the matter and the form of cognition. Contrary to material idealism, Kant takes the subject only as a formal condition of cognition, and refers the material part outside the subject, to the things in themselves. Hence, Kant’s idealism is formal idealism: the idealistic element of the theory amounts only to the form of cognition given by the subject of cognition. Due to this separation of the material from the ideal/formal element in cognition, we are not allowed to have knowledge of the things in themselves. Since we can have knowledge only through the transcendental forms of cognition, we can have knowledge only of appearances. Through the transcendental forms of cognition we give objects those properties and determinations, which, according to Kant, allow us to have cognition and knowledge in the first place. The mere presence of the material part of cognition (sensation) in the subject’s mind gives nothing for us, “…intuitions without concepts are blind.”

Second, Kant’s specific constraints on knowledge concern all epistemic considerations based on those laws and principles of thought which can yield knowledge proper. Before Kant, the idea of restricting knowledge to the level of experience had not often been recognized. Both rationalistic philosophers, - like G. W. Leibniz (1646-1716), Christian Wolff (1679-1754), and A. G. Baumgarten (1714-1762) - and certain empirists - like George Berkeley (1685-1753) - had put forward metaphysically loaded claims and theories of the world. Kant did not accept the rationalistic claim that reason (Vernunft) in itself would give

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21 “…Anschauungen ohne Begriffe sind blind.” (KrV, A51/B75)
contentual knowledge of the essence and connections of the world (see more below, Chapter 4.1). Reason has no content, “Thoughts without content are empty…”22 In order to say anything contentual of the world, reason has to borrow the content from elsewhere, that is, from experience (intuition). However, it is important to note that Kant was not against metaphysics as such. He was against that kind of metaphysics which did not pay attention to the limits of human knowledge. Focusing his criticism mainly against the rationalistic tradition, Kant wanted to reformulate the idea of metaphysics. This resulted in two different kinds of metaphysics: 1) the so-called scientific metaphysics (Prolegomena), which consists of knowledge of the transcendental conditions of cognition, and 2) a new kind of understanding of the traditional metaphysical questions (see more below).

Kant’s idea of the constraints on knowledge is also apparent in his claim that all epistemic concepts acquire so-called objective meaning23 only through their relation to the transcendental conditions of cognition. Kant writes:

"The concepts of reality, substance, causality, even that of necessity in existence have, beyond their use in making possible the empirical cognition of an object, no significance at all which might determine any object. They can therefore be used for explaining the possibility of things in the world of sense, but not the possibility of a world-whole itself, because this ground of explanation would have to be outside the world and hence it would not be an object of a possible experience."24

Transcendental concepts - like ‘reality’, or ‘substance’ - have objective meaning only as concepts explaining the possibility of experience. They do not tell anything about the world as it is in itself. This retraction from the use of epistemic concepts as determinations of the things in themselves is clearly apparent in Kant’s note on one of his central metaphysical concept, the ‘transcendental object’ (transzendentales Objekt). In the determination of the

22 “Gedanken ohne Inhalt sind leer…” (KrV, A51/B75)
23 Besides ‘objective meaning’, which determines the cognition of empirical objects, concepts may have also a non-objective meaning. See below, for example, the so-called ‘empty’ use of categories (p. 29-31).
24 “Die Begriffe der Realität, der Substanz, der Kausalität, selbst die der Notwendigkeit im Dasein, haben, außer dem Gebrauche, da sie die empirische Erkenntnis eines Gegenstandes möglich machen, gar keine Bedeutung, die irgendein Objekt bestimmte. Sie können also zwar zu Erklärung der Möglichkeit der Dinge in der Sinnenwelt, aber nicht der Möglichkeit eines Weltganzen selbst gebraucht werden, weil dieser Erklärungsgrund außerhalb der Welt und mithin kein Gegenstand einer möglichen Erfahrung sein müßte.” (KrV, A677/B705)
‘transcendental’ object, we must, according to Kant, refrain from any concepts which determine sensible cognition. Kant notes that the transcendental object:

“…cannot be thought of either as magnitude or as reality or as substance, etc. (since these concepts always require sensible forms in which they determine an object)…”

Though empirically properties like magnitude or reality can be applied to objects, in the metaphysical context of the transcendental object they must be omitted. While I leave the consideration of the concept of the transcendental object to a further occasion (Chapters 3.2 and 3.2.1) I want here to make a note on its phenomenal equivalent - that is empirical object, including its relation to a subject. Kant holds that ‘subject’ and ‘object’ are correlative concepts. Henry Allison notes that Kant evinces a radically new conception of an object. An object is now to be understood as whatever conforms to our knowledge, and this means whatever conforms to the subject’s conditions for the representation of it as an object. Consequently, an object is by its very nature something represented: a reference to subject and its cognitive apparatus is built into the definition of the term (Allison 1983,30.) This new conception of an object is the correlate of the conception of an epistemic condition (Allison 1983,30), or the correlate of a certain mode of representation (Allison 1996,5). In other words, Kant’s concept of an object refers to something cognizable in experience. An object is by definition a cognizable, empirical object – something constituted by the subject of cognition. Similarly, subject is by definition that which has a cognition of an object. Subject can exist only in relation to object. Generally, Kant holds that any concepts that can give knowledge proper are valid only within experience. These concepts have their basis in the faculties of understanding or intuition, or they are empirical concepts, having their origin in the empirical world (for example, as generalizations of empirical objects).

Third, Kant proposes a new kind of understanding of the traditional metaphysical matters. We are no longer supposed to have direct knowledge of the world, the soul, and God, or other such such matters that traditional metaphysics paid attention to. Inquiries into these

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25 “…weder als Größe, noch als Realität, noch als Substanz usw. gedacht werden kann (weil diese Begriffe immer sinnliche Formen erfordern, in denen sie einen Gegenstand bestimmen;)…” (KrV, A288/B344)

26 According to Allison, epistemic condition (or "objectivating condition") is a necessary condition for the representation of objects, that is, a condition without which our representations would not relate to objects or, equivalently, possess 'objective reality' (Allison 1996,4). There are two kinds of epistemic conditions: sensible conditions, or ‘forms of sensibility’, through which objects (or, better, the data for thinking objects) are given, and intellectual conditions, or categorial concepts, through which the data are referred to objects in judgment (Allison 1996,6-7).
matters are, according to Kant, important, and for us unavoidable, but our conceptions of them cannot be counted as knowledge proper. However, Kant maintains that we may form regulative - or, in a sense, “transcendental” - accounts of metaphysical matters: by applying the principles of reason, we orient our understanding of (otherwise for us unreachable) transcendent matters. In this way, by using, for example, the above-mentioned (necessary) ideas (Ideen) of reason (the world, the soul, and God), we modify traditional knowledge of metaphysical matters into regulative conceptions of them. Another example of regulative judgments is analogical judgments. According to Kant, analogy “…does not signify…an imperfect similarity of two things, but a perfect similarity of relations between two quite dissimilar things.”

For example, as the promotion of the welfare of children (=a) is to the love of parents (=b), so the welfare of the human species (=c) is to that unknown character in God (=x), which we call love (P, 357, footnote). Such analogical judgments yield problematic knowledge of the relation that God might have with human species, not contentual knowledge of God itself.

After this introduction of some of the basic features of Kant’s philosophy, I turn to the consideration of the two main interpretative lines of Kant’s things in themselves: the "two-world" interpretation and the "two-aspect" interpretation. I do not aim to give a full account of the multiple and rich discussion of these interpretations. Instead, I will restrict my consideration to those aspects of these theories, which, in my judgment, have a direct application to Schopenhauer. In other words, I will study the “two-world” interpretation and the “two-aspect” interpretation in respect of how, in my opinion, Schopenhauer might have understood them.

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27 By the concept of “transcendental” I refer to that kind of considerations, judgments etc. of metaphysical matters, which are based on our transcendental and empirical modes of thinking and language, but which, on account of their metaphysical nature, cannot give us knowledge proper. I understand ‘“transcendental” ’ as a genus term, which includes both Kant’s regulative or problematic metaphysical knowledge and Schopenhauer’s contentual metaphysical knowledge.

28 “…nicht…eine unvollkommene Ähnlichkeit zweier Dinge, sondern eine vollkommene Ähnlichkeit zweier Verhältnisse zwischen ganz unähnlichen Dingen bedeutet…” (P,357)
3.1 The “two-world” interpretation

According to the "two-world" interpretation, Kant’s distinction between appearances and the things in themselves is a metaphysical distinction between two kinds of entities. While things in themselves are metaphysically real entities, appearances are subject’s representations – or mental states – of the things in themselves. Since things in themselves are distinct from appearances, appearances have no existence without the subject of cognition. Kant writes:

“…all appearances…are not in themselves things, but rather nothing but representations, and they cannot exist at all outside our mind…”

“All objects of an experience possible for us, are nothing but appearances, i.e., mere representations, which, as they are represented, as extended beings or series of alterations, have outside our thoughts no existence grounded in itself.”

Allison emphasizes the subjective nature of the “two-world” interpretation of appearances as mental states. According to Allison, the “two-world” interpretation takes Kant’s appearances (representations) as the contents of our minds, interpreting them as ideas in the Berkeleian sense (Allison 1983,5). Though it is intrinsic for the “two-world” interpretation that appearances are regarded as some kind of subjective ‘ideas’, Allison’s reference to Berkeley’s ideas needs certain clarifications. To start with, Berkeley does not make the distinction between the material and the formal parts of cognition. Instead, he holds that subject’s ideas are both materially and formally constituted by the (humane or divine) subject of cognition. Hence, unlike Kant’s idealism, Berkeley’s idealism concerns both the material and the formal aspect of ideas, the very existence of ideas. Kant in turn notes that transcendental idealism does not concern the existence of things (Sachen), but only the sensible representation of things (P, 293). Moreover, while Berkeley’s subject is a

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29 “…alle Erscheinungen…sind…an sich selbst keine Dinge, sondern nichts als Vorstellungen, und können gar nicht außer unserem Gemüt existieren…” (KrV, A492/B520)

30 “…alle Gegenstände einer uns möglichen Erfahrung, nichts als Erscheinungen, d.i. bloße Vorstellungen sind, die, so wie sie vorgestellt werden, als ausgedehnte Wesen, oder Reihen von Veränderungen, außer unseren Gedanken keine an sich gegründete Existenz haben.” (KrV, A 490-91/B 518-19)

31 In this connection, Allison speaks of the so-called ‘standard picture’, which is Allison’s earlier (1983) term for the position that will later be referred as the “two-world” view (1996).
metaphysical entity - a human or a divine substance – Kant’s subject is only a logical condition of cognition. On the basis of these differences, we may conclude, at least, that, for Kant, the representations or ‘ideas’ (mental states) have a much lighter metaphysical bearing than with Berkeley. Even if Kantian representations were understood as something existing ‘inside the mind’, they differ from Berkeley’s ideas in not being both materially and formally constituted by the metaphysical subject. Clearly Kantian representations do not cover the whole world.

Instead, in the “two-world” interpretation representations are contrasted with the distinct things in themselves. According to P.F. Strawson, appearances, as the contents of consciousness, are appearances of the supersensible thing in itself (Strawson 1966,236-238). According to Paul Guyer, the ontology from which Kant begins includes two classes of objects: things (like tables and chairs) as they are without the properties of space and time (nominated as things in themselves) and our representations of these things (nominated as appearances), which, as objects possessing spatial and temporal properties, are identified with mere mental entities (Guyer 1998,335). Generally, according to the “two-world” interpretation, we can have knowledge only of our representations, while the whole metaphysical realm of the distinct things in themselves remains outside the sphere of knowledge. As Allison notes, the “two-world” interpretation takes Kant’s transcendental idealism as a metaphysical theory that affirms the unknowability of things in themselves and relegates knowledge to the subjective realm of representations. It combines a phenomenalistic account of what is actually experienced by the subject, and therefore knowable, with the postulation of an additional set of entities, which, in terms of the very theory, are unknowable (Allison 1983,3-4.). This contention of things in themselves and appearances forms the basis for the consideration of human cognition: the cognition of empirical objects arises when the distinct things in themselves have a causal effect upon the subject of cognition. Through this affection the subject receives the material necessary for the constitution of empirical cognition. As Allison notes, a basic assumption of the “two-world” interpretation is the

32 Guyer also notes that since Kant transfers spatiality and temporality from objects to our representations of them, he has no need to create a third set of objects beyond, first, objects like tables and chairs, and, second, our representations of these objects (Guyer 1998,335).

33 According to Allison, this kind of interpretation gives us a chance to read Kant as an inconsistent Berkeley. The view that Kant’s transcendental idealism amounts to a combination of the essentially Berkeleian phenomenalistic idealism with the postulation of an inaccessible realm of the things in themselves is an inconsistent position (Allison 1983,4-5). It is as if Kant wanted to back up his otherwise Berkeleian, phenomenalistic idealism with a realistic postulation of things in themselves. A thought that is in sharp contradiction to the nature of Berkeley’s idealism, especially its aim to overcome scepticism concerning external objects.
conception that the subject acquires the materials for representations as a result of being affected by the things in themselves (Allison 1983,4). After having received the matter of cognition – that is, sensations – the subject adds the formal structure to the given material. This gives rise to a coherently structured empirical cognition, which can yield us knowledge proper.

The “two-world” reading of Kant's philosophy gives rise to some problems relating to Kant’s idea of the constraints on knowledge. To start with, the denial of the knowledge of things in themselves gives rise to difficulties. On the unknowability of the things in themselves, Kant writes:

“…objects in themselves are not known to us at all…the thing in itself, is not and cannot be cognized through them [representations], but is also never asked after in experience.”

In the light of these constraints on knowledge, the very postulation of things in themselves seems problematic. If we cannot have any knowledge of things in themselves, then we cannot assert their existence either. Related to this problem is the above-mentioned problem of affection - the postulation of a causal relationship between the things in themselves and the subject of cognition. With respect to the idea of the constraints on knowledge, the only valid realm of application of a non-qualified concept of affection is the realm of the spatio-temporal world. As Strawson notes, Kant’s conception of affection is unintelligible since his

34 In contrast to what a language here might suggest, I do not claim that, according to the “two-world” interpretation, cognition consists of two consecutive levels of cognition – the first, material level upon which the second, the formal level is afterwards added. Instead, this distinction is probably best read as a logical or analytic distinction between different components of cognition.

35 The problem of exceeding the constraints on knowledge in respect of the things in themselves was already noticed in the early reception of Kant’s transcendental idealism, for example by F.H. Jacobi (1743-1819). The “two-world” theorists often hold that Kant’s transcendental idealism is a problematic theory, which includes inner and unsolvable contradictions and problems. The “two-aspect” theorists in turn are keener to find solutions to these problems.

36 “…uns die Gegenstände an sich gar nicht bekannt sind…das Ding an sich selbst, dadurch[Vorstellungen] gar nicht erkannt wird, noch erkannt werden kann, nach welchem aber auch in der Erfahrung niemals gefragt wird.” (KrV, A30/B45)

37 The problem of postulating things in themselves as the basis of cognition also concerns the “two-aspect” interpretation, although in another manner (see below, Chapter 3.2.).

38 By a ‘non-qualified’ concept of affection I refer to the understanding of ‘affection’ on the basis of its objective meaning (see above, p. 19, footnote 23). In connection with the “two-aspect” interpretation, I will introduce a qualified concept of affection (Chapter 3.2.1).
transposition of the terminology of objects ‘affecting’ the subjects takes that terminology out of the range of its intelligible employment, that is, the spatio-temporal range. The doctrine that we are aware of things only as they appear and not as they are in themselves because their appearances to us are the result of ourselves being affected by the objects, is a doctrine that we can understand so long as the ‘affecting’ is thought of as something that occurs in space and time. When the ‘affecting’ refers to the things in themselves, we no longer know what it means (Strawson 1966,41.) If Kant really claims that there are distinct things in themselves, which have a causal effect upon the subject, then he uses the concept of affection improperly. Regardless of this, there is some evidence that this is just what Kant does. Kant writes:

“And we indeed, rightly considering objects of sense as mere appearances, confess thereby that they are based upon a thing in itself, though we know not this thing as it is in itself but only know its appearances, namely, the way in which our senses are affected by this unknown something.”39

“...how things in themselves may be (without regard to representations through which they affect us) is entirely beyond our cognitive sphere.”40

Such passages support the view that, according to Kant, there are distinct things in themselves, which have a causal effect upon the subject, giving rise to its cognition (representations). This is the most obvious, and the most common-sense reading of the relation between appearances and things in themselves.

Besides these problems, I still want to refer to one specific question in Kant’s theory to which Schopenhauer pays attention to (see below, Chapter 5.4). Namely, sometimes Kant talks of things in themselves as ‘objects’, though the concept of object (Gegenstand, Objekt), when used in a non-qualified sense, is an epistemic concept, and meaningless beyond the empirical level of consideration (compare also Strawson’s note on the concept of affection). As has been seen, the epistemic nature of the concept of object is apparent in Kant’s

39 “In der Tat, wenn wir die Gegenstände der Sinne, wie billig, als bloße Erscheinungen ansehen, so gestehen wir hierdurch doch zugleich, daß ihnen ein Ding an sich selbst zum Grunde liege, ob wir dasselbe gleich nicht, wie es an sich beschaffen sei, sondern nur seine Erscheinung, d. i. die Art, wie unsere Sinne von diesem unbekannten Etwas affiziert werden, kennen.” (P, 314-315)

40 “...wie Dinge an sich selbst (ohne Rücksicht auf Vorstellungen, dadurch sie uns affizieren,) sein mögen, ist gänzlich außer unserer Erkenntnissphäre.” (KrV, A190/B235)
contention of the correlative relation of subject and object (Chapter 3). Though Kant carefully criticizes the non-valid use of the concept of subject outside of experience, he does not seem to be so careful with the concept of object. Sometimes Kant clearly speaks of things in themselves as objects. He writes:

“...the word “appearance” must already indicate a relation to something the immediate representation of which is, to be sure, sensible, but which in itself, without this constitution of our sensibility...must be something, i.e., an object independent of sensibility.”

“...all speculative a priori knowledge of which we are capable extends no farther than to objects of a possible experience, with the proviso that this field of possible experience does not encompass all things in themselves; consequently, there are other objects in addition to objects of possible experience - indeed, they are necessarily presupposed, though it is impossible for us to know the slightest thing about them.”

In these passages, Kant talks about an object independent (unabhängig) of sensibility and other (andere) objects in addition to the objects of possible experience. According to Kant, these objects are also necessarily presupposed. It is quite plausible to think, in accordance with the “two-world” interpretation, that these objects (Gegenstand) refer to the things in themselves understood as metaphysically real, independently existing objects. Possibly Kant - perhaps against his better judgment - sometimes thought of things in themselves as objects. In any case, clearly Kant was not always bothered to make it explicit that things in themselves must not be understood on the basis of our understanding of empirical objects.

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41 “...das Wort Erscheinung schon eine Beziehung auf etwas anzeigt, dessen unmittelbare Vorstellung zwar sinnlich ist, was aber an sich selbst, auch ohne diese Beschaffenheit unserer Sinnlichkeit...Etwas, d. i. ein von der Sinnlichkeit unabhängiger Gegenstand sein muß.” (KrV, A252)

42 “...alle uns mögliche speculative Erkenntis a priori nicht weiter reiche, als auf Gegenstände einer uns möglichen Erfahrung, nur mit dem Vorbehalte, daß dieses Feld möglicher Erfahrung nicht alle Dinge an sich selbst befasse, folglich allerdings noch andere Gegenstände übrig lasse, ja so gar als nothwendig voraussetze, ohne daß es uns doch möglich wäre von ihnen das mindeste bestimmt zu erkennen.” (Ak. X, 346; 106-107)

43 The idea of the things in themselves as objects does not fit with the “two-aspect” interpretation, since, as will be seen, the very method of the “two-aspect” interpretation of things in themselves consists of a certain kind of abstraction from all the epistemic properties of objects. Though the requirement of restricting the validity of epistemic properties of objects to the level of experience also holds good for the “two-world” interpretation, this requirement does not constitute its very method of considering the things in themselves. Hence, there remains a possibility to refer to the things in themselves as objects.
I now turn to the consideration of the "two-aspect" interpretation, and its efforts to correct the (alleged) problems in the “two-world” interpretation.

3.2. The “two-aspect” interpretation

According to the “two-aspect” interpretation, Kant’s distinction between appearances and things in themselves is not a metaphysical distinction between two distinct entities. Instead, it is an epistemological distinction between two ways of considering one and the same things. The distinction between appearances and things in themselves is based on thinking, on a formation of different concepts on objects. While the concept of an appearance refers to objects considered through their transcendentally constituted properties, the concept of the thing in itself refers to objects considered without these transcendentally constituted properties.

Accordingly, Allison notes that Kant’s distinction between appearances and things in themselves is between a consideration of a thing as it appears and a consideration of the same thing as it is in itself (Allison 1983, 241). Markku Leppäkoski notes in turn that the most successful way to understand Kant’s conception of objecthood/thinghood is to read him as dealing not with ontologically different kinds of things but the same things considered from different perspectives. Things in themselves are not ontologically different objects but the same objects of cognition considered as they are in themselves. Distinguishing different kinds of objects belongs merely to the language of philosophical reflection (Leppäkoski 1993, 158-159.) The general idea behind considering objects as appearances is to reveal in what respect they are constituted by the subject of cognition. Likewise, the idea behind considering objects as they are in themselves is to retain a thought that a merely subjective (that is, transcendental) point of view is not enough to reveal the real nature of objects. We can see that this kind of approach to objects as appearances and things in themselves is present in Kant’s texts. Kant writes:

"...the distinction between things as objects of experience and the very same things as things in themselves, which our critique has made necessary...”

44 "...die durch unsere Kritik notwendig gemachte Unterscheidung der Dinge als Gegenstände der Erfahrung, von eben denselben, als Dingen an sich selbst...” (KrV, B XXVII)
“…appearance…always has two sides, one where the object is considered in itself (without regard to the way in which it is to be intuited, the constitution of which however must for that very reason always remain problematic), the other where the form of the intuition of this object is considered, which must not be sought in the object in itself but in the subject to which it appears…”

“We must, with respect to the intuition of an object in space or in time, at all times make the distinction between the representation of the thing in itself and that of the same thing as appearance - although we can attribute to the former no predicates, but, as = x, can regard it only as a correlate for the pure understanding…in which concepts, not things, are contrasted with one another.”

"Yet the reservation must also be well noted, that even if we cannot cognize these same objects as things in themselves, we at least must be able to think them as things in themselves.”

With respect to the method of the consideration of things as appearances and things in themselves, Allison notes that that the relevant terms function adverbially to characterize how we consider things in transcendental reflection, not substantively to characterize what it is that is being considered or reflected upon (Allison 1983, 241). This has an echo of Gerold Prauss’s interpretation of Kant. Karl Ameriks notes that, according to Prauss, Kant’s phrase ‘thing in itself’, in its full meaning, is adverbial rather than adjectival. It is meant to designate a special way of looking at things and not to hypostatize a special kind of thing (Ameriks 2001).

45 "…Erscheinung…jederzeit zwei Seiten hat, die eine, da das Objekt an sich selbst betrachtet wird, (unangesehen der Art, dasselbe anzuschauen, dessen Beschaffenheit aber eben darum jederzeit problematisch bleibt,) die andere, da auf die Form der Anschauung dieses Gegenstandes gesehen wird, welche nicht in dem Gegenstande an sich selbst, sondern im Subjekte, dem derselbe erscheint, gesucht werden muß…” (KrV, A38/B55)

46 "Wir müssen in Ansehung der Anschauung eines Objects im Raume oder der Zeit jederzeit die Eintheilung machen zwischen der Vorstellung des Dinges an sich und der eben desselben Dinges aber als Erscheinung ob wir zwar jenem keine Prädicate behlegen kön en sondern es als = X blos als Correlatum für den reinen Verstand…betrachten wo die Begriffe nicht die Sachen gegen einander gestellt werden.” (OP, 32-33)

47 “Gleichwohl wird, welches wohl gemerkt werden muß, doch dabei immer vorbehalten, daß wir eben dieselben Gegenstände auch als Dinge an sich selbst, wenn gleich nicht erkennen, doch wenigstens müssen denken können.” (KrV, B XXVI)
In the adverbial consideration of things the concepts of an appearance and the thing in itself do not pick up some entities in the world (or grasp the substantival nature of things), but determine the way of the consideration in question - they determine the verb ‘to consider’. We consider things either with respect to the transcendental conditions of cognition or without these conditions of cognition. Though with respect to the consideration of things as appearances we may, in an empirical sense, talk of the nature and the properties of various objects/entities, with respect of the consideration of things as they are in themselves such substantival and adjectival descriptions must be omitted, or their validity must be qualified.

The consideration of things as they are in themselves may appear in various forms. In his *Kant’s Transcendental Idealism* (1983), Allison gives a description of the so-called negative knowledge of things in themselves. He notes that to consider things as appearing is to consider them in their relation to the sensible conditions under which they are given to the subject in intuition. Correlatively, to consider them as they are in themselves is to think of them apart from all reference to these conditions (Allison 1983, 240-241.) This is the simplest way to consider things as they are in themselves. Regarding the negative concept of the thing in itself it suffices to think of things merely in abstraction from their transcendentally constituted forms and properties. No thought of what might count as a contentual description of things as they are in themselves is used here. However, later, in his *Idealism and Freedom* (1996), Allison modifies his earlier account that to consider things as they are in themselves is to consider them independently of all epistemic conditions (conceptual as well as sensible) to a claim that Kant allows for a logical (as opposed to a real) use of the categories for the thought of things in general and/or as they are in themselves. This is to reflect things in a way which ignores or abstracts from the subjective conditions of human sensibility, and considers them through the mere understanding or as some pure understanding might represent them (Allison 1996, 7.) Allison refers to this kind of thinking as ‘empty’, and emphasizes that it is not to be understood as a thought of things as they “really are”. Instead, it becomes a reflection on how we are constrained to think of things, once we abstract from the sensible conditions through which they are given in experience (Allison 1996, 18-19.) It is important to note that the logical use of the categories does not determine the objective reality of objects. Objectively real description of objects can be given only through that kind of use of the categories which has a relation to intuition. This is the role of the so-called schematized

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48 Ameriks also notes that, according to Prauss, in the overwhelming majority of cases Kant uses not the mere phrase *Ding an sich* but rather *Ding an sich selbst*. He also claims that the latter should be seen as an abbreviation for *Ding an sich selbst betrachtet* (Ameriks 1982, 6).
categories, which are supposed to bring structure and determination to the otherwise undetermined manifold of intuition.\textsuperscript{49} Since ‘empty’ use of the categories has no relation to, or limitation in intuition, it does not give objective, real description of objects.

Yet ‘empty’ thinking is not supposed to be empty in the sense that the negative consideration of things as they are in themselves may be claimed to be. Instead, this kind of - what I will call - \textit{positive} consideration of the things in themselves can be thought to lean on a requirement that, in order to make intelligible the very idea of the consideration of things as they are in themselves (or the abstraction from the transcendentally constituted properties of things), this consideration still has to have some content or form. The mere negative thinking of things as they are in themselves, reduced from all the epistemic conditions of cognition, and from all the properties of objects, easily seems an empty idea. As Sebastian Gardner notes, it is not clear what significance attaches to the methodological directive to consider things in abstraction from cognition, for it is not clear why subtracting relation to cognition should be thought to leave any object of thought or reference at all to be considered (Gardner 1999, 293). It is quite reasonable to claim that thoughts always have to have some content or form. But what does this mean in respect of the logical use of the categories?

Leppäkoski notes that Kant’s theory of meaning is realistic - not verificationist (as, for example, Strawson suggests\textsuperscript{50}). Concepts may be empty outside of experience, but empty means that no matter is given to them. Their meanings remain, although they are a “mere play of imagination”. They denote logical but not real possibilities (Leppäkoski 1993,20.) It might be said that in the ‘empty’, logical use of the categories the ‘merely formal’ turns into ‘metaphysically contentual’. Though Kant denies the rationalistic idea of mere formal thinking as a way to knowledge, he retains the idea of the origin of concepts in reason, and, as such, the idea of the intelligibility and meaning of pure concepts as such.\textsuperscript{51} Hence, Kant’s ‘empty’ thinking refers to a contentual (positive and meaningful) thinking of things as they are in themselves. It refers to a metaphysically oriented, and only logically limited, thinking through pure concepts. Or, to put it another way, in contrast to the application of pure

\textsuperscript{49} Kant’s so-called transcendental deduction of the categories is aimed at giving justification for the claim that categories can have an objective, real application as determinations of objective cognition.

\textsuperscript{50} According to Strawson, Kant’s so-called principle of significance states that there can be no legitimate, or even meaningful, employment of ideas or concepts which does not relate them to empirical or experiential conditions of their application. If we use a concept in a way that we are unable to specify the kind of experience-situation to which the concept, used in that way, would apply, then we do not really know what we are saying (Strawson 1966,16.) See also above ‘objective meaning’ of concepts (p. 19, footnote 23).

\textsuperscript{51} Kant did not accept the empiricist claim that concepts acquire their meaning only though their relation to experience.
concepts to intuitions, in logical thinking, the concepts are not schematized (or interpreted) in respect of time, but they retain their metaphysical meaning (whatever that is). However, and most importantly, Kant also emphasizes that for sensible beings like us, the content of this kind of metaphysical thinking has only problematic status. It defines the way things might look from the point of view of a pure intelligible being. As Allison noted above, ‘empty’ thinking refers to the consideration of things through the mere understanding or as some pure understanding might represent them (Allison 1996,7). In the end, however, the reality of this kind of thinking always remains problematic.

In any case, both the negative and the positive versions of the “two-aspect” interpretation accept the existence of things in themselves. However, they do this differently from the “two-world” interpretation. According to Ameriks, Prauss thinks a kind of distinct sense can be given to considering objects as things in themselves. This is not to lead to a view of something that is literally a ‘non-appearance’, but simply to consider objects as something that is in some way transcendentally independent of us, and such consideration comes down to a matter of recognizing rather than cognizing objects (Ameriks 1982,7.) In this interpretation, the concept of the thing in itself refers primarily to an acknowledgment (‘recognition’) of the existence of things (objects) as they are in themselves: there is always an independent element in cognition, and the idea of the things in themselves is meant to capture a notion of this element. As Kant’s basic distinction between the receptivity and spontaneity of cognition implies: the formal structure of the world depends on the spontaneity of the subject, but there could be no structure in cognition at all, if something were not given to the subject in the first place. Accordingly, Gardner notes that we can have indeterminate (contentless) knowledge of the things in themselves. This kind of knowledge does not determine any object: we know the things in themselves only in so far as we know that something not constituted by the forms of our sensibility must occupy the conceptual space outside experience. We know of the things in themselves - of their existence - without knowing anything (synthetic) about them (Gardner 1999,281.) In other words, we recognize that our knowledge of objects (or, of the transcendental conditions of objects), does not give a full account of these objects. This leads to the realization that these objects, as they are in themselves, must have an existence in itself.52 Kant writes:

52 On a general level, this idea of the recognition of the non-transcendental element in cognition is also applicable to the “two-world” interpretation.
“…the existence of the thing that appears is…not destroyed…but it is only shown that we cannot possibly know it by the senses as it is in itself.”

“…our kind of outer as well as inner intuition, which is called sensible because it is not original, i.e., one through which the existence of the object of intuition is itself given…. rather it is dependent on the existence of the object…”

According to the “two-aspect interpretation, the recognition of the existence of things in themselves does not refer to the existence of entities distinct from empirical objects (appearances). Instead, it refers to the metaphysical aspect of the existence of one and the same objects. In line with this, Leppäkoski notes that Kantian objects seem to be both given and constituted, depending on the perspective (Leppäkoski 1993, 172). The existence of objects is given, but their form is constituted. This idea is apparent in Kant’s qualified remark of the existence of objects. Kant writes:

“…all objects of an experience possible for us…are nothing but appearances, i.e., mere representations, which, as they are represented…have outside our thoughts no existence grounded in itself.”

Leppäkoski and Allison pay attention to the fact that Kant does not claim here that objects have no independent existence (existence grounded in itself), but that such existence cannot be attributed to them “as they are represented” (Leppäkoski 1993, 165; Allison 1983, 27). It is only the transcendental aspect (form) of the existence of objects that is constituted by the subject of cognition. The existence of objects as such is independent of the subject.

I still want to consider what the ‘thing’ is that the concepts of an appearance and the thing in itself refer to. The most obvious answer is that it is an empirical object. Accordingly, Allison speaks of the two aspects of considering the spatio-temporal objects of human

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53 …die Existenz des Dinges, was erscheint, wird…nicht…aufgehoben, sondern nur gezeigt, daß wir es, wie es an sich selbst sei, durch Sinne gar nicht erkennen können.” (P, 289 )

54 “…unserer äußeren sowohl als inneren Anschauungsart…die darum sinnlich heißt, weil sie nicht ursprünglich, d. i. eine solche ist, durch die selbst das Dasein des Objekts der Anschauung gegeben wird…sonstern von dem Dasein des Objekts abhängig…” (KrV, B72)

55 “…alle Gegenstände einer uns möglichen Erfahrung…nichts als Erscheinungen, d. i. bloße Vorstellungen sind, die, so wie sie vorgestellt werden….außer unseren Gedanken keine an sich gegründete Existenz haben.” (KrV, A490-91/B518-19)
experience (Allison 1996,xv), and notes that Kant’s distinction between apperances and things in themselves is primarily between two ways in which things (empirical objects) can be considered (1996,3). Gardner in turn refers to the two ways of conceiving objects, which we identify as composing a single, empirical world (Gardner 1999,290). However, there is one terminological problem here: the concept of an aspect seems to imply that there is something of which an aspect is an aspect of and that this something must be distinct from the aspect itself. If we now say that appearance is an aspect of an empirical object, and recognize that the concept of appearance refers to empirical objects considered through their transcendentally constituted properties, then we must recognize that the concepts of appearance and empirical object are (more or less) identical. This is, at least, how Kant uses these terms. But in this case, appearance would be an aspect of itself, which is not acceptable. Is this a serious problem to the “two-aspect” interpretation, or can we get out of it?

Gerd Buchdahl notes that it is important not to confuse the ‘sensory object’ with the ‘appearance’ - even if Kant frequently employs the same term ‘appearance’ for denoting either of these concepts – since ‘appearance’ presupposes a certain interpretation of the world of things or objects in general (Buchdahl 1989, 220). In other words, if it is recognized that the concept of an appearance, as well as the concept of the thing in itself, belongs to the different level of consideration than the concept of an empirical object - that is, to the metalevel interpretation of empirical objects – then it may be said that it is empirical objects which are being considered from two points of view. There are, first, objects in an everyday sense, and second, philosophical, metalevel descriptions of these objects as ‘appearances’ and ‘things in themselves’. As Allison notes, Kant’s distinction between appearances and things in themselves is a distinction made on the metalevel of philosophical reflection (Allison 1996,3). Only when we leave our everyday point of view to empirical objects and reach the level of philosophical reflection can we make the distinction between appearances and the things in themselves. In this case, there is no problem in talking about ‘aspects’ of empirical objects.

Or, alternatively, the problem of speaking of ‘aspects’ may be solved by thinking that it should be understood merely metaphorically. In this case, the concept of the thing in itself refers (problematically) to the unknown thing as it is in itself, which (the same thing) also

56 Buchdahl presents a very sublime theory of Kant’s various metalevel notions of the ‘thing’ (object). For the present purposes suffice it to note that, according to Buchdahl, the starting point of all of these notions is the consideration of ‘sensory objects’ or ‘objects of the senses’ (empirical objects), and that ‘appearances’ and ‘the things in themselves’ are included among these notions (Buchdahl 1989.)
appears to us in a certain manner (that is, as an appearance). This kind of metaphorical interpretation is not concerned about the above-mentioned terminological requirement of individuating some third thing, or the third manner of description, of which the two aspects would be aspects of.\(^{57}\)

In any case, Allison proposes yet another solution to this problem.\(^{58}\) Parallel to my above consideration of the concept of an appearance, Allison notes that the required thing cannot be the thing as it is in itself, since “as it is in itself” is one of the ways of considering the thing. On this basis, he claims that the resources of the Critique of Pure Reason can provide only one conceivable answer: the thing must be characterized as a “transcendental object = x". The transcendental object can act as the required thing, since it is distinguished both from the concept of an appearance and the concept of the thing considered as it is in itself. According to Allison, the thing in itself simpliciter is that which for us (as finite discursive intellects) can be thought of merely as a transcendental object = x, and the thing considered as it is in itself is that which is thought through pure categories (see above: the positive consideration). The basic difference between the concepts of the transcendental object and the thing considered as it is in itself is that the former must be characterized as “ = x” because it remains inaccessible to all of the resources of a discursive intellect, while the latter, as involving independence merely from sensible conditions, can at least be thought of problematically (Allison 1996,16.) In other words, remaining distinct both from the appearance and the thing considered (positively) as it is in itself, the transcendental object, as a mere negative thought of the thing in itself (simpliciter), is able to function as the thing that we can have two aspects of.\(^ {59}\)

In conclusion, the main advantage of the “two-aspect” interpretation compared to the “two-world” interpretation is that it allows Kant to be seen as a more consistent thinker (depriving Kant, for example, of the idea of independently existing things in themselves). But how does the "two-aspect" interpretation deal with the problem of affection?

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\(^{57}\) I am grateful to Heikki Kannisto for pointing out the possibility of this kind of interpretation.

\(^{58}\) In this connection, Allison notes that, to his knowledge, Kant never addressed the problem discussed here explicitly (Allison 1996,16).

\(^{59}\) Elsewhere Allison gives the transcendental object a role, which seems to be in a contradiction with his determination of it merely as a non-discursive thought of x (see next Chapter 3.2.1).
3.2.1 The material basis of experience (the problem of affection)

In the “two-aspect” interpretation, the idea of affection by the things in themselves cannot be understood as a causal affection by independently existing metaphysical entities. This approach is precluded by the claim that the concepts of an appearance and the thing in itself refer to one and the same objects. How then should the question of metaphysical affection be understood?

To start with, the "two-aspect" interpretation admits an empirical affection between empirical objects. There is no problem in asserting a causal relation between, for example, a corporeal object (say, a table) and an empirical subject. As far as we remain on the level of experience, we can use epistemic concepts (like ‘causality’) in order to explain the relations between empirical objects. The following passage from Kant may be read as positing a causal relation between an empirical object and (see below: the empirical or transcendental) subject:

“...intuition...takes place only insofar as the object is given to us; but this in turn, is possible...only if it affects the mind in a certain way. The capacity (receptivity) to acquire representations through the way in which we are affected by objects is called sensibility.”

This passage is not problematic if the concept of an object (Gegenstand) refers here to an empirical object. In this case, Kant does not posit a causal relation between the things in themselves and the subject of cognition, but refers to a causal relationship between empirical objects and the subject of cognition. This subject may be understood from different points of view. It may be conceived as an empirical subject, in which case the consideration of the constitutive role of the subject is more of a scientific (for example, physiological) rather than a philosophical matter. Alternatively, the subject may be conceived as the transcendental subject (transzendentales Subjekt), in which case it is understood as an a priori condition of cognition.

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60 “...Anschauung...findet aber nur statt, sofern uns der Gegenstand gegeben wird; dieses aber ist wiederum...nur dadurch möglich, daß er das Gemüt auf gewisse Weise affiziere. Die Fähigkeit (Rezeptivität), Vorstellungen durch die Art, wie wir von Gegenständen affiziert werden, zu bekommen, heißt Sinnlichkeit.” (KrV, A19/B33)
But how does the "two-aspect" interpretation deal with those passages, where Kant straightforwardly speaks of the things in themselves which affect a subject. Earlier (p. 25), I took two excerpts from Kant’s texts:

“And we indeed, rightly considering objects of sense as mere appearances, confess thereby that they are based upon a thing in itself, though we know not this thing as it is in itself but only know its appearances, namely, the way in which our senses are affected by this unknown something.”

“...how things in themselves may be (without regard to representations through which they affect us) is entirely beyond our cognitive sphere.”

According to the “two-aspect” interpretation, we must refrain from the first-hand, empirically minded understanding of the problem of affection, and approach it from another point of view. We must move into a qualified understanding of Kant’s reference to things in themselves as the cause of sensations and cognition. Kant’s concept of the transcendental object (transzendentales Objekt) is important in this respect. In the Critique of Pure Reason the ‘transcendental object’ is determined in the following manner:

“The non-sensible cause of these representations is entirely unknown to us, and therefore we cannot intuit it as an object; for such an object would have to be represented neither in space nor in time (as mere conditions of our sensible representation), without which conditions we cannot think any intuition. Meanwhile we can call the merely intelligible cause of appearances in general the transcendental object, merely so that we may have something corresponding to sensibility as a receptivity.”

61 “In der Tat, wenn wir die Gegenstände der Sinne, wie billig, als bloße Erscheinungen ansehen, so gestehen wir hierdurch doch zugleich, daß ihnen ein Ding an sich selbst zum Grunde liege, ob wir dasselbe gleich nicht, wie es an sich beschaffen sei, sondern nur seine Erscheinung, d. i. die Art, wie unsere Sinne von diesem unbekannten Etwas affiziert werden, kennen.” (P, 314-315)

62 “...wie Dinge an sich selbst (ohne Rücksicht auf Vorstellungen, dadurch sie uns affizieren,) sein mögen, ist gänzlich außer unserer Erkenntnisphäre.” (KrV, A190/B235)

63 “Die nichtsinnliche Ursache dieser Vorstellungen ist uns gänzlich unbekannt, und diese können wir daher nicht als Objekt anschauen; denn dergleichen Gegenstand würde weder im Raume, noch der Zeit (als bloßen Bedingungen der sinnlichen Vorstellung) vorgestellt werden müssen, ohne welche Bedingungen wir uns gar keine Anschauung denken können. Indessen können wir die bloß intelligible Ursache der Erscheinungen
Allison notes that here Kant’s phrase “appearances in general” underscores the transcendental nature of the account. It makes it clear that the concern is not with the cause of a given appearance, which is always an empirical matter (see above: empirical objects), but rather with the cause or ground of the “matter” of human knowledge taken as a whole (the sensible manifold). Kant characterizes this cause as “non-sensible” and hence “unknowable” precisely because it must not be represented as being in either space or time (Allison 1983, 251-252.) Since the transcendental object is “the merely intelligible cause of appearances” it must not be understood within empirical way of thinking. As a non-sensible cause of representations it is not subject to the conditions of sensible representations (for example, time and space), but refers to the non-sensible, intelligible (thinkable) cause in general. As Kant's general idea of sensibility suggests: human cognition is always cognition of "something" but we are not capable of knowing this "something" as such (compare above: the recognition of the existence of the things in themselves, p. 31). As a necessary correlate for the receptivity of cognition (sensibility), the transcendental object refers to this "something". It refers to the general idea that our knowledge of empirical objects does not explain the metaphysical basis of these objects. Empirically, with regard to our individual representations, we may always refer to some individual empirical object as the cause of our representations. Metaphysically, with regard to a metaphysical understanding of the empirical affection by empirical objects, we must refer to the transcendental object as the basis of affection in general.64

Taken by themselves, such descriptions of the cause of appearances would adjust to the “two-world” interpretation as well. It is quite intelligible to talk about a non-sensible cause or even an unknowable cause in general also with respect to the “two-world” interpretation. However, from the “two-aspect” point of view, the emphasis on the ‘non-sensible’ and ‘general’ nature of the cause of appearances is meant to retract thoughts from any empirical analogies in thinking of the affection by the things in themselves. This idea is further enforced by evincing the concept of ground (Grund) by the side of the concept of cause (see below). All this prepares the transformation of an empirical, determinate understanding of the cause of appearances into a non-determinate, metaphysical understanding of it. And, as has been seen, Allison thinks that the concept of the

überhaupt, das transzendentale Objekt nennen, bloß, damit wir etwas haben, was der Sinnlichkeit als einer Rezeptivität korrespondiert.” (KrV, A 494/B 522)

64 These remarks have a connection to Kant's distinction between two senses of the concept of reality. As the category of understanding, the concept of reality refers to the empirical reality of experience. In its extra-categorical and problematic use, the concept of reality refers to that "something" which grounds all experience.
transcendental object is appropriate for this job (Allison 1983, 250-252). However, in this respect, it must be noted that Allison’s earlier claim that the transcendental object is inaccessible to all of the resources of a discursive intellect (p. 34) contradicts his claim that the transcendental object is the purely intelligible cause of appearance in general (Allison 1983, 251). If Kant’s concept of intelligible is understood to refer generally to something thinkable, then the concept of the transcendental object has its origin in the subject’s intellectual capacity to think. Moreover, in his determination of the ‘transcendental object’ through the concept of a cause (Ursache), Kant uses a concept which has its origin in a discursive intellect.65 On this basis, contrary to Allison, I suggest that when Kant refers to the idea of the metaphysical ground of appearances, he does not make a specific distinction between the concepts of the transcendental object and the thing in itself, but uses both in the same sense.66

Before closing this chapter, I still want to consider more closely the question of the matter of experience - sensation (Empfindung), impression (Eindruck), or matter (Stoff). Like the question of affection, this question also allows two points of view. On the other hand, the matter of experience can be considered with respect to the empirical way of thinking. In this case, it is empirical objects which give matter to the subject of cognition. On the other hand, there is a metaphysical point of view of the (same) matter of experience. Allison notes that Kant makes a distinction between the matter of sensible representation and its ground (or ‘transcendental matter’). The point of Kant’s distinction between ‘ground’ and ‘matter’ is to indicate the supersensible nature of the former, in contrast to the sensible nature of the latter. The reason for characterizing the ground as supersensible is its nonrepresentability in space and time. Moreover, as supersensible, Kant naturally assigns this ground to objects as things in themselves (Allison 1983, 253-254.) Kant’s note on matter (Stoff) may be read on this basis. Kant writes:

“...the Critique...places this ground of the matter of sensible representations not itself again in things as objects of the senses, but in something super-sensible, which grounds the sensible representations, and of which we can have no knowledge. It says:

65 Allison’s idea of the transcendental object as the intelligible cause of appearances is from his Kant’s Transcendental Idealism (1983), while his claim that the transcendental object is inaccessible to all of the resources of a discursive intellect is from his Idealism and Freedom (1996). In this later work, Allison does not pay attention to the contradiction between these two contentions.

66 I am grateful to Heikki Kannisto for pointing out these problems in Allison’s conceptions on the ‘transcendental object’.
the objects as things in themselves give the matter to empirical intuition (they contain
the ground of the determination of the faculty of representation in accordance with its
sensibility), but they are not the matter of these intuitions.\textsuperscript{67}

Here Kant's idea that things in themselves “give the matter to empirical intuition” or “contain
the ground of the determination of the faculty of . . . sensibility” may, once again, be read as
referring to the idea that human sensibility requires something – that is, matter - that is given
to it. However, this presupposition of the ‘ground’ of the matter of experience does not refer
to anything that is capable of becoming knowledge. Instead, it evinces the idea that we cannot
but think that empirical matter also has a metaphysical ground. In accordance with this view,
Gardner notes that to say that sensation arises through our being affected by the things in
themselves is to say that it is the immediate subjective, precognitive expression or
manifestation of the subject’s relation to what is transcendentally outside it. It is part of the
concept of sensation in transcendental discourse that sensation is the product of our being
affected by the things in themselves (Gardner 1999, 288.) In other words, we may
indeterminately refer to the metaphysical basis of the matter of experience (that is, to the
‘ground’ of experience), but we can know it only through our sensible mode and manner of
perceiving it (as the ‘matter’ of experience). The idea of the metaphysical ground of the
matter of experience refers to the "ultimate" fact that something is given to us.

It has now been seen that in the “two-aspect” interpretation the meaning of the
concepts like the thing in itself, affection, matter, cause, and ground is extended beyond their
theoretical (objective) meaning. If these concepts are understood in the qualified sense
considered above, the earlier passages from Kant (p. 36) may be read accordingly. It may be
claimed that, in these passages, Kant’s reference to affection by the things in themselves
denotes to the idea of a common, non-determinate ground of cognition in general, or to a
metaphysical understanding of empirical affection (not to the idea of distinct things in
themselves, with a causal effect upon the subject of cognition). Though this reading is open,
for example, to the criticism that the meanings of Kant’s concepts are extended in a non-valid
way (beyond their “proper” theoretical meaning), the basic idea behind the “two-aspect”

\textsuperscript{67} “...der Kritik...diesen Grund des Stoffes sinnlicher Vorstellungen nicht selbst wiederum in Dingen, als
Gegenständen der Sinne, sondern in etwas Übersinnlichen fehlt, was jenen zum Grunde liegt und wovon wir kein
Erkenntnis haben können. Sie sagt: Die Gegenstände als Dinge an sich geben den Stoff zu empirischen
Anschauungen (sie enthalten den Grund, das Vorstellungsvermögen seiner Sinnlichkeit gemäß zu bestimmen),
aber sie sind nicht der Stoff derselben.” (UE, 215)
interpretation is quite intelligible. In brief, it states that Kant has two conceptions of causality and the matter of experience: empirical and metaphysical. They differ in their application, but have a common point of reference: the idea of grounding a subject's cognition of empirical objects. This gives rise to an interplay of two different, but not mutually exclusive, points of view.

I now approach the main topic of the study: the examination of Schopenhauer’s idealism in its relation to Kant. I will start by studying Schopenhauer's contention of the constitution and nature of human cognition.
4. Schopenhauer’s theory of cognition

I will argue that Schopenhauer has a transcendental-philosophical theory of cognition. Schopenhauer makes a distinction between the matter and the form of cognition (which differentiates his position from material idealism), and pays attention to those transcendental conditions of cognition which set constraints on our knowledge. While I leave the specific study of these questions to the later sections of this chapter, I want to start by making a few general points on Schopenhauer’s understanding of transcendental philosophy, and the distinction between appearances and the thing in itself.

Like Kant, Schopenhauer understands the meaning of the concept of transcendental, as well as transcendental idealism, on the basis of the subjective constraints on knowledge. In speaking of the conditions and limitations of questions raised to human brain-consciousness\(^68\) (for example, questions concerning the beginning and end of the world) (P1,106-107;83-84), Schopenhauer writes:

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\text{“…a philosophy that brings to distinct consciousness all these conditions and limitations as such, is transcendental and, in so far as it vindicates for the subject the universal fundamental determinations of the objective world, it is \textit{transcendental idealism}.”}\quad (P1, 107;84)
\]

Moreover, transcendental philosophy is described as

\[
\text{“…a philosophy that starts from the fact that its nearest and immediate object is not things, but only man’s \textit{consciousness} thereof, which should, therefore, never be left out of account.”}\quad (P2, 16;9)
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\(^68\) As will be seen (Chapter 6.2), Schopenhauer identifies the transcendental forms of cognition with brain phenomena. Hence, his references to brain as the condition of cognition can be read as references to the transcendental conditions of cognition. This naturalization of the transcendental forms of cognition will be discussed in Chapter 6.2.

\(^69\) “Eine Philosophie…welche alle diese Bedingungen und Beschränkungen \textit{als solche} zum deutlichen Bewußtsein bringt, ist \textit{transzendent}, und, sofern sie die allgemeinen Grundbestimmungen der objektiven Welt dem Subjekt vindiziert, ist sie \textit{transzendentaler Idealismus}.” (P1, 107;84)

\(^70\) “…Philosophie, welche davon ausgeht, daß ihr nächster und unmittelbarer Gegenstand nicht die Dinge seien, sondern allein das menschliche \textit{Bewußtsein} von den Dingen, welches daher nirgends außer Acht und Rechnung gelassen werden dürfte.” (P2, 16;9)
According to Schopenhauer, the essence of transcendental idealism lies in this recognition of the subjective nature of cognition, which again results in the distinction between appearances and the thing in itself. Schopenhauer notes that transcendental idealism differs from so-called rationalism, and dogmatism, which refer to an objective source of knowledge (on the one-sidedly objective philosophy, see Chapter 4.4) and do not recognize the subject’s role in cognition. In transcendental philosophy, the objective point of view arrives at the knowledge that its organon grasps only the appearance, but does not reach the ultimate, inner, and original essence of things (P2, 16;9.) According to Schopenhauer this is the fundamental characteristic of Kantian philosophy - the distinction of the appearance from the thing in itself, and hence the doctrine of the complete diversity of the ideal from the real (W1, 566;418).

However, Schopenhauer’s descriptions of the distinction between appearances and the thing in itself seem, at first sight, somewhat puzzling with respect to Kant. Namely, Schopenhauer holds that in this distinction Kant propounded (originally and in an entirely new way) the same truth, which Plato expresses in his example of the dark cave: that the world that appears to the senses has no true being, but only a ceaseless becoming. Its comprehension is not so much knowledge as an illusion (Wahn). Schopenhauer finds this same thought in the doctrine of Maya of the Vedas and Puranas. According to Schopenhauer, this visible world (in which we are) is the work of Maya, a magic effect called into being, an unstable and inconstant illusion (Schein) without substance, comparable to the optical illusion (Illusion) and the dream (W1, 566-567;419.) Such passages suggest that, contrary to Kant, Schopenhauer wants to emphasize the illusory nature of the phenomenal world. However, on some other occasions, Schopenhauer clearly accepts Kant’s claim of a specific kind of reality of the phenomenal world. Like Kant, Schopenhauer identifies transcendental ideality with empirical reality (for example, in W1, 32;4). According to Schopenhauer, real objects (reale Objekte) are representations, which are united to form the complex of empirical reality, such reality in itself always remaining ideal (vW, 48;52). This empirically real world is not reduced to illusion but is as real as it seems. Schopenhauer writes:

“…the perceived world in space and time…is perfectly real, and is absolutely what it appears to be….The whole world of objects is and remains representation, and is for this reason wholly and for ever conditioned by the subject; in other words, it has transcendental ideality. But it is not on that account falsehood or illusion; it presents
I suggest that, in order to attain a clearer understanding of Schopenhauer’s contention of the illusionary/real nature of the phenomenal world, we have to acknowledge that Schopenhauer uses the concept of illusion (Wahn, Schein, Illusion) in two senses. First, he uses it in contrast to the thing in itself. The phenomenal world differs from the thing in itself in being partly - that is, formally - constituted by the subject of cognition. In this respect, there is a certain kind of “illusionary” element in the phenomenal world. Though, most likely, Kant would not have used the word ‘illusion’ in this sense, in principle, this kind of understanding of illusion does not contradict Kantian transcendental idealism. It makes sense to speak of the ‘relatively illusionary nature’ of the phenomenal world with respect to the thing in itself. Second, Schopenhauer uses the concept of illusion in the meaning of something like hallucination, or cognition empty of all the lawfulness and determinacy of the empirical world. In this sense, Schopenhauer does not regard the phenomenal world as an illusion. Instead, he accepts Kant’s claim that the acknowledgment of the ideality of the empirical world does not interfere with our common way of understanding the world (as the real world), it only modifies our philosophical point of view to this world. The common, and scientific, understanding of the world is left to stand as it is.

In order to attain a more exhaustive conception of Schopenhauer’s transcendental-philosophical approach to human cognition attention must be paid on the specifics of his theory. The basis of Schopenhauer’s theoretical philosophy is given in his ingenious interpretation of the principle of sufficient reason.

4.1 The principle of sufficient reason

Schopenhauer’s early dissertation On the Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason (1813) includes both a historical survey of the principle of sufficient reason (Satz vom zureichenden Grunde), and an introduction to a new, allegedly genuine, understanding of it –

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71 “…ist…die angeschaute Welt in Raum und Zeit…vollkommen real und ist durchaus das, wofür sie sich gibt…Die ganze Welt der Objekte ist und bleibt Vorstellung und eben deswegen durchaus und in alle Ewigkeit durch das Subjekt bedingt: d.h. sie hat transzendentale Idealität. Sie ist aber dieserwegen nicht Lüge noch Schein: sie gibt sich als das, was sie ist: als Vorstellung, und zwar als eine Reihe von Vorstellungen, deren gemeinschaftliches Band der Satz vom Grunde ist.” (W 1, 45-46;14-15)
or, more exactly, what Schopenhauer subsumes under that title.\textsuperscript{72} As will be seen, Schopenhauer’s definition and application of the principle of sufficient reason differ notably from the previous (rationalistic) understanding of it, and has an interesting relation to Kant’s transcendental theory of cognition. Contrary to all previous use, Schopenhauer refers with the concept of the principle of sufficient reason to the Kantian transcendental faculties of cognition – that is, intuition, understanding, and reason. This modification in the understanding of the principle of sufficient reason is based on Schopenhauer’s idea that the content of Kant’s faculties of cognition may be formulated with respect to the traditional expression of the principle of sufficient reason: “Nothing is without a reason why it is.”\textsuperscript{73}

According to Schopenhauer, Kant’s laws and principles of the faculties of cognition provide answers to different questions concerning the reason of something. The forms of intuition (space and time) make up the framework in which the reason for a specific part of space or a specific moment in time may be stated. The category of causality (understanding) sets up a condition for the reason (cause) of the changes in objects, as well as for the reason of individual human actions. Finally, the logical forms of all thought determine the framework in which the reason for the truth of a judgment may be asked and answered.\textsuperscript{74} Hence, Schopenhauer includes all the modes of human intellect and thinking under the concept of the principle of sufficient reason. Due to this specific understanding of the principle of sufficient reason, I will not focus my attention to the traditional understanding of it. Instead, I will concentrate on Schopenhauer’s modification of this principle, especially on its nature and validity as an explanatory principle. In this respect, I will pay attention to two aspects in Schopenhauer’s account: 1) the transcendental nature of the principle, 2) the division of the principle in four forms.

An understanding of Schopenhauer’s transcendental-philosophical account of the principle of sufficient reason requires a quick look at the rationalistic understanding of metaphysics, as well as Kant’s criticism of it. Rationalistic philosophers claimed that it is possible to have metaphysical knowledge of the world. The general idea behind rationalism was that things and the relations between things in the world have a rational structure. It was

\textsuperscript{72} Schopenhauer notes that his treatment of the principle of sufficient reason forms the presupposition of his whole philosophy (W1, 9;xiv).

\textsuperscript{73} Schopenhauer refers to Wolff’s formulation of this principle: “Nihil est sine ratione, cur potius sit quam non sit.” (vW, 15;6), “Nothing is without a reason why it is rather than is not” (translation on a footnote, p. 7).

\textsuperscript{74} In other words, the principle of sufficient reason sets forth various ways to ask “Why?” According to Schopenhauer, this is the basic question of all sciences (vW, 14-15;5-6 ).
also held that, as rational beings, we are in a position to have knowledge of this rational structure, or content, of the world. We have *a priori* knowledge of the general essences, properties and relations of things. The rationalistic method of acquiring knowledge of the world started from an insight into clear and distinct ideas, which provided an opportunity to determine the basic concepts of philosophy. Once the basic concepts of metaphysics were settled, it was possible to deduce truths concerning the world. This deduction was analytical: on the basis of knowledge of the essence and content of metaphysical concepts, it was possible, by using the valid principles of reason, to deduce what belongs to these concepts. For example, on the basis of the clear and distinct idea of God (the most perfect being), it was deduced that the concept of existence belongs to the concept of God. This so-called ontological proof of the existence of God was an analytic proof based on the analysis of the content of concepts. Accordingly, Leppäkoski notes that for rationalists philosophy and science were possible totally *a priori*, dealing with concepts only. If we knew concepts completely everything would turn out to be analytic because we knew the essences (Leppäkoski 1993,39.) Contrary to this rationalistic approach, Kant claimed that all our concepts, as well as the laws and principles of explanation (such as the principle of sufficient reason) have objective validity only on the phenomenal level of consideration. Kant did not accept the rationalistic idea of an apriori access to the metaphysical level of the world. Instead, he claimed that, up to his time, the procedure of rational metaphysics had been a mere groping, and what is worst, a groping among mere concepts (KrV, B xv). In place of this groping Kant brought his new method of metaphysics.

Kant’s new method is apparent in his distinction between analytic and synthetic judgments. According to Kant, analytic judgments are judgments which express nothing in the predicate but what has been already thought in the concept of the subject (though not so distinctly or with the same consciousness). Contrary to this, synthetic judgments are judgments which contain in their predicate something not thought in the concept of the subject (P, 266-267.) These determinations of analytic and synthetic judgments form the basis of Kant’s critique of rationalistic metaphysics. Being based on the analysis of concepts, rationalistic metaphysical judgments turned out to be analytic in the Kantian sense. However, contrary to rationalists, Kant maintained that we cannot have an apriori insight into the content and essence of metaphysical concepts. This has the most important result: if we do not have knowledge of the content of the basic concepts of metaphysics, then we cannot

75 Besides the fundamental principle of sufficient reason, the valid principles of reason included the principle of identity, and the principle of contradiction.
analyse these concepts either. Hence, since the analysis of the metaphysical concepts cannot begin in the first place, the rationalistic metaphysical judgments (based on these concepts) cannot be analytic. Instead, in Kant’s view, they are synthetic judgments based not on the analysis of the clear and distinct ideas but on the combination of separate and individual concepts. For example, in the judgment “Every event has a cause” the predicate (cause) does not belong to the subject (event), but is combined to it synthetically. Kant emphasized that, in order to acquire objective reality (instead of being mere fantasies of the imagination), all synthetic judgments need some kind of support from experience. The nature of this support varies in respect of different kinds of synthetic judgments. In respect of empirical judgments, we need empirical intuition or experience. In respect of mathematical judgments, we need pure intuition (the forms of space and time). In respect of transcendental judgments (like “Every event has a cause”), we need justification of these judgments with respect to some fact of experience, or with some other transcendental concept (Kant’s transcendental argumentation). In some way, we have to back up the objective reality of synthetic judgments.

Schopenhauer accepts Kant’s critique of rationalistic metaphysics. He notes that before Kant all Western philosophers had imagined that the laws according to which phenomena are connected to one another, and which are now comprehended under the concept of the principle of sufficient reason (time and space, causality and inference), were absolute laws conditioned by nothing at all, *aeternae veritates* (W1, 568;420). Contrary to this, and in accordance with Kant, Schopenhauer maintains that the laws of the intellect are not at the same time the laws of the world, but only of the subject’s modes of cognizing the world. Hence, philosophy must not start from metaphysics, but from the investigation of the origin and nature of knowledge, or, as I will call it, epistemology. Schopenhauer writes:

“…every philosophy has to begin with an investigation of the faculty of knowledge, its forms and laws, and also the validity and limits thereof. Accordingly, such an investigation will be ‘philosophia prima’….Now this general part at the same time embraces or rather replaces what was formerly called *ontology* and was put forward as the doctrine of the most universal and essential properties and qualities of things in general and as such. For one regarded as the properties of things in themselves that

76 Analytic judgments need support only from the logical laws of thought.
which belongs to them only in consequence of the form and nature of our representation-faculty…” 77

In this new approach, ‘knowledge *a priori*’ does not refer to metaphysical knowledge of the rational structure of the world, but to knowledge of the subject’s transcendental faculties of cognition. Accordingly, Schopenhauer notes that ‘knowledge *a priori*’ (‘Erkenntnisse *a priori*’) and ‘the intellect’s own forms’ (‘die selbsteigene Formen des Intellekts’) are fundamentally two expressions for the same thing, and so are, to a certain extent, synonyms (W1,590;438). This what might be called an epistemological turn is also apparent in Schopenhauer’s emphasis on the importance of the investigation of the origin of concepts. Schopenhauer refers approvingly to John Locke (1632-1704), who, according to him, propounded a doctrine that a philosopher who wants to deduce or demonstrate anything from concepts has first to investigate the origin of these concepts, since their content and what may follow therefrom are determined entirely by their origin, as the source of all knowledge that is attainable by means of them (P1, 91;70). Schopenhauer holds that the origin of (almost all 78) concepts is phenomenal - either transcendental or empirical (see more below, Chapters 4.6 and 6.1). Due to this, they cannot give us an access to the world as it is in itself.

The outcome of Schopenhauer’s transcendental epistemology is his classification of the four classes of objects, each of which has a relation to one form of the principle of sufficient reason. In each class of objects, there is one specific way of conceiving the question of the reason of some fact/thing/object. 79 First, there are *empirical objects* – also referred to as real (*reale*) objects (see for example vW, 48;53). Schopenhauer’s full determination of

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77 “…hat jede Philosophie anzuheben mit Untersuchung des Erkenntnisvermögens, seiner Formen und Gesetze, wie auch der Gültigkeit und der Schranken derselben. Eine solche Untersuchung wird demnach ‘philosophia prima’...sein...Dieser allgemeine Teil nun begreift oder vielmehr vertritt zugleich das, was man früher *Ontologie* nannte und als die Lehre von den allgemeinsten und wesentlichen Eigenschaften der Dinge überhaupt und als solcher aufstellte; indem man für Eigenschaften der Dinge an sich selbst hielt, was nur infolge der Form und Natur unsers Vorstellungsvermögens ihnen zukommt...” (P2, 26;18)

78 This allows one exception, the concept of will (*Wille*). See below p. 75.

79 In finding that there are exactly four forms of the principle of sufficient reason Schopenhauer refers to the transcendental laws of homogeneity and specification (vW, 11;1). According to Hamlyn, these laws are at best methodological or heuristic principles. They will find an application only to the extent that the subject-matter admits (Hamlyn 1985, 13.) Hence the laws of homogeneity and specification differ from the four forms of the principle of sufficient reason in not being constitutive principles of cognition. In the following, I will present the four roots of the principle of sufficient reason in that order which Schopenhauer follows in the *Fourfold Root*. Schopenhauer notes that this is not a systematic arrangement, but chosen for the sake of clarity, in order to present first that which is better known and least presupposes the rest (vW, 178;221).
these objects is “…perceptive, complete, empirical representations.” These objects are perceptive as opposed to concepts, which are abstract representations. They are complete since they contain both the formal and the material element of cognition. They are empirical insofar as they have their origin in sensation, and since they are connected by the laws of space, time and causality to a complex that constitutes the empirical reality of the world (vW, 42;45.) The form of the principle of sufficient reason ruling in this class of objects is the principle of sufficient reason of becoming (Satz vom zureichenden Grunde des Werdens) (vW, 48;53). As will be seen in the next chapter (4.2), the principle of sufficient reason of becoming is identified with the principle of causality, which (principle), according to Schopenhauer, determines the changes (of states) in objects. Schopenhauer holds that the reason for the existence of a new state of an object is found, according to the principle of causality, in some state that precedes it. This appearance of the new state of an object is then called change (Veränderung) (vW, 48;53.) Hence, the principle of sufficient reason of becoming (the law of causality) expresses the way that a human intellect conceives the reason/ground - in this case, cause (Ursache) - of a change in an empirical object.

Second, there are concepts (Begriffe), which, according to Schopenhauer, are representations of the first class of objects, that is, of empirical objects (vW,120;145). The form of the principle of sufficient reason ruling here is the principle of sufficient reason of knowing (Satz vom zureichenden Grunde des Erkennens), whose function is to express a piece of knowledge (Erkenntnis) by determining the truth (Wahrheit) of a judgment, which (judgment), according to Schopenhauer, is a combination of concepts under various restrictions and modifications (vW,129;156). Schopenhauer holds that the ground (Grund) of the truth of a judgment can be divided into four kinds (vW,129;157). First, a judgment may have its ground in another judgment(s), as in syllogisms. This truth is then called logical or formal truth (vW, 129-130;157-158.) For example, the judgment “Socrates is mortal” may logically be derived from the judgments “All men are mortal” and “Socrates is a man” (F.C. White 1992,70, footnote). Second, a judgment may have its ground in experience (the first class of objects), which then has material truth. Moreover, when a judgment is founded

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80 “…anschaulichen, vollständigen, empirischen Vorstellungen.” (vW, 42;45)

81 Schopenhauer notes that whether a judgment, whose truth is logical, has also material truth (see below) remains undecided and depends on whether the judgment supporting it has material truth, or whether the series of judgments, on which this judgment is based, leads back to one that has material truth (vW,129-130;157). Seemingly Schopenhauer does not here clearly separate the validity of a deduction from the truth-value of the conclusion. That is, if a judgment is correctly deduced from materially false premises, the deduction is logically valid, but the conclusion has the truth-value ‘false’. From this point of view, it would be advisable for Schopenhauer, in the above, to speak not of the logical truth of the judgment but of the validity of the deduction.
directly on experience, it is empirical truth (vW, 131;159.) For example, a judgment “This horse is white” is, on the proper conditions, a material, empirical truth. Third, a judgment may have its ground in some transcendental principle (the forms of space and time, and the law of causality). For example, the ground of the truth of a judgment “Nothing happens without a cause” is the transcendental law of causality. In this case, it is a question of transcendental truth (vW, 131-132;160.) Fourth, a judgment may have its ground in the formal conditions of all thought. According to Schopenhauer, there are only four judgments, which are the expression of these conditions of thought and therefore have these as their ground: 1) A subject is equal to the sum of its predicates, or \( a = a \), 2) No predicate can be simultaneously attributed and denied to a subject, or \( a = -a = 0 \), 3) Of every two contradictorily opposite predicates one must belong to every subject, 4) Truth is the reference of a judgment to something outside it as its sufficient reason. These four cases are metalogical truths (vW, 132-133;161-162.)

In sum, the principle of sufficient reason expresses the four different ways in which a human intellect conceives the reason/ground of the truth of a judgment.

Third, there are intuitions of space and time. The form of the principle of sufficient reason ruling here is the principle of sufficient reason of being (Satz vom zureichenden Grunde des Seins), which is the law whereby the parts of space and time determine one another as regards their relations (vW, 157-158;193-194.) On the side of the principle of sufficient reason of becoming (the law of causality), the principle of sufficient reason of being (space and time as its forms) acts as a transcendental condition of empirical cognition, that is, of the first class of objects. Moreover, the principle of sufficient reason of being forms the basis of geometry and arithmetic. Following Kant, Schopenhauer holds that geometry is a science concerning the relations of the parts of space, and arithmetic is a science concerning the relations of the moments in time (vW, 160;197-198). According to the principle of sufficient reason of being, the reason for a specific part of space or a specific moment in time is another part of space or another moment in time. Hence, this principle expresses how a human intellect conceives the reason/ground of a part of space or a moment in time.

Fourth, as the immediate object of the subject’s inner sense, there is the subject of willing (vW, 168;207). The form of the principle of sufficient reason ruling here is the

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82 According to Schopenhauer, the four judgments of metalogical truth form the basis of logical truth (see above). In this case, Schopenhauer talks about the principle of identity, the principle of contradiction, the principle of excluded middle, and the principle of sufficient reason of knowing itself (vW,130-131;158 ).
principle of sufficient reason of acting (*Satz vom zureichenden Grunde des Handels*) (vW, 173;214). This principle contains the same law as the principle of sufficient reason of becoming, the law of causality. According to the principle of sufficient reason of acting, a subject recognizes that the reason for his own individual act is a motive (*Motiv*), which causally gives rise to this act. When asked “Why does a person act in some specific way?” a (partial\(^83\)) answer is found in the motive of the action. Hence Schopenhauer may say that motivation is causality seen from within (vW, 173;214). In sum, the principle of sufficient reason of acting expresses how a human intellect conceives the reason/ground – in this case, motive - of an action.

Since the second and the third classes of objects (concepts, space and time) are of minor importance with respect to the consideration of the main-questions of this study, I will, in the following, concentrate on the first and the fourth classes of objects (empirical objects and the subject of willing). The natural place to start is Schopenhauer’s theory of cognition of empirical objects.

4.2 Cognition

The most original aspect in Schopenhauer’s account of empirical cognition is his unification of Kant’s concepts of intuition (*Anschauung*) and understanding (*Verstand*) into the idea of the intellectual nature of intuition (*Intellektualität der Anschauung*) (vW, 67;75). The reason for this combination of concepts is Schopenhauer’s claim that Kant falsely separated intuition and understanding, which gave rise to a serious contradiction in his theory of cognition. According to Schopenhauer, Kant, on the one hand, speaks as if objects were given through mere intuition, but, on the other hand, claims that the cognition of objects presupposes the application of concepts (W1, 593-594;440-441.) By bringing the concepts of intuition and understanding together, Schopenhauer wants to emphasize that, in order for us to have a cognition of objects, we need not only the non-intellectual work of *Anschauung* but also the intellectual work of *Verstand*.\(^84\)

\(^83\) See more below, Chapter 5.2.

\(^84\) Schopenhauer uses the concept of *Intellekt* (including its various derivatives) at least in two senses. As in the concept of the intellectual nature of intuition, he refers with it to *Verstand*. Besides this, he also uses it in reference to the knowing subject as such. This meaning of the concept of *Intellekt* is apparent in Schopenhauer’s contention of the correlative relation of intellect and matter (W2, 27;15; see below, Chapter 4.3).
However, and most importantly, Schopenhauer's contention of understanding as a faculty of cognition (that is, his contention of the intellectual nature of cognition) differs notably from Kant. To start with, Schopenhauer abandons all the other Kantian categories of understanding, except one - that is, the category of causality.\textsuperscript{85} Among the reasons for rejecting the doctrine of categories Schopenhauer mentions that, in his reckoning, Kant’s *Transcendental logic* is not a genuine philosophical work, but constructed merely for the sake of architecture, and that it includes contradictions which have their foundation in the confusion of knowledge from intuition with abstract knowledge (see above).\textsuperscript{86} Schopenhauer also maintains that Kant did not give a distinct and definite conception of the faculties of understanding and reason, and that his own explanations of these faculties result in the rejection of the doctrine of categories. Schopenhauer notes that, contrary to Kant’s account, his explanations are definite and distinct, and result from a consideration of the nature of our knowledge itself (W1,604-605,609;448-449,452.)\textsuperscript{87} In Schopenhauer’s account, the cognition of objective, external world is produced solely by means of the forms of pure sensibility (time and space) and the form of causality (vW, 67;75).

Moreover, Schopenhauer claims that the operation of the law of causality is not discursive or reflective, it does not take place *in abstracto* by means of concepts and words. Instead, it is intuitive (intuitive) and quite immediate (unmittelbare) (vW, 69;78.) Hence, there is nothing discursive or conceptual in the transcendental conditions of empirical cognition. This has an interesting relation to Schopenhauer’s conception of *feeling* (*Gefühl*). Schopenhauer defines the concept of feeling negatively with respect to rational knowledge (*Wissen*):

"...the true opposite of rational knowledge is feeling...The concept denoted by the word feeling has only a negative content, namely that something present in

\textsuperscript{85} Schopenhauer does not use the concept of category with respect to the principle of causality. Instead, he speaks of the form (*Form*) of causality (vW, 67;75) and the law (*Gesetz*) of causality (vW, 69;78).

\textsuperscript{86} In Chapter 6.1, I will consider Schopenhauer’s ‘phenomenological’ critique of Kant’s distinction between *Anschauung* and *Verstand*.

\textsuperscript{87} For example, Schopenhauer holds that the actual and legitimate content of the concept of substance constitutes of pure matter (*Materie*) (W2,395;305). The concept of matter again is a certain kind of abstraction from empirical objects, or, if considered from another point of view, from the law of causality (see below, Chapter 4.3).
consciousness is not a concept, not abstract knowledge of reason. However, be it what it may, it comes under the concept of feeling…”

Now, since everything that is not a concept, is called feeling, and since everything in cognition is non-conceptual, everything in cognition must be subsumed under the genus ‘feeling’. Schopenhauer notes that he includes the a priori knowledge\(^89\) of intuition of spatial relations and knowledge of the pure understanding under the concept of feeling (W1, 95;52), as he does with the most heterogeneous other things, such as religious feeling, moral feeling, aesthetic feeling, feeling of sensual pleasure, bodily feeling such as touch, and feelings concerning different kinds of truths - for example, geometrical truth (W1, 95;51-52). All these instances of knowledge, or modes of cognition, are called feelings. With this terminological move Schopenhauer seeks to emphasize the non-discursive (non-conceptual) essence of empirical cognition - as well as of metaphysics (see more below, Chapters 5.1 and 6.1).\(^90\)

Leaving aside the above-mentioned differences, Schopenhauer's theory of cognition is Kantian in important respects. As Schopenhauer says, his line of thought is completely under Kant’s influence, and necessarily presupposes and starts from it (W1, 563;416-417).\(^91\) Like Kant, Schopenhauer operates with the distinction of the material and the formal part of cognition: on the basis of a given matter, the subject formally constructs objective, empirical cognition. Schopenhauer refers to the material basis of cognition with the concept of sensation (Empfindung). He writes:

\(^{88}\) “…ist…der eigentliche Gegensatz des Wissens das Gefühl…Der Begriff, den das Wort Gefühl bezeichnet, hat durchaus nur einen negativen Inhalt, nämlich diesen, daß etwas, das im Bewußtsein gegenwärtig ist, nicht Begriff, nicht abstrakte Erkenntnis der Vernunft sei: übrigens mag es sein, was es will, es gehört unter den Begriff Gefühl…” (W1, 95;51)

\(^{89}\) In this case, I suggest, Schopenhauer’s concept of Erkenntnis (knowledge) should be read as some kind of immediate ‘grasp’ or ‘comprehension’ of things. This is, at least, how the logic of feelings works with him. This also has a relation to Schopenhauer’s ‘phenomenological’ account of the basis of knowledge (see below, Chapter 6.1).

\(^{90}\) As has become clear, Schopenhauer still leaves a place for a conceptual part of human cognition (Chapter 4.1). Schopenhauer's concept for this faculty of mind is Vernunft (reason), which is a faculty of abstract concepts (and the possession of which separates human beings from non-rational animals). Schopenhauer admits that reason is very valuable to human beings. For example, it is a presupposition of deliberate action, sciences, and philosophy. However, contrary to Kant, Schopenhauer maintains that reason itself can never give us concepts. Concepts are always based on empirical cognitions, as abstractions and generalizations of these cognitions. As Schopenhauer notes, the ultimate basis of all concepts and propositions is at all times intuitive (anschaulich) (P1, 164;131).

\(^{91}\) Schopenhauer prefers the first (1781) edition of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason. He thinks that in the second (1787) edition Kant destroyed much of his original, genuinely idealistic, account of the world.
“…the understanding…first creates and produces this objective external world out of the raw material of a few sensations in the organs of sense…”

Besides this Kantian formulation of the material basis of cognition, Schopenhauer gives an original description of it: he talks about body (Leib) as an immediate object (unmittelbares Objekt), which, according to him, forms the starting-point of a subject’s cognition (W1, 52;19). I suggest that, in order to understand the concept of an immediate object, we must acknowledge that Schopenhauer’s analysis of cognition consists of two different points of view. From the transcendental point of view (as described above), sensation is the basis of cognition. However, from an empirical point of view, focusing on the causal order of the origin of the cognition of objects, the “nearest” thing for us is our own body, and the states of its organs of senses. This body and the states of its senses are called ‘immediate objects’. Understandably, Schopenhauer holds that we must understand this reference to body as an immediate object only in a figurative sense (vW,106;121). Before the application of the transcendental forms of cognition, there is nothing ‘objective’ in our body. Body and the states of its organs of senses are not objects in any regular, full, and empirical meaning of the concept of an object. Instead of referring to the so-called object proper (eigentliches Objekt) (W1, 53;20), the concept of an immediate object refers to the (empirically understood) basis of the cognition of objects proper. Accordingly, the concept of an immediate object refers to the same thing than the concept of a sensation but from a different point of view. While the concept of a sensation refers to the material basis of cognition from the transcendental point of view, the concept of an immediate object refers to it from the empirical point of view.

The cognition of objects proper - or objective cognition - arises when the subject, by applying the forms of intuition (space and time) and the law of causality, gives form to the material part of cognition. While the forms of space and time provide the foundation for the constitution of empirical cognition, the law of causality fulfills the process. Schopenhauer’s account of the role of causality in cognition is also original. He holds that objective cognition

92 “ [Verstand] aus dem rohen Stoff einiger Empfindungen in den Sinnesorganen diese objektive Außenwelt allererst schafft und hervorbringt…” (vW, 67;75)
93 Generally, Schopenhauer refers with the concept of Leib to a living body, without any necessary reference to the consideration of the material basis of cognition.
94 I am grateful to Heikki Kannisto for pointing this out.
95 In Chapter 5.5.1, I will evince yet another – that is, metaphysical - point of view to the question of the material basis of cognition.
is constituted on a certain kind of causal inference: cognition of objects takes place when understanding, by applying the form of causality, “finds” a cause for a sensation, and takes this cause as an effecting object. In other words, sensation is taken as an effect, which must have a cause, that is, an object. All this happens non-discursively, without any concepts or logical inferences. Schopenhauer describes the constitution of objective cognition as follows:

“It is…only when the understanding applies its sole form, the law of causality, that a powerful transformation takes place whereby subjective sensation becomes objective perception. Thus by virtue of its own peculiar form and so a priori…the understanding grasps the given sensation of the body as an effect…and this effect as such must necessarily have a cause...In this process...the understanding now avails itself of all the data of the given sensation, even the minutest, in order to construct in space, in conformity therewith, the cause of the sensation. This operation of the understanding...is not discursive or reflective, nor does it take place in abstracto by means of concepts and words; on the contrary, it is intuitive and quite immediate. For only by this operation and consequently in the understanding and for the understanding does the real, objective, corporeal world…present itself....”

Since sensation is understood as an effect, which must have a cause (object), it is quite natural that, in respect of the starting-point of cognition, Schopenhauer also speaks of an effect (Wirkung). He notes that one could never arrive at cognition if some effect were not immediately known, and thus served as the starting-point. This effect is the effect on animal bodies (Wirkung auf die tierischen Leiber). The changes experienced by every animal body

96 Speaking of an ‘object’ is here, to a certain extent, misleading. As has been seen, Schopenhauer holds that the cause of an appearance of the new state of an object - that is, change - is always the preceding state (p. 48), also called change. To say that there is a causal relation between the object x and object y is to say that some change in x is the cause for the change in y. On this basis, in respect of the constitution of cognition, we might want to say that we “find” that the changes/effects in our body (immediate object) are effects of the changes in external objects, not effects of objects as such. However, this specific determination of causes as changes does not prevent talk of ‘object’ as the bearer of the changes.

97 “Erst wenn der Verstand... seine einzige und alleinige Form, das Gesetz der Kausalität, in Anwendung bringt, geht eine mächtige Verwandlung vor, indem aus der subjektiven Empfindung die objektive Anschauung wird. Er nämlich faßt vermöge seiner selbst-eigenen Form, also a priori,...die gegebene Empfindung des Leibes als eine Wirkung auf..., die als solche notwendig eine Ursache haben muß....Bei diesem Prozeß nimmt nun der Verstand...alle, selbst die minutiösesten Data der gegebenen Empfindung zu Hülfe, um ihnen entsprechend, die Ursache derselben im Raume zu konstruieren. Diese...Verstandesoperation ist jedoch keine diskursive, reflektive, in abstracto mittelst Begriffen und Worten vor sich gehende; sondern eine intuitive und ganz unmittelbare. Denn durch sie allein, mithin im Verstande und für den Verstand stellt sich die objektive, reale...Körperwelt dar...” (vW, 69;77-78)
are immediately known, that is, felt. To this extent the bodies are the immediate objects (see above). The cognitions of all other objects are brought about by them (W1, 42;11-12.)

Hence, objective cognition arises when the ‘effects on animal bodies’, an ‘immediate object’, or the ‘(data of)’ sensations’ are transformed into “mediate” objects, that is, objects proper. As Günter Zöller notes, any knowledge of other objects than immediate object is mediated by our bodily self-experience and is a result of the (typically unconscious) inference from given bodily sensations to their causal origin in some object or objects other than ourselves or our own body (Zöller 1999b, 26-27).

Finally, it is important to note that Schopenhauer identifies objects proper - and, accordingly, the whole empirical world - with representations (Vorstellung). Schopenhauer writes:

“‘The world is my representation’...no truth is more certain, more independent of all others, and less in need of proof than this, namely that everything that exists for knowledge, and hence the whole of this world, is only object in relation to the subject, perception of the perceiver, in a word, representation.”

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98 I will consider this empirical reference to sensation as an effect more closely in connection with the consideration of Schopenhauer’s “two-aspect” doctrine (Chapter 5.5.1).

99 As seen in the quotation above (vW, 69;77-78), Schopenhauer also refers to sensations with the concept of Data. See also, W1, 42;12.

100 The idea of a body as the basis of experience may seem to resemble certain 20th century phenomenologists. For example, Edmund Husserl (1859-1938) and Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1908-1961) have studied the role of the body in the constitution of experience. However, Schopenhauer's analysis of a body as the starting-point of cognition has not much in common with the phenomenological considerations of a living and a moving body. As has been seen, Schopenhauer's reference to the body as the basis of cognition appears in connection with his concept of an immediate object, which again refers to the material part of cognition. Hence Schopenhauer’s body (immediate object) does not give form to cognition, which a phenomenological living and a moving body does. As has been seen, Schopenhauer agrees with Kant that the form of cognition is given by the subject's transcendental conditions of cognition.

101 Besides the use of the concept of Vorstellung with respect to the cognition of empirical objects, Schopenhauer also uses it with respect to changes in the sense organs (W1, 52-53;20), and with respect to the so-called Platonic Ideas (Ideen), which, according to him, are the immediate objectivity of the thing in itself (W1, 252;174), and form the object of arts.

102 “Die Welt ist meine Vorstellung’...Keine Wahrheit ist...gewisser, von allen andern unabhängiger und eines Beweises weniger bedürftig als diese, daß alles, was für die Erkenntnis daist, also diese ganze Welt, nur Objekt in Beziehung auf das Subjekt ist, Anschauung des Anschauenden, mit einem Wort: Vorstellung.” (W1, 31;3)
“...object and representation are the same thing...the demand for the existence of the object outside the representation of the subject...has no meaning at all, and is a contradiction...”

Schopenhauer also understands representations as mental states or contents of consciousness. He writes:

“…outside world has its existence only in the consciousness of knowing beings…”

“What is representation? A very complicated physiological occurrence in an animal's brain, whose result is the consciousness of a picture at that very spot.”

As noted (p. 16-17), it is unclear how Kant understands the relation between representations (mental states) and empirical objects. The least that can be said on this difficult problem is that no common understanding of the nature of Kantian objects has yet been acquired. Schopenhauer’s explicit identification of empirical objects with representations marks a difference, at least, of expression between Kant and him.

Next, I will consider how Schopenhauer’s transcendental-philosophical approach is present in his idea of the correlative relation of subject and object.

4.3 The correlative relation of subject and object

Schopenhauer is critical of those philosophical theories which postulate distinct (independently existing) subject and object, and assign the origin of a subject’s cognition to the one or the other. Schopenhauer holds that such theories lead to serious metaphysical miscontentions concerning the ideality/reality of cognition (see more, next Chapter 4.4). In order to avoid these miscontentions, Schopenhauer evinces an idea of the correlative relation of subject and object: object always presupposes subject, and subject always presupposes

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103 “...Objekt und Vorstellung dasselbe sind...die Forderung des Daseins des Objekts außer der Vorstellung des Subjekts...gar keinen Sinn hat und ein Widerspruch ist...” (W1, 45;14)

104 “...Außenwelt ihr Dasein nur im Bewußtsein erkennender Wesen hat...” (P2, 24-25 ;16)

105 “Was ist Vorstellung? – ein sehr komplizierter physiologischer Vorgang im Gehirne eines Tieres, dessen Resultat das Bewußtsein eines Bildes ebendasselbst ist.” (W2, 248;191)
object. Neither a subject nor an object can exist independently of the other. Schopenhauer writes:

“Now with the subject the object is also at once assumed (for even the word would otherwise be without meaning), and in the same way the subject is at once assumed with the object. Hence being subject means exactly the same as having an object, and being object means just the same as being known by the subject…”

“…the division into object and subject....is that form under which alone any representation, of whatever kind it be, abstract or intuitive, pure or empirical, is generally possible and conceivable.”

Schopenhauer’s idealistic claim that object presupposes subject is in line with Kant’s transcendental theory of cognition. As noted, Kantian object is by its nature something represented, that is, a reference to the subject is built into the definition of the term (p. 20). Through the transcendental conditions of cognition, the subject determines “what it means to be” an object. In Schopenhauer’s words “being object means just the same as being known by the subject” (see above). Hence, as Konstantin Kolenda notes, Schopenhauer took over from Kant the insight that in any instance of knowledge subject and object presuppose each other. Schopenhauer rephrased Kant's claim that there is no world without I by saying that there cannot be objects without subjects (Kolenda 1988, 251.) However, contrary to Kant, Schopenhauer explicitly takes the correlative relation of subject and object as a correlative relation of subject and representation. Reading Kant from this point of view too, Schopenhauer claims to have found in the first edition of the *Critique of Pure Reason* that, although Kant does not use the formula “No object without subject”, he nevertheless, with just as much emphasis as himself and Berkeley, declares the external world to be a mere representation of the subject (W1, 586;434-435).

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106 “Wie mit dem Subjekt sofort auch das Objekt gesetzt ist (da sogar das Wort sonst ohne Bedeutung ist) und auf gleiche Weise mit dem Objekt das Subjekt, und also Subjekt-Sein geradesoviel bedeutet als ein Objekt haben und Objekt-Sein soviel als vom Subjekt erkannt werden...” (vW,170;209)

107 “...ist...das Zerfallen in Objekt und Subjekt...diejenige Form, unter welcher allein irgendeine Vorstellung, welcher Art sie auch sei, abstrakt oder intuitiv, rein oder empirisch, nur überhaupt möglich und denkbar ist.” (W1, 31;3)

108 Schopenhauer also holds that, besides the objects of cognition, Kant assumes the so-called absolute object (*absolutes Objekt*), that is, an object without a subject. According to Schopenhauer, Kant claims that by thought
In any case, the idea of the correlative relation of subject and object does not merely state the dependence of an object on the subject, but also *vice versa*. The dependence of a subject on an object - which in the idealistic tradition has not been as much emphasized – also has a parallel in Kant’s theory. Kant claims that a subject, or certain kinds of subject’s experiences presuppose the existence of objects. For example, in his “Refutation of Idealism”, in an argument against Descartes’s *cogito*, Kant claims that empirically determined consciousness of my own existence presupposes the existence of objects\(^{109}\) outside me (KrV, B274-B276). Schopenhauer accepts Kant’s general way of thinking. According to Schopenhauer, Kant’s synthetic unity of apperception - ‘I think’ - is, so to speak, the extensionless centre of the sphere of all our representations, whose radii converge on it. Though Schopenhauer does not accept Kant’s concept of a synthetic unity of apperception (which he regards “a very strange thing very strangely described”), he refers to the same idea with his concept of the subject of cognition (*Subjekt des Erkennens*), which, according to him, is the correlative of all representations (W1, 608;451-452.) Hence, both Kant and Schopenhauer maintain that the existence of a subject - or subjectivity - presupposes the existence of objects. As Schopenhauer noted above, “…being subject means exactly the same as having an object…” Accordingly, there is no independently existing metaphysical subject - or, at least we cannot know if there is – but subject must be understood in a logical sense as referring to the necessary counterpole of objective cognition.

Schopenhauer also emphasizes that there cannot be a causal relation between subject and object (for example, W1, 44;13). I suggest that this claim has its basis in the correlative relation of subject and object. If the existence of an object always presupposes the existence of a subject, a relation between subject and object is a relation between two simultaneously existing items of experience. However, a causal relation is a relation between two non-simultaneously existing states of objects - the other state (cause) existing prior to the other (effect) (see above, p. 48 and W2, 55-56;38-39). As such, a relation between subject and object can’t be a causal relation. Schopenhauer writes:

“...we must guard against the grave misunderstanding of supposing that, because perception is brought about through knowledge of causality, the relation of cause and

\(^{109}\) Kant refers to these objects with the concepts of *Gegenstand* and *Ding* (KrV, B275-276).
effect exists between object and subject...absolutely no relation according to the
principle of sufficient reason subsists between subject and object...object and subject
precede all knowledge, and hence even the principle of sufficient reason in general, as
the first condition. For this principle is only the form of every object, the whole nature
and manner of its appearance; but the object always presupposes the subject, and
hence between the two there can be no relation of reason and consequent.”

Instead of setting a causal relation between subject and object, the application of the law of
causality gives content to the cognition of objects. As has been seen, Schopenhauer maintains
that the application of the law of causality to sensations amounts to a cognition of the cause
of these sensations, which again amounts to a cognition of empirical objects (Chapter 4.2).
Interestingly, Schopenhauer also refers to these objects with the idea of causal activity itself.
He says that the being (Sein) of objects of cognition is their action (Wirken). The actuality
(Wirklichkeit) of the thing consists exactly in this, and the demand for a being of the thing
distinct from its action, has no meaning, and is a contradiction. Knowledge of the nature of
the affection (Wirkungsart) of a cognized object exhausts the object itself insofar as it is an
object, that is, a representation (W1,45;14.) In this case, ‘object’ counts as our awareness
(cognition) of the nature of the cause of that affection, which we (as subjects of cognition), on
the basis of the knowledge of the causal law, encounter through our sensations. Our
sensations, so to speak, inform us of the nature of the action of a cognized object, that is, on
the nature of the object.

Schopenhauer holds that the correlative relation of subject and object has its
manifestation in the relation of an intellect and matter (Materie). As the correlatives of

110 "Man hüte sich...vor dem großen Mißverständnis, daß, weil die Anschauung durch die Erkenntnis der
Kausalität vermittelt ist, deswegen zwischen Objekt und Subjekt das Verhältnis von Ursache und Wirkung
bestehe...zwischen Subjekt und Objekt gar kein Verhältnis nach dem Satz vom Grunde stattfindet...gehn Objekt
und Subjekt...als erste Bedingung aller Erkenntnis, daher auch dem Satz vom Grunde überhaupt vorher, da
dieser nur die Form alles Objekts, die durchgängige Art und Weise seiner Erscheinung ist; das Objekt aber
immer schon das Subjekt voraussetzt: zwischen beiden also kann kein Verhältnis von Grund und Folge sein.”
(W1, 44;13-14)

111 Below it will be seen that, contrary to this transcendental approach, in the empirical level of analysis
Schopenhauer admits a causal relation between subject and object (Chapter 5.5.1).

112 Schopenhauer’s concept of Materie, translated here as ‘matter’, refers to a physical concept of matter, that is,
to the ultimate material element of physical bodies. Hence, it must be distinguished from the concept of the
matter/material of experience, which has earlier been presented as the counterpole of the form of experience (see
for example, p. 9-10)
cognition, intellect and matter give two viewpoints to the world as representation. Schopenhauer writes:

“The fundamental mistake of all systems is the failure to recognize this truth, namely that the intellect and matter are correlative, in other words, the one exists only for the other; both stand and fall together; the one is only the other’s reflex. They are in fact really one and the same thing, considered from two opposite points of view...both are secondary, and therefore the origin of the world is not to be looked for in either of them...With me, on the other hand, matter and intellect are inseparable correlative, existing for each other, and therefore only relatively. Matter is the representation of the intellect; the intellect is that in the representation of which alone matter exists. Both together constitute the world as representation...”113

The intellect and matter are two aspects of one and the same thing, that is, the world as representation. They are two formal – uncognizable, but thinkable - counterpoints of cognition. Schopenhauer's distinction between a) empirically given matter (empirisch gegebene Materie) and thus the material (Stoff) of experience, and b) pure matter (Materie) clarifies the meaning of the concept of matter. According to Schopenhauer, the material of experience has entered the framework of the forms, and manifests itself only through their qualities and accidents, since in experience all acting is of a quite definite and special kind, and is never merely general (W2, 63-64;45.) Besides the definite material of experience, which always has some form, there remains the idea of the general basis of this material. This general basis is, according to Schopenhauer, pure matter. As he notes, all empirical properties of things (read: the material of experience) are fuller determinations of matter - or causality, since, according to Schopenhauer, matter is through and through causality (W1, 600;445-446). Hence, the concept of matter is a certain kind of generalization of the concept of the material of experience. Schopenhauer notes that we comprehend the more closely determined acting (read: the material) as the accident of matter. We think that it is matter, which becomes cognizable by means of this accident, in other words, exhibit itself as body (Körper) and

113 “Der Grundfehler aller Systeme ist das Verkennen dieser Wahrheit, daß der Intellekt und die Materie Korrelata sind, d.h. eines nur für das andere daist, beide miteinander stehn und fallen, eines nur der Reflex des andern ist, ja daß sie eigentlich eines und dasselbe sind, von zwei entgegengesetzten Seiten betrachtet...beide sekundär sind: daher der Ursprung der Welt in keinem von beiden zu suchen ist...Bei mir hingegen sind Materie und Intellekt unzertrennliche Korrelata, nur für einander, daher nur relativ da: die Materie ist die Vorstellung des Intellekts; der Intellekt ist das, in dessen Vorstellung allein die Materie existirt. Beide zusammen machen die Welt als Vorstellung aus...” (W2, 27-28;15-16)
object (Gegenstand) of experience (W2, 395;305). In other words, first we cognize the material of experience (that is, the definite and special modes of acting or individual objects) and then think that this material is an accident of pure matter. Accordingly, as Schopenhauer notes, pure matter is only an object of thought (W2, 64;45); under matter we think of acting positively and in general, and hence of activity in the abstract (W2, 394-395;305). This evinces the contrast between the transitory, empirical material of experience and the eternal, abstract matter as the bearer of this material.\textsuperscript{114} Hence, matter is an abstraction of an object, and the correlative relation of intellect and matter is an abstraction of the correlative relation of subject (intellect) and object.\textsuperscript{115}

The next chapter considers how Schopenhauer uses these ideas in his critique of the unjustified versions of idealistic and realistic philosophies.

4.4 A critique of idealistically and realistically one-sided philosophies (including a critique of the “two-world” doctrine)

Schopenhauer claims that, due to a misunderstanding of the relation between subject and object, as well as on the basis of some other false presuppositions, certain philosophical theories end up giving erroneous emphasis either to the idealistic or to the realistic part of cognition. There are two philosophical positions, which, according to Schopenhauer, are one-sidedly idealistic: absolute idealism (that is, Fichte's idealism), and spritualism.

According to Schopenhauer, so-called absolute idealism (absoluter Idealismus), which in the end becomes theoretical egoism (theoretischer Egoismus), takes objects as mere representations of a subject. In this case, however, the world is only a subject’s representation and nothing in itself, which means that all of its reality disappears, and the world becomes a mere subjective phantasm (W2, 250,193.) In other words, absolute idealism errs in not acknowledging that there must be something to back up the subjective representations, that is, there must be the thing in itself. This emphasis on the independent side of the existence of objects distinguishes Schopenhauer’s position from absolute idealism, which, by denying any

\textsuperscript{114} Since matter, according to Schopenhauer, is identified with causality (see above), it must also be considered as the condition of experience. As Schopenhauer notes, matter is the condition of experience, just as is the pure understanding itself, whose function to this extent it is (W2, 395;306).

\textsuperscript{115} Besides considering matter on its epistemological side (as causality), Schopenhauer also considers it from its metaphysical side as the visibility of will. In this study, I omit this point of view.
existence outside a subject’s representation, appears as a form of material idealism.\footnote{As has been seen (Chapter 3.2.1), the idea of the metaphysical basis of empirical objects in the thing in itself has a parallel in Kant’s theory - for example, in Kant’s claim that representation in itself does not produce its object as far as its existence is concerned (KrV, A 92/B125).}

Schopenhauer takes Fichte’s philosophy as an example of absolute idealism. He notes that systems that start from the subject afford us only a single example, the philosophy of Fichte (W1, 68;31-32).\footnote{This reference to Fichte as the only proponent of a philosophy that starts from the subject might be understood on the basis that often in idealistic philosophies there are also other elements besides a subject of cognition. For example, in Berkeley’s idealism (which Schopenhauer, however, also calls absolute idealism, W2, 603;472), there is God.}

According to Schopenhauer, Fichte’s philosophy is a metaphysical theory of the so-called absolute subject as the centre and origin of the world. Most notably, this theory also yields a metaphysical understanding of the principle of sufficient reason. Schopenhauer writes:

“…with Fichte, by virtue of the principle of sufficient reason as…a veritas aeterna, the ego is the ground of the world or of the non-ego, the object, which is just its consequent, its product. He has therefore taken good care not to examine further, or to check the principle of sufficient reason. But if I am to state the form of that principle, under the guidance of which Fichte makes the non-ego result from the ego as the web from the spider, I find that it is the principle of sufficient reason of being in space. For it is only in reference to this that those tortuous deductions of the way in which the ego produces and fabricates out of itself the non-ego, forming the subject-matter of the most senseless and consequently the most tedious book ever written, acquire a kind of sense and meaning.”\footnote{“Dem Satz vom Grund als einer…veritas aeterna zufolge ist…bei Fichte das Ich Grund der Welt oder des Nicht-Ichs, des Objekts, welches eben seine Folge, sein Machwerk ist. Den Satz vom Grund weiter zu prüfen oder zu kontrollieren hat er sich daher wohl gehütet. Sollte ich aber die Gestalt jenes Satzes angeben, an deren Leitfaden Fichte das Nicht-Ich aus dem Ich hervorgehoben läßt wie aus der Spinne ihr Gewebe; so finde ich, daß es der Satz vom Grunde des Seins im Raum ist: denn nur auf diesen bezogen erhalten jene qualvollen Deduktionen der Art und Weise, wie das Ich das Nicht-Ich aus sich produziert und fabriziert, welche den Inhalt des sinnlosesten und bloß dadurch langweiligsten Buchs, das je geschrieben, ausmachen, doch eine Art von Sinn und Bedeutung.” (W1, 70;33)}

Schopenhauer holds that in Fichte’s theory a metaphysical, independently existing subject produces (produziert, fabriziert, hervorgeht) the world from itself. In the above quotation, Schopenhauer referred to this production with the principle of sufficient reason of being in space. Elsewhere he refers to Fichte’s idea of making the object the effect (Wirkung) of the
subject (W1, 44;13), his algebraic equations between the ego and non-ego, as well as Fichte’s
sophist’s pseudo-demonstrations (vW,105;120). Apparently, Schopenhauer is uncertain of the
real nature of the relation between subject and object in Fichte’s philosophy. This uncertainty
is due to his contention that, basically, there is no genuine sense in Fichte’s fabrication of
object from the subject (see above: the most senseless book ever written). On this basis, it is
understandable that Schopenhauer does not end up putting much effort into the understanding
of the real nature of Fichte’s contention, but holds that the main fault in Fichte’s theory is its
metaphysical nature: subject is seen as an absolute subject, which, by applying the principle
of sufficient reason, produces the world solely – that is, materially – from itself. In this kind
of theory, as Schopenhauer noted, the subject’s representations become mere subjective
phantasms. It is also worth noting that Fichte’s theory gives rise to that kind of extension of
the meaning of concepts (like ‘subject’ and ‘producing’), which Schopenhauer does not
accept (see above p. 47 and below Chapter 4.6).

Schopenhauer’s account of spiritualism (Spiritualismus) yields another kind of critique
of idealistic philosophy. According to Schopenhauer, spiritualism aims to prove the knower’s
(subject’s) independence of matter. Spiritualism was set up along with realism, so long as it
was in undisputed authority. Hence the assumption was made of a second substance, outside
and along with matter, namely an immaterial substance. The reason for the assumption of the
spiritual, immaterial substance was that without it there would be only matter, of which
everything else is a modification (W2, 24-25; 13.)

Spiritualism is in line with Fichte’s idealism in regarding subject as an independently
existing metaphysical substance. However, it differs from Fichte’s idealism in the conception
of subject as an individual (not absolute) subject, and in postulating another substance besides
the immaterial substance, matter. Accordingly, unlike Fichte’s philosophy, spiritualism is not
a form of absolute or material idealism; it does not hold that cognition (the world) is
constituted solely by the subject. Though spiritualism places great emphasis on the reality of
the immaterial substance, as a dualistic philosophical position (see, W2, 24;13) it is not on
par with Fichte’s absolute monism. Schopenhauer’s own position differs from spiritualism,
first of all, in not accepting the starting point of spiritualism, that is, a realistically-minded
thinking (see above). On this basis, Schopenhauer likewise need not prove the subjects
independence of matter (a claim which he otherwise accepts) and evince a dualistic theory of
two independently existing, metaphysical substances.
At this point, it must be noted that though Schopenhauer clearly makes efforts to distinguish his idealism from the one-sidedly idealistic philosophical positions, sometimes his way of speaking seems to be in contradiction especially with his critique of absolute or material idealism. Namely, Schopenhauer sometimes says that both the formal and the material part of cognition have a subjective origin. Schopenhauer writes:

“It is clear...that both the material and the form of the representation of intuitive perception spring from the subject. Accordingly, the whole of our empirical knowledge is now resolved into two components both of which have their origin in ourselves; namely, the sense-impression and the forms time, space, causality that are given a priori and hence are embedded in the functions of our intellect or brain...” 119

“...the whole of empirical perception remains throughout on a subjective foundation, as a mere occurrence in us...” 120

“...the empirically real in general is conditioned by the subject in a twofold manner. In the first place, it is conditioned materially, or as object in general, since an objective existence is conceivable only in face of a subject and as the representation of this subject. In the second place, it is conditioned formally, since the mode and manner of the object’s existence, in other words, of its being represented (space, time, causality), proceed from the subject, and are predisposed in the subject. Therefore immediately connected with simple or Berkeleyan idealism, which concerns the object in general, is Kantian idealism, which concerns the specially given mode and manner of objective existence.” 121

119 “…ist klar, daß sowohl Stoff als Form der anschaulichen Vorstellung aus dem Subjekt entspringen. Hienach löst nun unsere ganze empirische Erkenntnis sich in zwei Bestandteile auf, welche beide ihren Ursprung in uns selbst haben, nämlich die Sinnesempfindung und die a priori gegebenen, also in den Funktionen unser Intellekts oder Gehirns gelegenen Formen, Zeit, Raum und Kausalität...” (P1, 117-118;93)

120 “…bleibt die ganze empirische Anschauung durchweg auf subjektivem Grund und Boden als ein bloßer Vorgang in uns...” (W1, 588;436)

121 “…das empirisch Reale überhaupt, durch das Subjekt zwiefach bedingt ist: erstlich materiell oder als Objekt überhaupt, weil ein objektives Dasein nur einem Subjekt gegenüber und als dessen Vorstellung denkbar ist; zweitens formal, indem die Art und Weise der Existenz des Objekts, d.h. des Vorgestellwerdens (Raum, Zeit, Kausalität) vom Subjekt ausgeht, im Subjekt prädisponiert ist. Also an den einfachen oder Berkeleyschen Idealismus, welcher das Objekt überhaupt betrifft, schließt sich unmittelbar der Kantische, welcher die speziell gegebene Art und Weise des Objetseins betrifft.” (W2, 17;8)
As such, without a wider context of interpretation, these passages would suggest that Schopenhauer puts forward a version of material idealism. However, besides this emphasis on the subjective basis of the matter of cognition, Schopenhauer also brings a metaphysical point of view to it. Considered from another point of view, the subjective sensations must be seen as manifestations of will as the thing in itself. As much as the whole empirical world is a manifestation of the thing in itself (see more below, Chapter 5.1), so are sensations as the starting-point of our cognition of that world. The first two quotations above can easily be understood on the basis of this idea of shifting the point of view. With respect of the first quotation, Schopenhauer afterwards notes that we can reach the thing in itself by shifting the standpoint (P1, 118;93). With respect of the second quotation, he speaks of arriving at the essence in itself of empirical cognition on an entirely different path (W1, 588;436). If it is acknowledged that the metaphysical point of view which Schopenhauer here introduces also includes the consideration of the basis of the material part of cognition, then this basis must refer, not to the subject of cognition, but to the thing in itself.

However, the third quotation, where Schopenhauer speaks of materially conditioned objects as Berkeleian ‘objects in general’ needs further comment. In order to understand this passage, we have to look at Schopenhauer’s critique of Kant’s alleged postulation of additional objects besides representations. Schopenhauer notes that Kant does not lay down the object simply as conditioned by the subject, but only the manner of the object’s appearance as conditioned by the subject’s forms of cognition. Hence, according to Schopenhauer, Kant failed to notice that the being-object in general belongs to the form of the phenomenon, and is just as much conditioned by the being-subject in general as the object’s mode of appearing is conditioned by the subject’s forms of cognition (W1, 674;502-503.) I suggest that in the third quotation the idea of the material conditioning of objects does not refer to a contention that the subject, in the sense of material idealism, constructs objects from its own resources. Instead, it refers to the above-mentioned contention that not merely the formal properties of objects, but also the ‘being-object in general’ (see the third quotation: “object in general”, or “objective existence”) is conditioned by the subject. As has been seen, this is just what Schopenhauer’s idea of the correlative relation of subject and object amounts to (Chapter 4.3). By making the distinction between the material conditioning of ‘objects in general’ (Berkeley) and the formal conditioning of the mode and manner of objects (Kant), Schopenhauer wants to point out that it is not allowed to postulate other objects beside representations.
Schopenhauer’s critique of realistically one-sided philosophies remains to be studied. This critique is given in Schopenhauer’s consideration of so-called realistic dogmatism (realistischer Dogmatismus). Schopenhauer notes that realistic dogmatism regarding the representation as the effect of the object tries to separate these two (representation and object), and to assume a cause different from the representation, an object-in-itself independent of the subject (W1, 45;14). In a sense, realistic dogmatism makes the same mistake than absolute idealism, but from another point of view: it gives too big, or the wrong kind of role to one part of cognition - in this case, to an object. Schopenhauer holds that this kind of thinking is an old prejudice that cannot easily be eradicated. He notes that systems that start from the object (realism) have been general in all past philosophy, while, as noted, systems that start from the subject include only the philosophy of Fichte (W1, 68;31-32). Like Kant, Schopenhauer holds that this kind of emphasis on object, and its effect on a subject, is also the basis for scepticism. Schopenhauer notes that scepticism holds that in the representation we always have only the effect/action of objects, never the cause, the real being (Sein). On this basis, a sceptic claims that this action may have no resemblance whatever to the real being of objects (W1,45;14.) Accordingly, realistic dogmatism and scepticism set two levels for the world: the world in itself (object), and our representation of that world.122

It is interesting to note that realistic dogmatism has also a close reminiscent of the "two-world" doctrine. Like realistic dogmatism, the “two-world” doctrine also postulates 1) distinct metaphysical entities, or objects, and 2) holds that these entities have a causal effect upon a subject, giving rise to its representations (Chapter 3.1). Hence Schopenhauer’s critique of realistic dogmatism may be seen as a critique of the “two-world” doctrine.

In the next two chapters, I will complete my consideration of Schopenhauer’s transcendental-philosophical theory of cognition. First (Chapter 4.5), I shall study some specific instances of Schopenhauer’s constraints on epistemic considerations. After that (Chapter 4.6), I shall consider Schopenhauer’s constraints on epistemic concepts.

122 Schopenhauer says that realism necessarily leads to materialism (W2, 24;13). The objective method is developed most consistently when it appears as materialism (W1, 61;27). This claim is comprehensible in the light of Schopenhauer's contention of matter: matter is an abstraction of the materially effective objects of cognition (see above, Chapter 4.3).
4.5 Constraints on epistemic considerations

In the following, I shall, first, introduce Schopenhauer’s concept of immanent dogmatism. After that, I shall examine his idea of the so-called antinomy of knowledge, including a consideration of the one-sidedly idealistic and realistic philosophies (see above) as two points of view on the world.

Schopenhauer calls his philosophical position immanent dogmatism (*immanenter Dogmatismus*) (P1,162;129), since it pays attention to the transcendental constraints on knowledge, and asserts that all its doctrines have only a transcendental validity. As Schopenhauer notes, the doctrines of his system are dogmatic but they do not go beyond the world that is given in experience - they merely explain what the world is (P1,162;129). In this respect, immanent dogmatism has a close relation to Kant. Schopenhauer writes:

"...my philosophy…does not presume to explain the existence of the world from its ultimate grounds...it arrives at no conclusions as to what exists beyond all possible experience, but furnishes merely an explanation of what is given in the external world and in self-consciousness...Consequently, it is *immanent* in the Kantian sense of the word."\(^\text{123}\)

The immanent nature of epistemic considerations implies that not all questions in philosophy can be answered. Schopenhauer says that his philosophy still leaves many questions untouched, for instance, why what is proved as a fact is as it is and not otherwise. All such questions - or rather, the answers to them - are really transcendent, that is, they cannot be thought by means of the forms and functions of our intellect (W2, 821-822;640.) Interestingly, the question "Why is what is proved as a fact as it is and not otherwise?" has a parallel to a certain interpretation of the nature of Kant’s transcendental conditions of cognition. According to this interpretation, Kant maintains that our cognition could be different from what it is and, in that case, the conditions of cognition would also be different from what they are. In line with this, Norman Kemp Smith notes that human experience might conceivably be altogether different from what it actually is, and its presuppositions are

\(^{123}\) "…meine Philosophie…maßt sich…nicht an, das Dasein der Welt aus seinen letzten Gründen zu erklären…Sie macht…keine Schlüsse auf das jenseit aller möglichen Erfahrung Vorhandene, sondern liefert bloß die Auslegung des in der Außenwelt und dem Selbstbewußtsein Gegebenen…Sie ist folglich *immanent* im Kantischen Sinne des Worts." (W 2, 821;640)
always, therefore, of the same contingent character. Even the universality and necessity, which Kant claims to have established for his a priori principles are of this nature. Their necessity is always for us extrinsic; they can be postulated only if we assume the occurrence of human sense-experience (Smith 1999, xxxv.) Kant’s philosophy can provide knowledge of the conditions of the actual cognition, but it cannot provide answers to questions such as why we have the kind of cognition (and, hence, the conditions of cognition) we have. Such questions are transcendent, and cannot be answered within the context of transcendental philosophy. Schopenhauer accepts this restriction of the sphere of theoretically meaningful questions, though he also provides other kinds of answers to some transcendent questions (as will be seen in Chapter 5).

The immanent nature of philosophy is apparent in Schopenhauer’s idea of the so-called antinomy of knowledge. In Kant, the discussion of the so-called antinomy of reason (KrV, A405/B432 ff.) relates to four pairs of opposite claims - thesis and antithesis - of the nature of the world. These claims concern 1) the beginning of the world in time, and its limitation in space, 2) the divisibility of substances, 3) the existence of causality through freedom, and 4) the existence of an absolutely necessary being. Kant claims that, in all these four cases, there is as much reason to believe both in the validity of the thesis and in the validity of the antithesis. But, in this case, reason contradicts itself: if both the thesis and the antithesis are valid, then reason brakes against its fundamental law of contradiction - that is, of the two given opposite alternatives both cannot be valid at the same time. If both the thesis and the antithesis were applied to the world as it is in itself, the world would contain an inner contradiction: something would have to be both accepted and rejected of the world. Kant’s solution to this dilemma lies in his distinction between appearances and things in themselves. Generally, Kant introduces an idea that, instead of arguing in favour of the validity of the thesis or the antithesis, their validity must be restricted. First of all, if the sphere of the application of the thesis and the antithesis are restricted to the different levels of the world, then both can be true at the same time. This is the case with respect to the last two antinomies (the so-called dynamic antinomies) in respect of which Kant claims that the thesis concerns the noumenal world, and the antithesis the phenomenal world. Or, alternatively, as with respect to the first two antinomies (the so-called mathematical antinomies), it may be thought that both the thesis and the antithesis concern only our way of thinking, not the way things are in themselves. Seemingly we may think of the beginning, limitation and constitution of the empirical world in two contradictory ways (both of which Kant ends up in regarding as false), but these ways of thinking do not concern the constitution of things in themselves.
Schopenhauer’s treatment of the antinomy of knowledge (*Antinomie in unserm Erkenntnisvermögen*) is reminiscent of Kant’s treatment of the antinomy of reason - especially the mathematical antinomies. Schopenhauer’s antinomy of knowledge concerns the two contradictory, but for us necessary views of the dependence of the world on the first knowing being, and the dependence of the first knowing being on a chain of causes and effects that preceded it (W1, 66;30.) Schopenhauer maintains that until the first knowing being had its appearance in the world, a whole series of empirical, and causally ordered modifications of matter must have been gone through. Obviously, this empirical understanding of the genesis of the subject/world poses a challenge to idealistic philosophy. It evinces the two contradictory claims of the antinomy of knowledge: a) the existence of the world is dependent on the subject of cognition, and b) the subject is dependent on the world (that is, on the chain of causes preceding the appearance of the subject). Schopenhauer writes:

“Thus we see, on the one hand, the existence of the whole world necessarily dependent on the first knowing being, however imperfect it be; on the other hand, this first knowing animal just as necessarily wholly dependent on a long chain of causes and effects which has preceded it, and in which it itself appears as a small link.”

Schopenhauer’s antinomy of knowledge differs from Kant’s antinomy of reason in that the nature of the contradiction between the two claims is different. While the contradictory claims in Kant’s antinomy were the thesis and the negation of the thesis, Schopenhauer puts forward two separate (not directly opposing) theses. However, like Kant, Schopenhauer finds a solution to his antinomy in the doctrine of transcendental idealism, and especially in its distinction between appearances and the thing in itself. With a reference to Kant’s corresponding distinction (between appearances and the thing in itself), Schopenhauer notes that the contradiction finds its solution in the fact that the objective world, the world as representation, is not the only side of the world, but merely its external side, so to speak, and that the world has an entirely different side which is its innermost being, its kernal, the thing in itself (W1, 66-67;30-31). This passage may be read on the basis of Kant’s solution of the

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124 “So sehn wir einerseits notwendig das Dasein der ganzen Welt abhängig vom ersten erkennenden Wesen, ein so unvollkommenes dieses immer auch sein mag; andererseits ebenso notwendig dieses erste erkennende Tier völlig abhängig von einer langen ihm vorhergegangenen Kette von Ursachen und Wirkungen, in die es selbst als ein kleines Glied eintritt.” (W1, 66;30)
mathematical antinomies: the contradictory claims of the antinomy of knowledge do not concern the world as it is in itself, but only its external, phenomenal side. Schopenhauer does not reduce the world either to the subject of cognition (what might be called transcendental explanation), or to an empirically real world (what might be called empirical explanation).\textsuperscript{125} Both of these explanations are correct from their own respective points of view, but the metaphysical origin of the world is not to be found either in the subject of cognition nor in the objects of empirical world (the causal chain of matter). These points of view show only the two ways we can think about the origin of the phenomenal world.\textsuperscript{126}

In this respect, it is worth taking a new look at Schopenhauer's critique of the one-sided philosophical positions (Chapter 4.4). As has been seen, Schopenhauer holds that the one-sidedly idealistic and realistic philosophies are not adequate explanations of the world. However, according to Schopenhauer, they are still, in a certain sense, simultaneously true. Schopenhauer notes that consistent materialism (like that of Epicurus) and absolute idealism (like that of Berkeley) are not entirely false views, but only very one-sided and imperfect. Such fundamental views of philosophy are extremely one-sided interpretations, and therefore, in spite of their contrasts, are simultaneously true, each from a definite point of view. But as soon as we rise above this point, they appear to be true only relatively and conditionally (W2, 603;472.) It is important to note that Schopenhauer both acknowledges the importance of the subjective and objective points of view, and, at the same time, restricts their validity. In fact, Schopenhauer thinks that this kind of thinking, which takes account of different viewpoints, is an example of a genuinely philosophical thinking. He notes that in philosophy we must change our standpoint in order to give justification or compensation to some thing, which, in the first place, was taken as given. For example, if we start from the subjective, we shall obtain a philosophy that is in part very one-sided and to some extent not entirely justified. We must supplement it by taking once more as our starting-point what was first given, and by deducing from the opposite standpoint the subjective from the objective, as previously the objective had been from the subjective (P2, 43-44;33-34.) Neither an idealistic nor a realistic

\textsuperscript{125} According to Ted Humphrey, Schopenhauer rejects such explanations because they presuppose that knowledge depends essentially on only a single factor (subject or object), and that either only the subject or only the object has genuine integrity of existence. In this respect, Schopenhauer follows Kant in rejecting metaphysical reductionism (Humphrey 1981, 205.)

\textsuperscript{126} Despite this kind of (formal) similarity between Kant’s mathematical antinomies of reason and Schopenhauer’s antimony of knowledge, Schopenhauer is very critical of Kant’s treatment of the antinomies in the \textit{Critique of Pure Reason}. According to Schopenhauer, the assertions and proofs of the theses of the antinomies have only a subjective ground, and rely solely on the weakness of the subtly reasoning individual (W1, 662;493). I do not go into the specifics of Schopenhauer’s critique of Kant on this issue. More may be learned from W1, 662;493 ff.
point of view gives a valid description of the world as it is in itself. This was the lesson of the antinomy of knowledge between the above so-called transcendental and empirical explanations of the world. If a further understanding of the world is sought, one has to retract from an epistemic approach, and move into a metaphysical way of consideration (as will be done in Chapter 5).

4.6 Constraints on epistemic concepts

As noted (p. 47), Schopenhauer emphasizes the importance of studying the origin of concepts, which, according to him, is always phenomenal. Schopenhauer notes that the whole property of concepts is nothing but what has been deposited in them, after it had been begged and borrowed from intuitive cognition (anschauliche Erkenntnis), the real and inexhaustible source of all insight (P2, 15;8). Hence, all abstract concepts must be controlled by cognition (vW, 182;226). If we do not lean on experience, we end up using concepts devoid of meaning, for example ‘immaterial substance’, ‘absolute reason’, ‘absolutely necessary being’, and ‘cause in general’ (vW, 182;226). Schopenhauer holds that the use of such concepts is the fundamental error of the post-Kantian idealists, whose absolute philosophical theories were constructed on the basis of abstract and empty concepts. In this respect, along with all philosophers before Locke, Schopenhauer also criticizes Spinoza (1632-1677) for starting from concepts (like ‘substance’ and ‘cause’) without previously investigating their origin, which results in giving these concepts a much too extensive validity (W2, 828;645). In fact, Schopenhauer claims that Spinoza purposely misuses words for expressing concepts that in the entire world go by other names, and deprives these concepts of the meaning which they have everywhere. Thus Spinoza calls ‘God’ that which is everywhere called ‘the world’, ‘justice’ that which is everywhere called ‘power’, and ‘will’ that which is everywhere called ‘judgment’ (P1, 23;13-14.) On his own behalf, Schopenhauer maintains that we must, as much as possible, hold on to those concepts, and the meanings of them, which commonly, and at all times, have been acknowledged. Hence, philosophy must have empirical foundations and cannot be spun out of pure abstract concepts (P2, 26;17).127

127 In this respect, Schopenhauer also criticizes Kant for defining philosophy as a branch of learning from mere concepts (P2, 15;8).
An important example of Schopenhauer’s constraints on epistemic concepts has already been presented. Schopenhauer’s idea of the correlative relation of subject and object (Chapter 4.3) sets qualifications to the meaning of the concepts of subject and object: being subject means the same as having an object, and being object means the same as being known by the subject (vW, 170;209); subject and object are inseparable even in thought, for each of the two has meaning and existence only through and for the other (W1, 34;5). In a like manner, Schopenhauer qualifies, for example, the meaning of the concepts of finite and infinite, as well as the concept of necessity. Schopenhauer notes that the concepts of finite (endlich) and infinite (unendlich) have significance merely in reference to space and time, since both these are infinite (endless), and infinitely divisible. If the concepts of finite and infinite are applied to other things, then it must be to such as fill space and time and partake of the qualities thereof. This is, according to Schopenhauer, something that the philosophasters and windbags (read: post-Kantian idealists) of the 19th century did not reckon with (P2, 25;17, footnote.) Likewise, Schopenhauer maintains that the concept of necessity (Notwendigkeit) has no true and clear meaning except that of the inevitability of the consequent with the positing of the ground: to be necessary means to follow from a given ground (vW, 181;225-226). Since the concept of necessity always refers to something whose necessity depends on something else, ‘necessity’ is a relative concept: a necessary thing is necessary only with respect to some other thing. Hence, as Schopenhauer notes, it is logically inconsistent, for example, to talk of absolute or unconditioned necessity (vW, 181;225), or an absolutely necessary being (see above). This conception of necessity has an affinity with Smith’s idea mentioned above of the so-called extrinsic necessity of Kant’s a priori principles of cognition (p. 67-68), implying that the a priori principles of cognition can be postulated only on the assumption of the occurrence of human sense-experience (Smith 1999, xxxv). However, it must be noted that Kant’s wide and multifaceted conception(s) of necessity cannot be understood merely on this basis. For example, contrary to Schopenhauer, who regards the concept of an absolute necessity as a contradictio in adjecto (vW,181;225), Kant does not see an inner contradiction in the conjunction of the concepts of absolute and necessary. This is apparent, for example, in Kant’s fourth antinomy of reason, where he speaks of an absolutely necessary being.

According to Schopenhauer, there is a fourfold necessity corresponding to the four forms of the principle of sufficient reason: 1) logical necessity, 2) physical necessity, 3) mathematical necessity, and 4) moral necessity (vW, 182;226-227). As has been seen (Chapter 4.1), in the case that some thing appears/exists in an empirical world, the principle of sufficient reason posits a ground for that thing. This positing of a ground yields the four modes of necessity.
In order to specify Schopenhauer’s constraints on epistemic concepts, I will still examine and interpret his consideration of the concepts of existence (*Dasein, Sein*) and external world (*Außenwelt*). Schopenhauer’s analysis of existence yields a distinction between empirical and metaphysical points of view. He writes:

“…it is evident that the existence conditioned through a knowing being is simply and solely existence in space, and hence that of a thing extended and acting. This alone is always a known thing, and consequently an existence *for another being*. At the same time, everything that exists in this way may still have an existence *for itself*, for which it requires no subject. This existence by itself, however, cannot be extension and activity (together space-occupation), but is necessarily another kind of being, namely that of a *thing in itself*, which, purely as such, can never be *object*.129

Here Schopenhauer makes a distinction between ‘existence for another’ and ‘existence for itself’. ‘Existence for another’ is identified with a subject’s cognition of the empirical world, and its objects. In this level of consideration, we say that external, extended objects exist. In this respect, Schopenhauer also speaks of representation-existence (*Vorstellungsein*) (W1, 183;120), and objective existence (*objektives Dasein*) (W2, 13;5). Most importantly, he denies the absolute validity of objective existence. Schopenhauer writes:

“There can never be an existence that is objective absolutely and in itself; such an existence, indeed, is positively inconceivable. For the objective, as such, always and essentially has its existence in the consciousness of a subject; it is therefore the representation of this subject, and consequently is conditioned by the subject, and moreover by the subject’s forms of representation, which belong to the subject and not to the object.”130

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129 “…versteht es sich, daß das Dasein, welches durch ein Erkennendes bedingt ist, ganz allein das Dasein *im Raum* und daher das eines Ausgedehnten und Wirkenden ist: dieses allein ist stets ein erkanntes, folglich ein Dasein *für ein anderes*. Hingegen mag jedes auf diese Weise Daseiende noch ein Dasein *für sich selbst* haben, zu welchem es keines Subjekts bedarf. Jedoch kann dieses Dasein für sich selbst nicht Ausdehnung und Wirksamkeit (zusammen Raumfüllung) sein; sondern es ist notwendig ein Sein anderer Art, nämlich das eines Dinges *an sich selbst*, welches eben als solches nie *Objekt* sein kann.” (W2, 16;7)

130 “Nimmermehr kann es ein absolut und an sich selbst objektives Dasein geben; ja ein solches ist geradezu undenkbar: denn immer und wesentlich hat das Objektive als solches seine Existenz im Bewußtsein eines Subjekts, ist also dessen Vorstellung, folglich bedingt durch dasselbe und dazu noch durch dessen Vorstellungsformen, als welche dem Subjekt, nicht dem Objekt anhängen.” (W2, 14;5)
Here Schopenhauer considers the content of objective existence with a reference to the idea of absolute existence. He notes that there cannot be an existence that is "objective absolutely and in itself". This means that, whenever we speak of objective existence, we are not allowed to speak of absolute existence - the concepts of objective and absolute must be kept apart.

The concept of objective existence refers to something transcendentally constituted by the subject, while the idea of absolute existence refers to something totally independent of the subject. As Schopenhauer noted, everything objectively existing may have an existence for itself, for which it requires no subject (see above, p. 73).\(^\text{131}\) This idea of absolute existence comes close to Kant’s idea of reality in its extra-categorial, transcendent sense. Both of these ideas refer to that level of the world, which cannot be known through the transcendental conditions of cognition.

Schopenhauer’s analysis of external world also evinces his constraints on epistemic concepts. Schopenhauer writes:

“...the question of the reality of the external world...After an examination of the whole nature of the principle of sufficient reason, of the relation between object and subject, and of the real character of sense-perception, the question itself was bound to disappear, because there was no longer any meaning in it.”\(^\text{132}\)

Here Schopenhauer states that the reality of the external world is constituted by the subject’s transcendental conditions of cognition (the relation of subject and object, the principle of sufficient reason). This by now familiar contention may be clarified, for example, with respect to the spatio-temporal form of cognition. Since the external world is constituted by the subject's transcendental conditions of cognition - for example, space and time – it may be said that the proposition “to exist externally” is, in one of its important aspects, equivalent to the proposition “to exist in the forms of space and time”. Hence, the concept of external has meaning only in relation to the subjective forms of space and time. From this point of view, it would be contradictory to speak of something external to the subject: since the meaning of

\(^{131}\) Regardless of the above Schopenhauer’s prohibition of the use of the concept of objective in connection with the metaphysical side of existence, he sometimes refers by it to the thing in itself. Schopenhauer notes, for example, that Locke’s so-called primary qualities do not belong to the purely objective nature of things or to the thing in itself (P1,110;86). Accordingly, Schopenhauer uses the concept of objective in at least two senses.

\(^{132}\) “...die Frage nach der Realität der Außenwelt...Sie mußte nach Erforschung des ganzen Wesens des Satzes vom Grunde, der Relation zwischen Objekt und Subjekt und der eigentlichen Beschaffenheit der sinnlichen Anschauung sich selbst aufheben, weil ihr eben gar keine Bedeutung mehr blieb.” (W1, 47;16)
the concept of external has its ground in the subjective, transcendental conditions of cognition, it has no meaning beyond this level of consideration. From the transcendental point of view, scepticism, which concerns the relationship between the subject’s mental states and external objects, without specifying the meaning of ‘external’ (but taking it granted, as referring to objects existing independently of the subject) is meaningless. By making a reference to objects independent of the subject, scepticism does not pay attention to the restriction of the meaning of the concept of external, but uses it in a non-restricted sense.

Though Schopenhauer restricts the meaning of epistemic concepts to the level of experience, for certain other kind of concepts he allows a non-epistemic use. Schopenhauer notes that the concept of will (Wille) is of all possible concepts the only one that has its origin not in the phenomenon, not in the mere intuitive representation (anschauliche Vorstellung), but comes from within, and proceeds from the most immediate consciousness of everyone (W1,172;112). This immediate contact with a subject’s inner consciousness gives the concept of will a metaphysical status. I will now turn into the study of the nature and scope of Schopenhauer’s metaphysics of will.
5. Will as the thing in itself

Schopenhauer’s theory of will is a multiple doctrine of the metaphysical side of the world. It has also gained quite a wide treatment among Schopenhauer scholars. Starting from general matters such as studies of will as the metaphysical principle of the world (for example, John E. Atwell 1995), or its relation to philosophy of life and human morality (for example, Atwell 1990, Frederick Copleston 1975), some commentators have paid attention to specific matters such as the relation of the doctrine of will to eastern thought (for example, Moira Nicholls 1999), to post-modern religious thinking (Mannion 2003), or to evolutionary thinking (Arthur O. Lovejoy 1911).

I will restrict my consideration of Schopenhauer’s metaphysics into its relation to Kantian transcendental philosophy. I will start by studying Schopenhauer’s idea of the basis of the metaphysics of will in the parallelism of human will and human body, and the extension of this thought to the whole world (Chapter 5.1). After that, I will relate this discussion to the problem of motion in nature (Chapter 5.2). Having introduced the basic content of Schopenhauer’s metaphysics, I will turn my attention to certain problems in it (Chapter 5.3). Finally, I will study the connection of Schopenhauer’s metaphysics to the "two-world" doctrine (Chapter 5.4), and the "two-aspect" doctrine (Chapter 5.5), including an examination of the problem of affection (Chapter 5.5.1).

5.1 The way to the idea of metaphysical will: the identity of human will and human body

Schopenhauer's theory of will as the thing in itself has its basis in a subject's understanding of his own will: what willing is for human beings is essentially the same what will as a metaphysical principle is for the world.

The starting-point of Schopenhauer’s metaphysical theory of will is the recognition of an immediate relationship between a subject’s body (Leib) and his will. Schopenhauer maintains that a human body and a human will are, in a certain sense, identical.\textsuperscript{133} a human

\textsuperscript{133} In this connection, Schopenhauer uses the concept of Identität (for example, W1, 160;102).
body, including its acts, is a manifestation of a human will. According to John E. Atwell, to say that the will and the body are ‘identical’ is to say that they ‘correspond to’ or ‘parallel’ each other. For any activity of the will, there will be a corresponding activity of the body, and for any activity of the body, there will be a corresponding activity of the will (Atwell 1990,16.) In Schopenhauer’s phrase, the body is given to the subject of knowing in two ways: as an object among objects, that is, as representation, and as immediately known, that is, as will (W1,157;100). Hence, we have twofold knowledge of one and the same thing (W1,162;103): the body, including its acts, is known objectively as the acting body, and subjectively as the will. Every true, genuine, immediate act of the will is also at once and directly a manifest act of the body (W1,158;101). Accordingly, the descriptions of a human action as an act of will and as a bodily act do not refer to two distinct and sequently ordered states of an action, but to the two sides or aspects of that action. As such, there is no causal relation between the will or its acts and the body or its acts. Schopenhauer writes:

“To the subject of knowing...this body is given in two entirely different ways. It is given in intelligent perception as representation, as an object among objects, liable to the laws of these objects. But it is also given in quite a different way, namely as what is known immediately to everyone, and is denoted by the word will.”

“The act of will and the action of the body are not two different states objectively known, connected by the bond of causality; they do not stand in the relation of cause and effect, but are one and the same thing, though given in two entirely different

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134 With respect of a living body (Leib), Schopenhauer talks, at least, of an act (Akt, W1,158;101), action (Aktion, W1,158;100), and motion or movement (Bewegung, W1,157;100) of a body. I will use all these terms in connection with the acts of a human body. In Chapter 5.2, it will be seen that, with Schopenhauer, the concept of motion (Bewegung) also refers generally to all kinds of motion in nature (including human acts).

135 Schopenhauer contends that if some so-called act of will is not manifested as a bodily action, it is not a genuine act of will, but a mere resolution of will relating to the future. The resolutions of will relating to the future are, according to Schopenhauer, mere deliberations of reason about what will be willed at some time, not real acts of will. Only the carrying out stamps the resolve; till then, it is always a mere intention that can be altered. It exists only in reason, in the abstract (W1,158;100.)

136 “Dem Subjekt des Erkennens...ist dieser Leib auf zwei ganz verschiedene Weisen gegeben: einmal als Vorstellung in verständiger Anschauung, als Objekt unter Objekten, und den Gesetzen dieser unterworfen; sodann aber auch zugleich auf eine ganz andere Weise, nämlich als jenes jedem unmittelbar Bekannte, welches das Wort Wille bezeichnet.” (W1,157;100)
ways, first quite directly, and then in perception for the understanding. The action of
the body is nothing but the act of will objectified, i.e., translated into perception.”^{137}

The knowledge of the identity of the body and the will is a special kind of knowledge. Schopenhauer notes that it can never be demonstrated as indirect knowledge from some other, more direct knowledge, since it itself is the most direct knowledge. The directness of the knowledge of the identity of the body and the will is apparent in Schopenhauer’s contention that the truth of the judgment “Will and body are identical” differs from every truth expressed by the principle of sufficient reason, that is, empirical, logical, transcendental, and metalogical truth (see above, p. 48-49). According to Schopenhauer, every truth expressed by the principle of sufficient reason consists of the reference of an abstract representation to another representation (empirical truth), or to the necessary form of intuitive (intuitiv) or abstract representing (transcendental, logical and metalogical truth). Contrary to this, the truth of the judgment of the identity of the will and the body consists of the reference of a judgment (“Will and body are identical”) to the relation that a representation (body) has to that which is not a representation at all (will). This truth is called philosophical truth (W1, 160-161;102.) In other words, the philosophical truth of the judgment “Will and body are identical” does not have its basis in another representation, or in some form of the principle of sufficient reason, but in a subject’s direct and concrete^{138} recognition that there exists an immediate relation between his will and his body.

Since the distinction of will and body is a distinction between two different kinds of knowledge, it is not an ontological, but an epistemological distinction. As White notes, the difference between ourselves as bodies and ourselves as wills is one of knowledge, not being (White 1999,82). Epistemically, from the point of view of non-immediate, theoretical knowledge, we know our will as an empirical body. Metaphysically, from the point of view of immediate, non-theoretical knowledge, we know our empirical body as will. According to Schopenhauer, epistemologically, the starting-point of the knowledge of will, and its identity with body, is the voluntary actions of our body. By getting into the essence and significance

\(^{137}\) “Der Willensakt und die Aktion des Leibes sind nicht zwei objektiv erkannte verschiedene Zustände, die das Band der Kausalität verknüpft, stehn nicht im Verhältnis der Ursache und Wirkung; sondern sie sind eines und dasselbe, nur auf zwei gänzlich verschiedene Weisen gegeben: einmal ganz unmittelbar und einmal in der Anschauung für den Verstand. Die Aktion des Leibes ist nichts anderes als der objektivierte, d.h. in die Anschauung getretene Akt des Willens.” (W1, 158;100)

\(^{138}\) With respect of the identity of the will and the body, Schopenhauer talks about knowledge in the concrete (Erkenntnis in concreto), which may be raised to knowledge in the abstract (Erkenntnis in abstracto) (W1, 160;102.)
of these actions, we come to understand what these actions are (besides of being empirical movements of a body). As Schopenhauer notes, the voluntary movements of the body first of all proclaim that which this body is besides being an object of cognition, that is, will (W1,165;106.) Schopenhauer also notes that voluntary acts of will have a ground outside themselves in a motive, which determine what I will at this time, in this place, in these circumstances (see next Chapter 5.2), but that our knowledge of will is not based on the knowledge of these motives (W1,165;106). Instead, it is based on the knowledge of our inner nature (character) acting upon these motives (see next Chapter 5.2). As Schopenhauer notes, motives do not determine that I will in general, or what I will in general, in other words, the maxim characterizing the whole of my willing (W1,165;106). It is this knowledge of the ‘that –’ or ‘what –’ aspect of our voluntary willing, which gives us inner knowledge of the movements of our body - that is, knowledge of our body as will. Only in this kind of non-theoretical knowledge have we an immediate understanding of the meaning of our willed movements according to motives/concepts. Schopenhauer notes that though we see our conduct following motives with the constancy of a law of nature, this gives us no understanding (Verstehen) of the influence of the motives on the will. If we remained on this level of consideration, we would call the inner, in this view incomprehensible, nature of the manifestations and actions of our body a force (Kraft), a quality (Qualität), or a character (Chatakter), but we would have no further insight (Einsicht) into it (W1, 157; 99-100.) But we have an insight into our actions. Schopenhauer notes that will reveals to us the significance (Bedeutung), and shows the inner mechanism of our being, actions (Tuns), and movements (Bewegungen) (W1, 157;100). 139 Hence, I recognize that, in certain circumstances, and in a certain way, I am influenced by certain motives. Or, I recognize, that I have no appeal to certain other motives. This gives me knowledge of (the character of) my will. Since, as has been seen, my will has a parallel in the empirical movements of my body, I also recognize, for example, that the outer movements of my arms (say, for example, in pushing some physical obstacle away from me) have a parallel with those inner and concrete efforts and feelings, which I have in acting, for my specific reasons/motives, just the way I do. Besides of my cognition of the outer movements of my body and my acknowledgment that there are certain motives for my action, I immediately feel my characteristic and purposiveness will “in action”. As D.W. Hamlyn notes, we know of our willed and

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139 Schopenhauer maintains that we know and understand what will is better than anything else (W1, 172;111). This is the reason for his choice of “will” as the primary description of the metaphysical principle of the world.
intentional actions in willing or intending them and in so doing them, and not simply in what is thereafter available to cognition (Hamlyn 1985, 83).

After this first contact with will in voluntary actions, Schopenhauer gives a word of warning. He emphasises that the essence of will must not be understood on the basis of the distinct features of the voluntary actions - that is, consciousness (intellect), knowledge, and motives. Schopenhauer notes that the circumstance of will being accompanied by cognition, and determined by motives, belongs only to its appearance, not to it itself (W1, 164; 105). Will, as it is in itself, is not guided by knowledge or motives. This non-rational140 essence of will is apparent in the involuntary actions of human bodies. Many of these actions relate to the life-supporting functions of human bodies, for example, the process of digestion in the stomach, or the beating of the heart (W2, 326; 252). As Christopher Janaway notes, whenever the body behaves according to the various unconscious functions of nourishment, reproduction, or survival, Schopenhauer discerns will manifesting itself in them (Janaway 1994, 29). Both in the conscious/voluntary and unconscious/involuntary movements of the body, the essence of will is the same. According to Janaway, Schopenhauer holds that the ordinary conscious willing is not different in principle, for example, from the beating of the heart, or the activation of the saliva glands (Janaway 1994, 29). The only difference between the voluntary and the involuntary movements of will is that, in the first case, will is manifested through a subject’s cognitive awareness of the goal (motive) of the action, while in the latter case, will is manifested without a subject’s conscious cognition of it.

Regarding Schopenhauer's metaphysical ambitions, it is important to recognize that the specific kind of immediate and non-theoretical knowledge of our will is supposed to give knowledge of ourselves as we are in ourselves, that is, as a thing in itself. As Janaway notes, Schopenhauer thinks that if there is a way of knowing something about oneself, which is not at all a matter of representation, then it is bound to provide access to oneself considered as thing in itself (Janaway 1989, 192). Schopenhauer writes:

“...it has now become clear to us that something in the consciousness of everyone distinguishes the representation of his own body from all others that are in other respects quite like it. This is that the body occurs in consciousness in quite another way, toto genere different, that is denoted by the word will. It is just this double knowledge of our own body which gives us information about that body itself, about

140 As a description of the essence of will, I understand ‘non-rational’ as ‘devoid of conscious intentionality’ or ‘devoid of conscious purpose of the movement’.
its action and movement following on motives, as well as about its suffering through outside impressions, in a word, about what it is, not as representation, but as something over and above this, and hence what it is in itself. We do not have such immediate information about the nature, action, and suffering of any other real objects.”

The inner and immediate knowledge of ourselves as will gives us a chance to exceed the limits of theoretical knowledge, which always concerns only the outer side of things. As Schopenhauer notes, a way from within stands open to us to that real inner nature of things to which we cannot penetrate from without. It is, so to speak, a subterranean passage, a secret alliance, which places us all at once in the fortress that could not be taken by attack from without (W2, 253;195.)

Characteristically, Schopenhauer expands this idea of will as the thing in itself to the whole world. He notes that if we set aside an object’s existence as the subject’s representation, what still remains must be, according to its inner nature, the same as what in ourselves we call will (W1, 164;105). We must learn to understand nature from ourselves: what is directly known to us gives the explanation (Auslegung) of what is indirectly known (W2, 254;196). Schopenhauer writes:

“Only from a comparison with what goes on within me when my body performs an action from a motive that moves me, with what is the inner nature of my own changes determined by external grounds, can I obtain an insight into the way in which those

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141 Contrary to Payne’s translation, Schopenhauer’s concept of Leiden might be understood as referring generally to the idea of existence of something as an object of affection. In this case, Schopenhauer’s clause “…Leiden durch äußere Einwirkung…” could be translated as “…existence as an object of outside impression…”. In this case, ‘suffering’ would be a (painful) subspecies of ‘existence as an object of affection’. This understanding of the concept of Leiden would also be more suitable to Schopenhauer’s note of “…Leiden aller andern realen Objekte…” in the end of the passage, where, in my interpretation, Schopenhauer refers to all kinds of phenomenal objects. Schopenhauer does not refer to the suffering, for example, of inanimate objects, though he does refer to inanimate objects as the objects of (causal) affection.

142 “…ist es uns nunmehr deutlich geworden, was im Bewußtsein eines jeden die Vorstellung des eigenen Leibes von allen andern, dieser übrigens ganz gleichen, unterscheidet, nämlich dies, daß der Leib noch in einer ganz andern, toto genere verschiedenen Art im Bewußtsein vorkommt, die man durch das Wort Wille bezeichnet, und daß eben diese doppelte Erkenntnis, die wir vom eigenen Leibe haben, uns über ihn selbst, über sein Wirken und Bewegen auf Motive wie auch über sein Leiden durch äußere Einwirkung, mit einem Wort, über das, was er nicht als Vorstellung, sondern außerdem, also an sich ist, denjenigen Aufschluß gibt, welchen wir über das Wesen, Wirken und Leiden aller andern realen Objekte unmittelbar nicht haben.” (W1, 161-162;103)
inanimate bodies change under the influence of causes, and thus understand what is their inner nature…\(^{143}\)

Schopenhauer’s main argument for his idea of will as the metaphysical principle of the world is this argument from analogy: the world must be understood from what I know about myself. As Schopenhauer notes, we shall judge all objects, which are not our own body, according to the analogy (\textit{Analogie}) of this body (W1,164;105). The direct knowledge, which everyone has of the inner essence of his own appearance, must afterwards be transferred by analogy to all other appearances. Such knowledge then becomes the key to knowledge of the inner essence of things, that is, of things in themselves (P1,119;94.)\(^{144}\) This argument from analogy, I suggest, has its basis in Schopenhauer’s contention that the existence of external objects only as my representation would lead to the above-mentioned philosophical position called theoretical egoism: if all objects were only my representation, they would become mere phantoms (\textit{Phantome}) (Chapter 4.4). In order to distance ourselves from this position, we must think that as much as I exist, not only as a representation, but also as will, so, analogically, do all the other objects exist, not only as a representation, but also as will. Schopenhauer holds that theoretical egoism can never be refuted by proofs, but in philosophy it has been positively used only as a sceptical sophism, that is, for the sake of appearance. As a serious conviction, it could be found only in a madhouse and, as such, it would need not so much a refutation as a cure (W1,162-163;104.)\(^{145}\)

The essence of will in nature is perhaps most easily approachable through Schopenhauer’s concept of striving (\textit{Streben}) (see, for example, W1,240;164). Janaway notes

\(^{143}\) “Nur aus der Vergleichung mit dem, was in mir vorgeht, wenn, indem ein Motiv mich bewegt, mein Leib eine Aktion ausübt, was das innere Wesen meiner eigenen durch äußere Gründe bestimmten Veränderungen ist, kann ich Einsicht erhalten in die Art und Weise, wie jene leblosen Körper sich auf Ursachen verändern, und so verstehn, was ihr inneres Wesen sei…” (W1, 190;125)

\(^{144}\) Below I will consider the problematic nature of this argument (p. 101). Schopenhauer himself does not pay any serious attention to the justification of his argument from analogy. Hamlyn notes even that it is doubtful if there is in a strict sense an argument here. Schopenhauer simply presumes that if we accept the point for one class of appearances we must accept it for appearances taken generally, if there is no plurality of wills (on the unapplicability of the concept of plurality to the will, see below footnote 146; on the unity of the one will, see p. 84) (Hamlyn 1985,97.)

\(^{145}\) Besides the argument from analogy, Schopenhauer maintains that his metaphysical theory of will is the best explanation available for the world. According to Schopenhauer, the criterion of the truth of a system is the general consistency and harmony of all the propositions of that system, accompanied by universal agreement with the world of experience. Schopenhauer also holds that there can be only one right system, and he does not hesitate to regard his metaphysics of will as that system (P1,89;68.) Moreover, Schopenhauer claims that his metaphysics attains corroboration from empirical sciences (see Schopenhauer’s \textit{Introduction} to his \textit{On the Will in Nature}, WN, 320;19).
that, according to Schopenhauer, at the broadest level of generality every part of the world possesses the same essence: it, as it were, pursues, strives, or tends somewhere (Janaway 1999b, 144). This striving is, according to Schopenhauer, blind and endless. Will, considered purely in itself, is devoid of knowledge and a blind, irresistible urge (W1, 380;275), which can never stop. Every attained end is at the same time the beginning of a new course, and so on ad infinitum (W1, 240;164). At bottom, all striving is a striving for life: everything presses and pushes towards existence (Dasein), if possible towards organic existence, that is, life (Leben), and then to the highest possible degree thereof (W2, 453;350).

Hence, Schopenhauer notes that it is immaterial if, instead of saying “will”, we say “will-to-life” (W1, 380;275). The concept of natura naturans (creative nature) also gives clarification of the nature of will. According to Schopenhauer, in the concept of natura naturans there is contained the knowledge that, behind the ever-fleeting and restlessly changing phenomena of the natura naturata (created nature) there must lie concealed an imperishable and untiring force by virtue of which they constantly renewed themselves, since this force itself would not be affected by their decline and extinction. Just as the natura naturata is the subject of physics, so is the natura naturans that of metaphysics. (P1, 142;113-114.)

Regarding animate beings, the concept of natura naturans brings forth the nature of will as an indestructible and renewing striving, which, through animate species, persist, though every individual of the species perish. As a concept, which also applies to inorganic bodies, Schopenhauer evinces the concept of forma substantialis by which is thought the inner principle of the complex of all the qualities of every natural being (P1, 70;52). With respect to inorganic bodies, the concept of forma substantialis is meant to focus the attention on will as a principle, which makes up the intelligible wholeness of objects. Due to this principle,

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146 Generally, it may be said that when Schopenhauer uses empirically based descriptions of will (for example, ‘striving’), these descriptions must not be understood straightforwardly and as such, but in a qualified, even metaphorical, sense. In this respect, Schopenhauer notes, for example, that phenomenal concepts like plurality, or the relation of part and whole are not applicable to will (W1,173,193;112,128). See more, Chapter 6.1.

147 According to Schopenhauer, this endless striving causes human suffering. Everyone is constantly striving to fulfill his needs, but as soon as one need is fulfilled, there appears another, and the striving continues. This causes pain and suffering.

148 This description of will as natura naturans might be interpreted as a form of pantheism. However, Schopenhauer separates his position from pantheism, which, according to him, includes certain moral qualities such as goodness, wisdom, bliss, etc., which, according to Schopenhauer, do not belong to the world (P1, 142;114).

149 According to Dictionary of Philosophy (edited by Dagobert D. Runes), forma substantialis is that constitutive element of a substance which is the principle or source of its activity, and which determines it to a definite species, or class, and differentiates it from any other substance (Dictionary of Philosophy, edited by Dagobert D. Runes, p. 126, J. J. Rolbiecki).
empirical objects are not just some arbitrary collections of aggregates, but form intelligible wholes.

Interestingly, Schopenhauer also holds that will as the thing in itself brings certain kind of teleology (Teleologie), that is, purposiveness (Zweckmäßigkeit), to empirical phenomena (W2, 423;327 ff.). At bottom, the purposiveness of empirical phenomena is what might be a called phenomenal reflection of what Schopenhauer calls the unity of the one will (Einheit des einen Willens, W1, 237;161). The purposiveness of phenomena appears in two ways. First, there is inner purposiveness, which is an agreement of all the parts of an individual organism so ordered that the maintenance of the individual and of its species results therefrom, and thus manifests itself as the purpose of that arrangement. Second, there is external purposiveness, which is a relation of inorganic to organic nature in general, or of the individual parts of organic nature to one another, which renders possible the maintenance of the whole of organic nature, or even of individual animal species, and thus presents itself to our judgment as the means to this end (W1, 228;154.).

Schopenhauer notes that both in the inner and outer teleology of nature, what we must think of as means and end is everywhere only the phenomenon of the unity of the one will so far in agreement with itself, which has broken up into space and time for our mode of cognition (W1, 236-237;161). In other words, Schopenhauer holds that, through the idea of means and end, we recreate the metaphysical unity, which the principium individuationis (space, time, causality) has separated.

Regarding animals, Schopenhauer notes that the inner essence of every animal form is an act of will lying outside the representation. That act knows neither succession nor juxtaposition, but has the most indivisible unity. Through cognition, the original unity and indivisibility of that act of will then appears as a juxtaposition of parts and succession of functions, which are closely connected through mutual relation for help and support, reciprocally as means and end. The understanding then admires this profoundly conceived arrangement of the parts and the combination of the functions. It involuntarily substitutes the manner in which it becomes aware of the original unity reestablishing itself out of plurality for the origination of that animal form. This is, according to Schopenhauer, the meaning of

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150 Though Schopenhauer clearly attaches a certain kind of harmony to nature, he also holds that this harmony has its limits. Schopenhauer notes that the reciprocal adaptation and adjustment of the phenomena springing from the unity of will does not eradicate the inner antagonism of will. That harmony goes only so far as to render possible the continuance of the world (W1, 237;161.)

151 Schopenhauer contends that the unity of will also appears in the causal necessity of all that happens (P2, 55;43).
Kant’s teaching that purposiveness is brought into nature by the understanding, which accordingly marvels at a miracle of its own creation (WN, 379-380;66-67.)

While I take another look at Schopenhauer’s teleology in the next chapter (5.2), I want to conclude this chapter by considering the relation of Schopenhauer’s metaphysics to Kant. To start with, it is interesting to note that, although the content of Schopenhauer’s metaphysics is un-Kantian, Schopenhauer thinks that, in a certain sense, it has a close relationship to Kant. Kant’s consideration of the metaphysical side of a subject - that is, the idea of the so-called intelligible subject – especially is supposed to lead to the recognition of will as the thing in itself. According to Schopenhauer, Kant’s distinction between empirical and intelligible characters of the subject is among the most admirable things ever said by man (W1, 677;505). Through this distinction Kant evinces the idea of the metaphysical (as well as ethical) essence of man, which, in Schopenhauer’s analysis, is revealed as will. Schopenhauer says that he assumes that whenever Kant spoke of the thing in itself, he always thought indistinctly of will in the obscure depths of his mind (W1, 677;505). The intimate relation between Kant’s thing in itself and Schopenhauer’s will is, according to Schopenhauer, most clearly apparent in the idea of freedom. Schopenhauer notes that the connection between the idea of freedom and the thing in itself is the point where Kant’s philosophy leads to his own, or his own philosophy springs from Kant’s as its parent stem (W1, 672;501). Schopenhauer refers to Kant’s *Critique of Judgement* (1790) (W1, 672-673; 501-502), where Kant writes:

“...the concept of nature represents its objects in intuition doubtless, yet not as things in themselves, but as mere appearances, whereas the concept of freedom represents in its object what is no doubt a thing in itself, but it does not make it intuitable...”152

This passage suggests that Schopenhauer has grounds for the identification of Kant’s thing in itself with will. First, Kant explicitly says that the thing in itself and the concept of freedom have a close relationship. Second, the concept of freedom is inseparately linked with the concept of a human will. ‘Will’ (Wille) and ‘choice’ (Willkür) are those concepts through which Kant postulates human freedom and morality, and, accordingly, brings metaphysical aspect to the consideration of human beings. In this way, Kant brings together the concepts of the thing in itself, freedom, and will. Schopenhauer agrees with all this: the concepts of will

152“...der Naturbegriff zwar seine Gegenstände in der Anschauung, aber nicht als Dinge an sich selbst, sondern als bloße Erscheinungen, der Freiheitsbegriff dagegen in seinem Objecte zwar ein Ding an sich selbst, aber nicht in der Anschauung vorstellig machen...” (KU, 175)
and the freedom of will refer to something over and above a plain theoretical understanding of man, that is, to the thing in itself (see more, next Chapter 5.2).

However, as has been seen, the all-important difference between Kant and Schopenhauer is that Schopenhauer does not restrict his considerations of will, and its relation to the thing in itself, to a human will. Instead, by using the above-mentioned argument from analogy, he applies the idea of will to the whole world. As Schopenhauer says, he has extended what Kant teaches about the appearance of man and his actions to all the appearances in nature: their foundation is will as the thing in itself (W2, 225;174). In this new account, Schopenhauer evinces a new and un-Kantian conception of metaphysics. While Kant regarded metaphysics as a rational and *a priori* matter *per se* (on account of which in traditional sense it was revealed to be impossible), Schopenhauer claims that metaphysics has an empirical and aposteriori basis. He notes that Kant’s contention that the source of metaphysics cannot be empirical, and its fundamental principles and concepts can never be taken from experience (inner or outer) is a *petitio principii* (W1, 577;427). Schopenhauer writes:

> “…I say that the solution to the riddle of the world must come from an understanding of the world itself; and hence that the task of metaphysics is not to pass over experience in which the world exists, but to understand it thoroughly, since inner and outer experience are certainly the principal source of all knowledge.”

By considering the inner and outer experience, it is possible to acquire knowledge of the metaphysical side of the world. This knowledge is not Kantian regulative knowledge of metaphysical matters (see above, p. 21), but contentual knowledge of the essence of the thing in itself (though the validity of this knowledge also has transcendental restrictions, see below Chapter 5.3). According to Schopenhauer, the essence of will manifests itself in the content/material of appearances. He writes:

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153 “Ich sage…, daß die Lösung des Rätsels der Welt aus dem Verständnis der Welt selbst hervorgehn muß; daß also die Aufgabe der Metaphysik nicht ist, die Erfahrung, in der die Welt dasteht, zu überfliegen, sondern sie von Grund aus zu verstehn, indem Erfahrung, äußere und innere, allerdings die Hauptquelle aller Erkenntnis ist…” (W1, 578;428)
“...thing in itself must express its inner nature and character in the world of experience; consequently it must be possible to interpret these from it, and indeed from the material, not from the mere form, of experience.”

“…what is left undetermined by all those a priori existing forms and thus is contingent or accidental with regard to them, is just the manifestation of the thing in itself. Now the empirical content of the appearances, that is to say, every closer determination thereof, every physical quality appearing therein, cannot be known otherwise than a posteriori. These empirical qualities (or rather their common source) are accordingly left to the thing in itself, as manifestations of its own essential nature through the medium of all those a priori forms.”

After the elimination of the a priori forms of cognition there remains the metaphysical content/material of that cognition. Schopenhauer notes that the a posteriori, which appears in every phenomenon, imparting to every being its special and individual character, is the material of the phenomenal world as opposed to its form. This material is left over after the abstraction (Abzug) of everything that flows from the forms of cognition (P1, 115-116;91.) Accordingly, those properties and qualities of objects, which are not reducable to the formal, transcendentally constituted properties of objects, have their origin in the thing in itself. These properties also make objects the kind of specific and individual objects they are. It is now possible to see that Schopenhauer’s claim considered above regarding the teleology of

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154 “…das Ding an sich…muß…sein Wesen und seinen Charakter in der Erfahrungswelt ausdrücken, mithin solcher aus ihm herauszudeuten sein, und zwar aus dem Stoff, nicht aus der bloßen Form der Erfahrung.” (W2, 238;183)

155 “…das durch alle jene a priori vorhandenen Formen unbestimmt Gelassene, also das hinsichtlich auf sie Zufällige ist eben die Manifestation des Dinges an sich selbst. Nun kann der empirische Gehalt der Erscheinungen, d.h. jede nähere Bestimmung derselben, jede in ihnen auftretende physische Qualität nicht anders als a posteriori erkannt werden: diese empirischen Eigenschaften (oder vielmehr die gemeinsame Quelle derselben) verbleiben sonach dem Dinge an sich selbst als Äußerungen seines selbst-eigenen Wesens durch das Medium aller jener apriorischen Formen hindurch.” (P1, 115;91)

156 I will consider the idea of elimination/abstraction in connection with the “two-aspect” doctrine (Chapter 5.5).

157 A certain connection to Hegel may be seen here. Hegel thought that there is no strict border between phenomena and things in themselves. Our concepts already have a reference to the absolute, and it is just a question of coming to know these concepts through a dialectical reasoning. Schopenhauer thinks that empirical phenomena already have a connection to the thing in itself. It is just that we have to make this connection distinct. However, as has been seen, contrary to Hegel, Schopenhauer does not accept an idea that concepts as such would have any privileged role in knowing the thing in itself (Chapter 4.1). Schopenhauer’s anti-rationalistic method of acquiring knowledge of the thing in itself differs radically from Hegel's rationalistic method.
nature is also a contentual claim of the thing in itself. Contrary to Kant, who maintains that
teleological judgments are mere regulative judgments (orienting our understanding of both
empirical phenomena/relations and metaphysical matters), Schopenhauer holds that
teleological judgments are contentual judgments of the essence of will as the thing in itself.
They count as an expression of one of the essential characters of will - that is, its unity. In the
next chapter, I will examine how Schopenhauer’s teleological account of motion in nature
parallels with his causal (phenomenal) account of it.

5.2 The explanation of motion in nature

Schopenhauer’s concept of motion (Bewegung) includes all kinds of motion in nature.\(^{158}\)
Starting from the mechanical motion of corporeal bodies and the motion in inorganic and
organic nature, this concept also comprises animal instinctive action and human deliberate
action. In every case, Schopenhauer claims, it is possible to evoke both phenomenal and
metaphysical explanations for motion. The phenomenal explanation has its basis in the
transcendental law of causality, and appears on the basis of three different causes: 1) a cause
in the narrowest sense, 2) a stimulus (Reiz), and 3) a motive (W1, 176-180;115-117). The
metaphysical explanation has its basis in will as the thing in itself, and appears in teleological
terms, taking note of the purpose of motion.

In inorganic nature, all phenomenal explanation happens according to a cause in the
narrowest sense, which, according to Schopenhauer, is that state or condition of matter,
which, while it brings about another state with necessity, itself suffers a change just as great
as that which it causes. In this case, the quantity of the effect increases in the same proportion
as the quantity of the cause. If the mode of operation is known, the degree of the effect can be
measured from the degree of the intensity of the cause, and conversely (W1, 176-177;115.)
For example, the mechanical motion of a ball that is struck by another ball is explained on the
basis of a cause in the narrowest sense. Schopenhauer notes that the cause of the motion of a
ball that is struck is the motion of another, which loses just as much motion as the former
gains (WN, 411;91). Schopenhauer also notes that on this level of explanation, the cause and
the effect are quite homogeneous and quite uniform. They are qualitatively the same (WN,
411;91.)

\(^{158}\) This is apparent, for example, in WN,408,88.
Besides mechanics, chemical phenomena are also explained on the basis of causes in the narrowest sense: in chemical phenomena, too, the effect increases in exact proportion to the cause (W1, 177;115). However, chemistry differs from mechanics in that with it the cause and the effect are no more qualitatively the same, that is, homogeneous and uniform (as, for example, in the phenomenon of one ball striking another ‘motion’ was both the cause and the effect). As Schopenhauer says, warming as cause, and expansion, liquefaction, volatilization, or crystallization as effect are not homogeneous (WN, 412;91).

In organic nature (including plants, animals, and human beings), the cause of a motion appears in other forms. Schopenhauer notes that in organic nature causality appears at a higher potential, namely as a stimulus and susceptibility to it (WN, 413;92). Schopenhauer calls ‘stimulus’ that cause which itself undergoes no reaction proportional to its effect, and whose intensity does not run parallel with the intensity of the effect according to degree; so that the effect cannot be measured from it (W1, 177;115). For example, the movement of a plant towards the sun is explained on the basis of a stimulus: the light of the sun functions as a stimulus for the plant, which reaches towards the light. Here the cause (the light of the sun) undergoes no reaction proportional to its effect (the movement of the plant).

At the more developed level of organic nature, with cognizing beings (erkennende Wesen, see for example, WN, 413;93), including non-rational and rational beings (or human beings), the cause/stimulus appears as a motive. Schopenhauer defines motive as:

“…an external stimulus from whose influence there first results an image in the brain, under whose mediation the will carries out the effect proper, an external bodily action.”

With non-rational beings, that is, with animals, the motive is some present, external object (or an image of that object). As Schopenhauer says, with animals the presence (Gegenwart) of the object acting as a motive is necessary. Upon this motive animals then act instantly and inevitably (if we exclude training, i.e., habit enforced by fear) (WN, 413;93). For example, a piece of meat, or an image of a piece of meat, may act as a motive for a hungry dog, which runs to the piece of meat.

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159 Below it will be seen that Schopenhauer also includes (animal and human) motives under the concept of a stimulus (see, for example, WN, 341-342;37).

160 “…ein äußerer Reiz, auf dessen Einwirkung zunächst ein Bild im Gehirn entsteht, unter dessen Vermittlung der Wille die eigentliche Wirkung, eine äußere Leibesaktion, vollbringt.” (WN, 341;37)
Rational beings (*vernünftige Wesen*), that is, human beings, differ from the non-rational beings in that their motive is no longer something present, intuitively cognizable (*Anschauliches*), existing (*Vorhandenes*), and real (*Reales*). Instead, motive is now a mere concept, which has its existence solely in the brain of the person who acts (WN, 413-414;93.)

In connection with the above determination of motive as an image in the brain, Schopenhauer notes that:

“…in the human species the place of that image can be taken by a concept that is drawn off from previous images of this kind by putting off their differences.”

It is worthwhile to compare a human motive to an animal motive. While an animal’s motive is always intuitively cognizable, the motive of a human being is mostly conceptual. In the case of an animal, it is said that this or that external object causes the action of the animal (see before: a piece of meat). Animals are dependent on the given intuitively cognizable motives upon which they react "instantly and inevitably". They cannot make choices between different motives, but are compelled to act according to their inner inclinations (for example, according to hunger). Instead, human beings are free of the requirement for the immediate presence of external objects, and the compulsion of inclinations. Unlike animals, human beings also react to abstract concepts, which function as motives for their actions. These concepts are generalizations of previous images in the brain (see above), and they allow human beings to create various ideas or thoughts in their minds.

On this basis, the world appears differently to human beings and animals: human beings have a wider understanding of the world, and its potential, which also enables them to do things that animals cannot do. This gives a basis for a certain kind of, what I will call, empirical freedom. Zöller notes that the human being is able to exercise a measure of control over the motives that take the form of thoughts. Such motives can be compared against each other in acts of deliberation. Accordingly, rational beings exercise a much higher degree of choice in their volitional processes than non-rational beings. One may even speak of the relative or comparative freedom here: human beings are free from the immediate compulsion through the intuitive, nonconceptual motives and hence free by comparison with their nonrational fellow beings (Zöller 1999a, xix-xx.) It may be said that, in this sense, the degree of conceptual rationality (that is, the ability to create abstract concepts and combinations of

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161 “Bei der Menschenspezies…kann ein Begriff, der sich aus früher Bildern dieser Art durch Fallenlassen ihrer Unterschiede abgesetzt hat…die Stelle jenes Bildes vertreten. “ (WN, 341-342;37)
concepts - judgments - on the basis of intuitive cognitions) correlates with the degree of freedom: the more conceptual rationality, the more alternatives and the more freedom from the immediate compulsion of nonconceptual motives and inclinations. This distinguishes the higher animals from the lower ones: rational animals simply have more options to choose from.

However, for Schopenhauer, the consideration of empirical freedom does not complete the question of freedom. The fact that there are more or fewer motives for us to choose does not imply that we are free to choose which motives we actually choose. Instead, Schopenhauer contends that everyone has an individual and characteristic will, which determines which motives one chooses, and, accordingly, which actions one performs. Although, as will be seen, this idea of an individual will on the basis of human actions yields also a metaphysical conception of freedom, empirically, every human action is as determined as the motion of balls. It is just that in the case of human beings the cause of an action is a conceptual motive. Human beings may have, for example (with reference to the example of the piece of meat), concepts or ideas of ‘satisfaction of hunger’, ‘health’, and ‘generosity to other people’ in their minds. Any one of these potential motives can be chosen, but the fact that one individual chooses just one specific motive is grounded on the fact that his will is that kind of will, which chooses just this motive. In this sense, it might be said that thoughts or motives “are there” waiting to be chosen, and it is the character of our will which determines which specific motive we choose. As Zöller puts it, the will is all ability and potential waiting to be called forth and realized through the approach of the motive. The motives do not actually generate the effect but call it forth, produce it from the underlying will qua character. The motive as cause merely provides the occasion for the specific manifestation of the will (Zöller 1999b,31.)

Schopenhauer also holds that each individual will is inborn and remains the same throughout the whole life, no one can change his will. If we could change the direction of our will, we could talk about what I will call effective (not merely empirical) freedom of

\[162\] Schopenhauer has an original contention of the basis of the character of an individual will. He claims that since we are responsible for our actions, we must also be responsible for our will. This again means that (in some metaphorical sense) it must be assumed that, before our birth, we have chosen our will. Thereafter, the will remains the same.

\[163\] This requires a certain reservation. Schopenhauer maintains that in the extraordinary case of a denial of an individual will (for example, as the result of asceticism) the character of a person’s individual will changes, or will vanishes altogether. From the point of view of willing, there is nothing left. However, Schopenhauer also thinks that, from another point of view, there may still be something, which, however, can no longer be called willing. This is the mystery where Schopenhauer’s philosophy ends.
will. Harry G. Frankfurt presents a relevant point on this matter. He makes a distinction between the so-called first-order desires and second-order volitions. The ‘first-order desires’ refer to what we want to do. The ‘second-order volitions’ refer to what we want to want to do, with a desire that this (first-order want) should form the basis of our will. Frankfurt argues that the second-order volitions give rise to the idea of the freedom of will: the statement that a person enjoys the freedom of will means that he is free to have the will he wants (Frankfurt 1971,10-15.) In this account, the freedom of will has two conditions: 1) an ability to desire a certain kind of will (for example, altruistic will) for the basis of one's actions, and 2) an ability to acquire this certain kind of will. If a person has an ability to choose the character of his will he is free. In this case, we have not merely a relative (empirical) freedom of choice between different motives, but also an effective freedom to choose the will itself. However, as has been noted, Schopenhauer does not accept the idea that we could change our will (the second condition above). This deprives us of the effective freedom of will.

Instead, Schopenhauer formulates another, metaphysical, conception of the freedom of will. Schopenhauer claims that, though our actions are empirically determined, will in the basis of these actions is metaphysically free, and that we, in our self-consciousness, also feel this freedom. According to Schopenhauer, the concept of freedom arises from the immediate knowledge of one's own will. This will as world-creating, as the thing in itself, is free from the principle of sufficient reason, and thus from all necessity, and hence is completely independent, free, and indeed almighty (W1, 675;503.) In the self-consciousness, where will is known directly and in itself, lies the consciousness of freedom (W1, 174;113). The idea of the basis of the concept of freedom in a subject’s consciousness is also apparent in human moral consciousness. Schopenhauer notes that if a being is to be responsible for its actions, it must be free. From the responsibility and imputability which our conscience states it follows that will is free (P1, 84;64.) It is important not to confuse this metaphysical freedom of will with the above-considered effective freedom of will. Schopenhauer notes that the delusion of the individual's unconditioned freedom (read: effective freedom) arises from the fact that in the ordinary consciousness metaphysical will is confused with its appearance, and what belongs only to will is attributed to the appearance (W1,675;503). Hence, metaphysically will is free, but empirically every human action, based on the individual will, is determined.

These ideas have a parallel in Kant’s philosophy. Kant, too, maintains that empirically our actions are determined, but metaphysically they are free. Moreover, Kant holds that the idea of the freedom of will has a relation to human moral consciousness: if we are to be
faithful to the nature and demands of our moral consciousness, we must posit some kind of freedom to our actions. However, in its details, Kant’s contention of the freedom of will and action differs from Schopenhauer’s. While Kant, for example, maintains that, through the idea of the so-called noumenal causality, it is possible to think that every single human action has a spontaneous beginning in the noumenal world, Schopenhauer holds that the idea of the freedom of will is not applicable to the explanation of single human actions at all. It is intelligible only as a general idea applying to will as the thing in itself.

Besides applying the idea of metaphysical freedom to human actions, Schopenhauer gives another kind of metaphysical account of human, as well as animal, actions. By describing the motive of an animal action\(^\text{164}\) not only as an efficient cause (see above) but also as a final cause, Schopenhauer brings teleology into the explanation of animal actions. He writes:

“…in the case of the arbitrary actions of animal beings do the two [the efficient cause and the final cause] directly coincide, since in them the final cause, the end or aim, appears as motive…”\(^\text{165}\)

While phenomenally animal actions are explained causally on the basis of motives as efficient causes, metaphysically these actions are explained teleologically on the basis of motives as final causes. With human beings, teleology appears in a subject’s deliberate aim to do something. With animals, it appears in an animal’s instinctive behaviour (see, for example, W1,175;114). In both cases, the motive (see above: external object, image in the brain, or concept in the head) of an action is regarded as a final cause. This requires, I suggest, that the agent of the action must “interpret” the motive on the basis of the purpose of its action. For example, a piece of meat as a mere “uninterpreted” object/motive of cognition (as it was regarded above) cannot function as the final cause of an action. Instead, the piece of meat must be “interpreted” on the basis of the content of an animal instinct, or on the basis of a human deliberate act of will. In order to explain an animal action as a purposeful action, we need both the information-content given by the external object (cognition of a piece of meat), and a reference to the agent’s aim to fulfill its need on the basis of that external object - that

\(^{164}\) By ‘animal action’ I refer both to the actions of (non-rational) animals and human beings (rational animals).

\(^{165}\) “…bei den willkürlichen Handlungen tierischer Wesen fallen beide [der wirkenden Ursache und der Endursache] unmittelbar zusammen, indem hier die Endursache, der Zweck, als Motiv auftritt…” (W2, 429,331)
is, an “interpretation” of the external object (a piece of meat) as a vehicle of fulfilling some need (hunger). In this way, Schopenhauer brings the metaphysical principle of teleology into the understanding of animal actions.

Interestingly, Schopenhauer claims that final cause (motive) also acts on beings by whom it is not known (W2, 429;332). He notes that the instinct of animals gives the best explanation for the remaining teleology of nature. Just as an instinct is a behaviour (Handeln), resembling one according to a concept of a purpose, yet entirely without such a concept, so is all formation/growth in nature (Bilden der Natur) like that which is according to a concept of a purpose, and yet entirely without this (W1, 236;161.) In plant life, we see a decided striving, determined by needs, modified in many different ways, and adapting itself to the variety of circumstances, yet all this without knowledge (W2, 382;295). Moreover, teleology holds good in inorganic nature, where, Schopenhauer admits, the final cause is always ambiguous, and leaves us in doubt as to whether it exists at all (W2, 434-435,335-336). Yet Schopenhauer maintains that even the motion of physical bodies is a manifestation of the blind purposiveness of will. Hence, those modes of motion in nature, which earlier were theoretically explained on the basis of the three different causes, are now all teleologically (metaphysically) explained according to the purpose of a motion.166

After this examination of some of the basic aspects of Schopenhauer’s metaphysics of will I take a look at some problems in it.

5.3 Some problems

There are some intrinsic problems in Schopenhaur’s theory of will. The correlative relation of subject and object especially gives rise to difficulties. First, if our knowledge is always knowledge of an object - that is, of an appearance - then how can we have knowledge of metaphysical will? Second, if subject and object are always distinct from, or opposed to, one another, how can knowledge of what we call our own will be knowledge of our own self? How can we talk about self in this case? In the following, I will discuss these problems (emphasizing the first, from my point of view, the more serious one).

Schopenhauer seems to have two different solutions to the problem of the nature of knowledge concerning metaphysical will (the first problem). Sometimes he claims that the

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166 Also compare above the inner and outer teleology of nature (Chapter 5.1).
correlative relation of subject and object does not hold in the knowledge of our own will, and that this allows us to have direct access to the thing in itself. Schopenhauer notes that in the consciousness of one's own will:

“...each one knows and at the same time is himself his own individuality according to its nature immediately, without any form, even the form of subject and object, for here knower and known coincide.”\(^{167}\)

In this case, there is:

“…object coinciding with the subject, in other words, ceasing to be object.”\(^{168}\)

In a consciousness of one’s will - that is, in a self-consciousness - the most fundamental distinctions of cognition are exceeded: subject and object are no longer distinguished from each other, and the knowing subject is free from all the formal conditions of cognition. This disattachment from the basic determinations of phenomenal cognition allows us direct contact with the thing in itself. Janaway refers to this interpretation as the strong claim. According to this, Schopenhauer holds that, since in being aware of one’s will one has cognition in some manner totally devoid of mediation through the representing subject, we have (in self-consciousness) direct access to the thing in itself (Janaway 1989,193.)

It is clear that the strong claim is problematic regarding Schopenhauer’s idea of the constraints on knowledge. Direct knowledge of the thing in itself is a plain contradiction both of Schopenhauer’s claim regarding the transcendental nature of cognition and knowledge, and of his critique of rationalistic metaphysics (which claimed direct knowledge of the world as it is in itself). Moreover, the idea of the identity of subject and object brings Schopenhauer close to certain post-Kantian philosophers among which he would not like to be compared with. Philosophers like Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel claimed that in the so-called intellectual intuition the phenomenal distinction of subject and object is surpassed: considered from a higher, philosophical point of view, the distinction of subject and object is only an apparent one. Though Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel did not agree on the method and nature of the

\(^{167}\) “...jeden...sein eigenes Individuum seinem Wesen nach unmittelbar ohne alle Form, selbst ohne die von Subjekt und Objekt erkennt und zugleich selbst ist, da hier das Erkennende und das Erkannte zusammenfallen.” (W1, 172-173; 112)

\(^{168}\) “...Objekt mit dem Subjekt zusammenfallen, d.h. …aufhören, Objekt zu sein…”(W1, 160;102)
intellectual intuition, they all claimed that in this specific kind of philosophical knowledge lies a path to metaphysics.

To be sure, Schopenhauer himself claims that he has always stood on the ground of reflection (Reflexion) and honesty, without the vain pretension of intellectual intuition or absolute thought that characterizes the period of pseudo-philosophy between him and Kant (W2, 375;289). But can we trust Schopenhauer’s word on his refraining from the intellectual intuition? There are at least three things in Schopenhauer’s theory that are reminiscent of intellectual intuition. First, Schopenhauer speaks of a specific class of knowledge, which, by exceeding the distinction of subject and object, differs from any other kind of knowledge. Second, this knowledge is contentual/material knowledge of the world as it is in itself (see above, Chapter 5.1). Third, Schopenhauer holds that the metaphysical knowledge of will is based on a subject’s direct knowledge of what he does, that is, on a subject’s knowledge of his action (Chapter 5.1). According to the post-Kantian philosophers, metaphysical knowledge is specific, contentual/material knowledge of the nature and action of an “extended subject”, where the empirical distinction between subject and object no longer holds.169 However, as noted with respect to Hegel (footnote 157), Schopenhauer differs from the post-Kantian idealists in denying the conceptual nature of metaphysical knowledge. While the post-Kantian philosophers claimed for direct knowledge of some sort of metaphysical concepts, Schopenhauer abandoned the very idea of a rationalistic structure of the world, and concepts as providing an access to this world.

In any case, considering the difficulties associated with the strong claim, it is only natural that Schopenhauer also tries to moderate his arguments concerning the identity of subject and object, and the knowledge of the thing in itself. Contrary to the strong claim, Schopenhauer often claims that the dichotomy of subject and object is still prevalent in the

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169 Regarding the content of metaphysics, Schopenhauer seems to agree with much of Schelling's philosophy of nature. There is much similarity in Schelling's 'substance' or 'absolute' and Schopenhauer's 'will'. Frederick Beiser notes that Schelling saw substance as a living force. According to Schelling, all nature is a hierarchical manifestation of this force, beginning with its lower degrees of organisation and development in minerals, plants, and animals, and ending with its highest degree of organisation and development in human self-consciousness (Beiser 1996, 5-6.) This similarity between Schelling’s and Schopenhauer’s metaphysical descriptions might be read in favour of a claim that, contrary to what Schopenhauer says, his philosophy is actually quite Schellingian. In this respect, it is interesting to note that Schopenhauer himself pays attention to this question. Schopenhauer notes that before every great truth has been discovered, a previous feeling, a faint outline is proclaimed. But he alone is the author of a truth who has recognized it from its grounds, thought it out to its consequences, developed its whole content, surveyed the extent of its domain, and expounded it clearly and coherently (P1, 166;133.) Schopenhauer admits that, starting from Kant’s philosophy, it is no wonder if Fichte’s and Schelling’s philosophies show traces of the same fundamental idea, the root of which, according to Schopenhauer, is in Kant’s philosophy – that is, the idea of will as the thing in itself (P1, 165-166;132). However, Schopenhauer presumably thinks that only he has reached the right conclusions of the common Kantian starting-point.
knowledge of our own will; knowledge of oneself as will contains both the knower and the known. Moreover, this knowledge is always knowledge of the individual acts of our bodies/wills, not knowledge of will as a whole. As Schopenhauer notes, we know our will not as a whole, not as a unity, not completely according to its nature, but only in its individual acts in time (W1, 159-160;101); the knowledge of will is always mediated by the intuitive form of time (W2, 255;197). All this sets limits to the knowledge of the thing in itself. Schopenhauer writes:

“Meanwhile it is to be carefully noted, and I have always kept it in mind, that even the inward observation we have of our own will still does not by any means furnish an exhaustive and adequate knowledge of the thing in itself. It would do so if it were a wholly immediate observation. But such observation is brought about by the will, with and by means of corporization, providing itself also with an intellect…and then through this intellect knowing itself in self-consciousness…but this knowledge of the thing in itself is not wholly adequate. In the first place, such knowledge is tied to the form of the representation; it is observation, and as such falls apart into subject and object. For even in self-consciousness, the I is not absolutely simple, but consists of a knower (intellect) and a known (will); the former is not known and the latter is not knowing, although the two flow together into the consciousness of an I. But on this very account, this I is not intimate with itself through and through, does not shine through so to speak, but is opaque, and therefore remains a riddle to itself.”

Janaway refers to this interpretation as the weaker view. According to this, in knowing our will we are not totally free from the mediation through the representing subject, but can come as close as possible to the thing in itself, because of the relative "thinness" of the mediation involved. In this case, the cognition of one’s will is a case of representation, but a case that is

170 “Inzwischen ist wohl zu beachten, und ich habe es immer festgehalten, daß auch die innere Wahrnehmung, welche wir von unserm eigenen Willen haben, noch keineswegs eine erschöpfende und adäquate Erkenntnis des Dinges an sich liefert. Dies würde der Fall sein, wenn sie eine ganz unmittelbare wäre: weil sie nun aber dadurch vermittelt ist, daß der Wille mit und mittelst der Korporisation sich auch einen Intellekt…schafft und durch diesen nunmehr im Selbstbewußtsein…sich als Willen erkennt; so ist diese Erkenntnis des Dinges an sich nicht vollkommen adäquat. Zunächst ist sie an die Form der Vorstellung gebunden, ist Wahrnehmung und zerfällt als solche in Subjekt und Objekt. Denn auch im Selbstbewußtsein ist das Ich nicht schlechthin einfach, sondern besteht aus einem Erkennenden, Intellekt, und einem Erkannten, Wille: jener wird nicht erkannt, und dieser ist nicht erkennend, wenngleich beide in das Bewußtsein eines Ich zusammenfließen. Aber ebendeshalb ist dieses Ich sich nicht durch und durch intim, gleichsam durchleuchtet, sondern ist opak und bleibt daher sich selber ein Rätsel.” (W2, 254;196-197)
sui generis, because it is relatively unmediated (Janaway 1989,193.) On the representational nature of the knowledge of will, Schopenhauer writes:

“…the act of will is indeed only the nearest and clearest appearance of the thing in itself…In this way, Kant’s doctrine of the inability to know the thing in itself is modified to the extent that the thing in itself is merely not absolutely and completely knowable...” 171

Knowledge of will is knowledge of the phenomenon of the thing in itself. This indirect acquaintance with the thing in itself allows Schopenhauer to claim that he has advanced beyond Kant’s constraints on metaphysical knowledge, and yet maintain that, in the end, the thing in itself remains unknown. Schopenhauer writes:

"...the question may still be raised what that will, which manifests itself in the world and as the world, is ultimately and absolutely in itself; in other words, what it is, quite apart from the fact that it manifests itself as will, or in general appears, that is to say, is known in general. This question can never be answered, because, as I have said, being-known of itself contradicts being-in-itself, and everything that is known is as such only appearance." 172

“If, in spite of this essential limitation of the intellect, it becomes possible…to arrive at a certain understanding of the world and the essence of things, this will nevertheless be only a very limited, entirely indirect, and relative understanding, a parabolic translation into the forms of knowledge…which must leave many problems still unsolved.” 173

171 “…ist zwar der Willensakt nur die nächste und deutlichste Erscheinung des Dinges an sich....Hiedurch wird Kant’s Lehre von der Unerkennbarkeit des Dinges an sich dahin modifiziert, daß dasselbe nur nicht schlechthin und von Grund aus erkennbar sei…” (W2, 255;197)

172 “…läßt…sich noch die Frage aufwerfen, was denn jener Wille, der sich in der Welt und als die Welt darstellt, zuletzt schlechthin an sich selbst sei, d.h. was er sei, ganz abgesehen davon, daß er sich als Wille darstellt oder überhaupt erscheint, d.h. überhaupt erkannt wird. – Diese Frage ist nie zu beantworten: weil, wie gesagt, das Erkanntwerden schon dem An-sich-Sein widerspricht und jedes Erkannte schon als solches nur Erscheinung ist.” (W2, 256;198)

173 “Wenn es trotz dieser wesentlichen Beschränkung des Intellekts möglich wird…zu einem gewissen Verständnis der Welt und des Wesens der Dinge zu gelangen; so wird dieses doch nur ein sehr limitiertes, ganz mittelbares und relatives, nämlich eine parabolische Übersetzung in die Formen der Erkenntnis…welches stets noch viele Probleme ungelöst übriglassen muß.” (W2, 374;288)
Hence, according to the weaker view, Schopenhauer does not put forward absolute, apodictically certain metaphysics. Metaphysical knowledge of will is not direct knowledge of the world as it is in itself, but an interpretation or translation (see above: parabolic translation) of the world as it is in itself. The nature of this kind of metaphysical knowledge will be discussed more closely below (Chapter 6.1).\textsuperscript{174}

I suggest that Schopenhauer's advanced opinion concerning the knowledge of the thing in itself accommodates rather to the weaker view than the strong claim. Generally, Schopenhauer’s idea of an empirical or \textit{a posteriori} basis of metaphysics (see above, Chapter 5.1) implies that no absolute metaphysics is possible. As Schopenhauer notes, the origin of metaphysics from empirical sources of knowledge deprives it of apodictic certainty (W2, 235;181). Instead of direct knowledge of the thing in itself, the empirical basis of metaphysics allows a certain conception of the thing in itself – that is, some kind of “transcendental” (second-order) description of the essence and nature of the thing in itself.

This being the case, it may be claimed that those passages where Schopenhauer speaks of direct knowledge of the thing in itself, or of the identity of subject and object, should not be read straightforwardly. Instead, they must be placed within a wider context of interpretation. Schopenhauer notes that his philosophy forms a single thought, which, for the purpose of being communicated, is split up into parts, which still constitute an organic connection. This means that even the smallest part cannot be fully understood until the whole has first been understood (W1, 7;xii.) It may be thought that the so-called direct knowledge of the thing in itself is direct only with respect to the other modes of cognition, which, as has been seen, have various formal and material conditions. The knowledge of the thing in itself is not direct knowledge \textit{per se}. Hence, in connection with the knowledge of will, Schopenhauer, in one passage (see above p. 95), speaks first of an object coinciding with the subject or ceasing to be an object, but later notes that the fourth class of objects - that is, will – cannot \textit{properly} be opposed to the subject as object (W1,160;102). In the case of the self-consciousness of will, subject and will are not (properly) opposed if we compare them to those forms of cognition where subject and object are (properly) opposed. This allows an option that, in some other (non-proper) sense, subject and object may still be opposed. In this respect, Schopenhauer’s later (1844) note that he has always kept it in mind that the

\textsuperscript{174} This cautiousness with respect to metaphysics is also apparent in Schopenhauer’s warning of mysticism. Schopenhauer notes that when we are immersed in the silent and obscure depths of the subject, we are threatened with the danger of falling into mysticism. Therefore, we can draw from this source only what is in fact true, accessible to each and all, and consequently absolutely undeniable (P1, 101;78.)
knowledge of our own will does not give exhaustive knowledge of the thing in itself (W2, 254;196, above p. 97) can be read as an attempt to emphasize that, contrary to what he sometimes seems to suggest, he does not claim direct knowledge of will as the thing in itself. Moreover, Schopenhauer’s above remark that, in the end, will, after all, may not be identical with the thing in itself (quotation, p. 98) in any case deprives direct knowledge of the thing in itself. In this case, the concept of will refers to that level of the world, which, to a certain extent, is open to our knowledge, but besides this there is something left upon of which we cannot form any conception at all. Hence, even if there were direct knowledge of will, there would not be direct knowledge of the thing in itself.175

However, here it is worth asking if there is any intelligibility at all in Schopenhauer’s claim that knowledge of will yields some kind of, even minimal, knowledge of the thing in itself. It might be claimed that, although the knowledge of our own will is different and more unconditional than any other kind of knowledge, it does not give access to the thing in itself. As Janaway notes, even if a clear account can be given of the inner experience of will, there can in principle be no guarantee that a smaller number of subjective forms of the understanding takes us "nearer" the thing in itself than does a larger number (Janaway 1989,197). It is quite reasonable to criticize the idea that the relative unconditionality in the knowledge of will brings us closer to the thing in itself. Our knowledge of will might be just a different kind of knowledge. Hence, there seems to be no basis for Schopenhauer’s identification of the knowledge of will with the knowledge of the thing in itself. Or is there?

Certain questions may be asked. What am I - as I am in itself? Is there any basis for regarding myself rather as a willing being, than as a determined, embodied organism acting on the basis of conceptual motives? If I want to give a proper description of my action, is it enough to refer to the conceptual motives on the basis of my action, and to some kind of theoretical/external understanding of myself as the subject of action? If this is the case, then the idea of my having a more proper and deeper insight into my own action (for example, as will) than to the actions of other people must be abandoned. If both the description of my own action and the description of any other action can be given only through the above-mentioned theoretical/external description of an action, then the description of my own action does not differ from the description of any other action. Not to mention that I would have any deeper insight into my own action than to any other action. But this is an absurd conclusion. I do have a different kind of, as well as a more proper and deeper, insight into my own action.

175 I will not go into a closer examination of the question of the identity/non-identity of will and the thing in itself. On this matter, see, for example, Janaway 1999b.
And, in my view, Schopenhauer’s account of will has an affinity with this more proper insight. It invokes certain qualities of myself, which I recognize as belonging to the essence of my action (for example, ‘striving’, or ‘aiming for goals’). Now, since this deeper and a more proper point of view to my action may also be said to be a description of my action in itself, I may say that I have knowledge of my action in itself. As such, regarding the knowledge concerning my own action, the knowledge of will and the knowledge of the thing in itself can, to a certain extent, be identified.\textsuperscript{176}

However, clearly this claim must be separated from the general, metaphysical knowledge of the thing in itself. Though it is quite consistent to claim that, through will, I have some kind of knowledge of myself as I am in itself, this knowledge concerns only me. Certain general aspects of this knowledge may be assumed also to concern other human beings, but certainly not the whole world. The idea of an analogy of what a self-conscious subject knows about himself with the rest of nature (also unconscious nature) is extremely problematic. A self-conscious subject is one phenomenon in the world, and there is no guarantee that those properties or qualities which he finds in himself would have any contextual meaning with respect to other natural phenomena. Though Schopenhauer, quite consistently, tries to avoid any straightforward use of the description of an activity of a conscious subject to the rest of the world, there may be no meaningful way to approach the metaphysical basis of the world in this way. The effort to use concepts related explicitly to a human consciousness (for example, ‘willing’ and ‘striving’) even metaphorically with respect to the whole world, together with Schopenhauer’s idea that any relation to consciousness must be detached from these concepts, is so unclear that it is more or less devoid of content. What can be left, for example, of our conscious experience of willing (wanting) something, if, as Schopenhauer requires, we suspend every human determination of it? Or, as Janaway asks, how could a thing that never acts, or experiences, or has any self-consciousness (for example, a stone) be in its own nature just what I discover myself to be in the self-conscious experience of being an agent (Janaway 1999b,148)? A more plausible path for Schopenhauer would be some kind of phenomenological and hermeneutic interpretation of a subject's inner nature,

\textsuperscript{176} Schopenhauer also holds that will constitutes the ‘I’ or the personal identity of a subject’s consciousness. He notes that will alone is permanent and unchangeable in consciousness. It holds all the ideas and representations together as means to its ends, tinges them with the colour of its character, its mood, and its interest. It is will that is spoken of whenever ‘I’ occurs in a judgment (W2, 180;140.) Hence, Schopenhauer’s explanation of a personal identity differs from all the common explanations of it, that is, 1) the sameness of immaterial substance (soul), 2) the sameness of a living human body, 3) the sameness of consciousness (including memory), and 4) the identity of human brains (A Companion to Metaphysics, Sydney Shoemaker, p. 380-385).
without strong metaphysical implications. But most likely this would not raise so much interest in him.

Before closing this chapter, I briefly discuss the second problem concerning the correlative relation of subject and object: How can we talk about self-knowledge in the knowledge of will? As Janaway asks, how can inner self-knowledge be self-knowledge, if for any instance of the schema x knows y, the subject x and the object y must be distinct (Janaway 1989,194)? To be sure, Schopenhauer never really resolves this problem. He holds that the identity between the knower and the known in self-knowledge is an inexplicable "knot of the world". Schopenhauer writes:

“Now the identity of the subject of willing with that of knowing by virtue whereof (and indeed necessarily) the word ‘I’ includes and indicates both, is the knot of the world, and hence inexplicable. For to us only the relations between objects are intelligible; but of these, two can be one only insofar as they are parts of a whole. Here, on the other hand, where we are speaking of the subject, the rules for the knowing of objects no longer apply, and an actual identity of the knower with what is known as willing and hence of the subject with the object, is immediately given. But whoever really grasps the inexplicable nature of this identity, will with me call it the miracle ‘par excellence.’”

Schopenhauer points here to a genuine problem. If the subject-object distinction is taken as given, there is no theoretical reason to assume any identity between subject and object, not even in the case of our own self-consciousness.

However, in the above passage Schopenhauer refers to another kind of solution. He notes that the identity of subject and object in the self-consciousness of will is immediately given. Somehow – immediately – we acquire not theoretical knowledge but yet some kind of understanding of the identity of subject and object. This understanding, I suggest, comes close to what Schopenhauer understands by the feeling of truth, of which, according to him, we are conscious only intuitively (intuitiv), but have not yet formulated into abstract concepts.

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177 "Die Identität nun aber des Subjekts des Wollens mit dem erkennenden Subjekt, vermöge welcher (und zwar notwendig) das Wort ‘Ich’ beide einschließt und bezeichnet, ist der Weltknoten und daher unerklärlich. Denn nur die Verhältnisse der Objekte sind uns begreiflich: unter diesen aber können zwei nur insofern eins sein, als sie Teile eines Ganzen sind. Hier hingegen, wo vom Subjekt die Rede ist, gelten die Regeln für das Erkennen der Objekte nicht mehr, und eine wirkliche Identität des Erkennenden mit dem als wollend Erkannten, also des Subjekts mit dem Objekte, ist unmittelbar gegeben. Wer aber das Unerklärliche dieser Identität sich recht vergegenwärtigt, wird sie mit mir das Wunder...[schlechthin] nennen.“ (vW, 171,211-212)
In this respect, Schopenhauer refers, for example, to the feeling of geometrical truth, logical
and mathematical feeling, and the feeling of the sameness or difference of two formulas (W1,
95-96;52.) The feeling of the identity of subject and object in the consciousness of will may
be counted as one instance of this kind of pre-conceptual cognition. Hence, it would be
feeling, not theoretical knowledge, which gives us a guarantee of the identity between
(theoretically separated) subject and object in self-consciousness. This identity is a \textit{fact par
excellence}, though from the point of view of theoretical knowledge, it may be called a
\textit{miracle par excellence}.\textsuperscript{178}

I now approach the consideration of Schopenhauer’s relation to the "two-world"
doctrine (Chapter 5.4), and the "two-aspect" doctrine (Chapter 5.5).

\textbf{5.4 The connection to the “two-world” doctrine}

Earlier it was shown that Schopenhauer’s critique of the so-called realistic dogmatism can be
seen as a critique of the “two-world” doctrine (Chapter 4.4). Besides this, certain other things
invoke Schopenhauer’s negative attitude to that doctrine. Namely, Schopenhauer explicitly
criticizes Kant for 1) illegitimate use of the category of causality with respect to the things in
themselves, and 2) regarding things in themselves as objects.

Schopenhauer’s critique of the use of the category of causality in connection with the
things in themselves is based on his contention that Kant nowhere discusses the thing in itself
thoroughly. Schopenhauer writes:

\begin{quote}
“Kant has nowhere made the thing in itself the subject of a special discussion or clear
inference, but whenever he makes use of it, he at once brings it in through the
conclusion that the appearance…must have a ground, an intelligible cause, which is
not appearance, and which therefore does not belong to any possible experience. This
he does after having incessantly urged that the categories, and thus also the category
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{178} A thorough account of the question of the identity/distinctness of subject and object in self-consciousness can
be found in Janaway’s \textit{Self and World in Schopenhauer’s Philosophy} (1989).
of causality, had a use in every way restricted only to possible experience…beyond which…they had no significance at all…”\textsuperscript{179}

“Kant bases the assumption of the thing in itself…on a conclusion according to the law of causality, namely that empirical perception, or more correctly sensation in our organs of sense from which it proceeds, must have an external cause. Now, according to his own correct discovery, the law of causality is known to us a priori, and consequently is a function of our intellect, and so is of subjective origin.”\textsuperscript{180}

Seemingly, in these passages, Schopenhauer understands Kant's concepts of a ground (Grund), an intelligible cause (intelligible Ursache), and a cause (Ursache) in the same sense as referring to a causal ground/cause.\textsuperscript{181} Accordingly, Schopenhauer notes that Kant reserves the causal nexus under the name “ground of the appearance” for his false inference (Ableitung) of the thing in itself (W1,602;447). This is erroneous, since the principle of causality is valid only within the phenomenal world, and cannot lead to the thing in itself. As Schopenhauer notes, on the path of the representation we can never get beyond the representation, which is a closed whole, and has in its own resources no thread leading to the essence of the thing in itself, which is toto genere different from it (W1,674;502).

Besides this critique of exceeding the limits of experience, there is another aspect in Schopenhauer’s critique of use of the law of causality in the inference of the thing in itself - namely, the mediate nature of this inference. In connection with a note on Kant’s erroneous inference of the thing in itself, Schopenhauer notes that he has not arrived at the thing in itself by roundabout ways. On the contrary, he has demonstrated the thing in itself directly, where it immediately lies - in will that reveals itself to everyone immediately as the in-itself of his

\textsuperscript{179} “Kant hat das Ding an sich nirgends zum Gegenstand einer besonderen Auseinandersetzung oder deutlichen Ableitung gemacht. Sondern, sooft er es braucht, zieht er es sogleich herbei durch den Schluß, daß die Erscheinung…doch einen Grund, eine intelligibele Ursache, die nicht Erscheinung wäre und daher zu keiner möglichen Erfahrung gehören, haben müsse. Dies tut er, nachdem er unablässig eingeschärft hat, die Kategorien, also auch die der Kausalität hätten einen durchaus nur auf mögliche Erfahrung beschränkten Gebrauch,…über welche hinaus sie…gar keine Bedeutung hätten…” (W1, 673;502)

\textsuperscript{180} “Kant gründet die Voraussetzung des Dinges an sich…auf einen Schluß nach dem Kausalitütsgesetz, daß nämlich die empirische Anschatung, richtiger die Empfindung in unsern Sinnesorganen, von der sie ausgeht, eine äußere Ursache haben müsse. Nun aber ist nach seiner eigenen und richtigen Entdeckung das Gesetz der Kausalität uns a priori bekannt, folglich eine Funktion unsers Intelletks, also subjektiven Ursprungs…” (W1, 588; 436)

\textsuperscript{181} Schopenhauer’s identification of these concepts is somewhat baffling in the light of his contention that various kinds of grounds must always be distinguished from each other (see above, Chapter 4.1).
own appearance (W1, 675;503). In Schopenhauer’s account, the thing in itself is not something which could be inferred from something else. In Kant’s case, this inference (see above: from appearances) proved to be illegitimate, but it seems that even a legitimate inference of the thing in itself (if one could be imagined) would contradict Schopenhauer’s conception of the nature of the knowledge of the thing in itself. Schopenhauer’s understanding of the method of metaphysics is so heavily based on intuitive knowledge (see below, Chapter 6.1) that any kind of rational or logical inference of the thing in itself seems alien to it. Schopenhauer notes that that which precedes knowledge as its condition, whereby that knowledge first of all became possible, and hence its own basis, cannot be immediately grasped by knowledge, just as the eye cannot see itself (W2, 372;287). Knowledge – including rational and logical inferences – has application only in the phenomenal world. In that world, knowledge is most useful, but it cannot offer any tools for getting into contact with the thing in itself. The world in itself does not contain those kinds of epistemic qualities, which would allow it to be revealed for an epistemic analysis (though epistemic considerations have an application in the further analysis of the thing in itself). An acquaintance with the thing in itself is not a mediated acquaintance aided by the forms of knowledge, but an immediate acquaintance with the inner essence of phenomena.

As noted, Schopenhauer also thinks that Kant regards the things in themselves as some kind of objects.182 He writes:

“[Kant] does not, as truth demanded, lay down the object simply and positively as conditioned by the subject, and vice versa, but only the manner of the object’s appearance as conditioned by the subject’s forms of knowledge, which therefore also come a priori to consciousness. Now what, in contrast to this, is known merely a posteriori, is for him already immediate effect of the thing in itself, which becomes appearance only in its passage through those forms that are given a priori. From this point of view, it is to some extent clear how he could fail to notice that being-object in general belongs to the form of the appearance, and is just as much conditioned by being-subject in general as the object’s mode of appearing is conditioned by the

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182 On one occasion, Schopenhauer makes a sort of reservation for this claim. He notes that even Kant, at any rate so long as he remained consistent, cannot have thought of any objects among his things in themselves (W2, 16;7). Presumably, however, Schopenhauer thinks that Kant did not remain consistent in his thinking, or in his expressions of thinking, of the things in themselves.
subject’s forms of knowledge; hence that, if a thing in itself is to be assumed, it
cannot be an object at all, which, however, he always assumes it to be…”183

Kant’s mistake was to forget that any references to objects must have a relation to the subject. The idea of the transcendental basis of objects includes also the “first-hand appearance” of an object for a subject - that is, the correlative relation of subject and object - not merely the individual forms of that appearance. As Schopenhauer notes, the being-object-for-a-subject (Objekt-für-ein-Subjekt-Sein) is the first and most universal form of all appearances. Kant should have noticed this, and expressly denied being-object (Objektsein) to the thing in itself (W1, 252;175.)184

Though Schopenhauer clearly is critical of the “two-world” doctrine, some of his ideas might be read in favour of this position. First of all, Schopenhauer sometimes seems to refer not to independently existing objects but yet to the independently existing thing in itself. Schopenhauer notes, for example, that in appearance:

“…an essence manifests itself, such essence being different from the appearance itself and accordingly would be the thing in itself.”185

On the assumption that the term ‘different’ (verschieden) refers here to two separately existing entities (appearances and the thing in itself/essence), this passage is in line with the “two-world” doctrine. However, I hold that such passages do not attach Schopenhauer to that doctrine. In the next chapter (where I take another look at the above quotation), I will suggest that Schopenhauer’s distinction between appearances and the thing in itself is more properly approachable, not as the “two-world” distinction of two independently existing entities, but as

183 “[Kant] setzt nicht, wie es die Wahrheit verlangte, einfach und schlechthin das Objekt als bedingt durch das Subjekt und umgekehrt; sondern nur die Art und Weise der Erscheinung des Objekts als bedingt durch die Erkenntnisformen des Subjekts, welche daher auch a priori zum Bewußtsein kommen. Was nun aber im Gegensatz hievon bloß a posteriori erkannt wird, ist ihm schon unmittelbare Wirkung des Dinges an sich, welches nur im Durchgang durch jene a priori gegebenen Formen zur Erscheinung wird. Aus dieser Ansicht ist es einigermaßen klarlich, wie es ihm entgegen konnte, daß schon das Objektsein überhaupt zur Form der Erscheinung gehört und durch das Subjektsein überhaupt ebensowohl bedingt ist als die Erscheinungsweise des Objekts durch die Erkenntnisformen des Subjekts, daß also, wenn ein Ding an sich angenommen werden soll, es durchaus auch nicht Objekt sein kann, als welches er es jedoch immer voraussetzt…” (W1, 674;502-503)

184 See also above Schopenhauer’s distinction between ‘objective existence’ and ‘absolute existence’ (Chapter 4.6).

185 “…ein von ihr selbst verschiedenes Wesen, welches demnach das Ding an sich wäre, sich darstellt.” (P2, 27;18)
a certain kind of analytic distinction between different aspects of empirical objects. However, what brings Schopenhauer close to the “two-world” doctrine, and gives rise to a difficulty in reading him as a proponent of the “two-aspect” doctrine, is his identification of appearances/objects with representations as mental states. This matter will also be considered in the next chapter, in connection with Schopenhauer’s “two-aspect” doctrine.

5.5 Will as the fundamental basis of the world – the connection to the “two-aspect” doctrine

Besides Schopenhauer’s identification of objects with representations, there are a few other things which deserve a consideration with respect to his relation to the “two-aspect” doctrine. These include 1) Schopenhauer’s way of speaking of appearances/representations and the thing in itself as the two aspects/sides of one and the same objects, 2) his method of acquiring knowledge of the thing in itself, and 3) the question what is the ‘thing’ that is being considered from the two points of view.

First, Schopenhauer explicitly refers to appearances and the thing in itself (will) as the different aspects or sides (Seiten) of objects, and the world. He writes:

“…will alone constitutes the other aspect of the world, for this world is, on the one side, entirely representation, just as, on the other, it is entirely will.”

“…to look for the inner nature of the world in quite another aspect of it which is entirely different from the representation.”

“…that the objective world, the world as representation, is not the only side of the world, but merely its external side, so to speak, and that the world has an entirely different side which is its innermost being, its kernel, the thing in itself.”

186 “...der Wille...allein die andere Seite der Welt ausmacht: denn diese ist, wie einerseits durch und durch Vorstellung, so andererseits durch und durch Wille.” (W1, 33;4)

187 “...das innerste Wesen der Welt in einer ganz andern von der Vorstellung durchaus verschiedenen Seite derselben zu suchen...” (W1, 71 ;34)

188 “...daß die objektive Welt, die Welt als Vorstellung, nicht die einzige, sondern nur die eine, gleichsam die äußere Seite der Welt ist, welche noch eine ganz und gar andere Seite hat, die ihr innerstes Wesen, ihr Kern, das Ding an sich ist...” (W1, 66-67;30-31)
“…the intuitive apprehension of the same object that is successively contemplated from different points of view…” 189

According to Schopenhauer, one and the same objects exist both as an object of cognition (as representation), and in itself, independent of our cognition (as will). This was already implicit in Schopenhauer’s identification of human will and the human body. As has been seen, Schopenhauer holds that the distinction of the body and the will is due only to a knowing subject. It is an epistemological distinction between two ways of knowing a human body, and yields knowledge of the two sides of this one and the same body (Chapter 5.1). This kind of speaking is in accordance with the "two-aspect" doctrine: will and representation are the two sides of objects, and of the world.190 As Janaway notes, for Schopenhauer will and its objectification in the phenomena are two sides of a coin, two aspects of the same world (Janaway 1994,32). In line with this, Robert Wicks notes that Schopenhauer’s key philosophical insight is that the immediate knowledge of oneself as will and the knowledge of causally-related things in space and time reflect two sides of the same ‘world as representation’ (Wicks 1993,181-182.)

Second, there is the question of method. As has been seen, according to the “two-aspect” doctrine, Kant’s distinction between appearances and things in themselves is based on the consideration of things with and without their transcendentally constituted properties. Schopenhauer’s contention that our knowledge of will as the thing in itself is, partly, due to a consideration of objects apart from their transcendentally constituted properties is in line with this – what I will call – analytic method of consideration. Schopenhauer writes:

“…if we set aside their [objects’]s existence as the subject’s representation, what still remains over must be, according to its inner nature, the same as what in ourselves we call will.”191

189 “…die anschauliche Auffassung desselben nur sukzessive von verschiedenen Seiten betrachteten Objekts…” (P1, 163;130)

190 Below I will consider how Schopenhauer’s contention of the different aspects of objects differs from the “two-aspect” doctrine as presented in connection with Kant (Chapter 3.2).

191 “…wenn man ihr [Objektes] Dasein als Vorstellung des Subjekts beiseite setzt, das dann noch Übrigbleibende seinem innern Wesen nach dasselbe sein muß, als was wir an uns Wille nennen.” (W1, 164;105)
“…the course of our investigation renders necessary this abstraction, this one-sided method of consideration, this forcible separation of two things [representation, the thing in itself] that essentially exist together.”

The analytic method of consideration is also apparent in Schopenhauer’s idea that metaphysical knowledge can be acquired by abstracting the material from the formal part of phenomena (see above, Chapter 5.1). Schopenhauer writes:

“…material is in no way to be derived from the forms of the appearance which attach to the subject...On the contrary it is still left over after the abstraction of everything that flows from those forms, and so it is found as a second wholly distinct element of the empirical appearance and as an addition that is foreign to them.”

Schopenhauer's language when describing the method of knowing the thing in itself is familiar from the “two-aspect” doctrine as presented in connection with Kant. In connection with Kant, mention was made of “abstraction” and “consideration”; now we talk about "abstraction", "consideration", and “setting aside”. Schopenhauer’s note on the separation of what is different and identical in appearances as it were sums up his method of metaphysics:

“…in this first book we consider the world...only in so far as it is representation...Only deeper investigation, more difficult abstraction, the separation of what is different, and the combination of what is identical can lead us to the truth…’The world is my will.’”

When we, analytically, consider the different sides of various objects in the world, we find them vastly different. However, on the basis of our self-knowledge of will, we also find one

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192 “…der Gang unserer Untersuchung macht diese Abstraktion, diese einseitige Betrachtungsart, dies gewaltsame Trennen des wesentlich Zusammen-Bestehenden [Vorstellung, das Ding an sich] notwendig…” (W1, 51;19)

193 “…Stoff keineswegs aus...am Subjekt haftenden Formen der Erscheinung abzuleiten ist, vielmehr nach Abzug alles aus diesen Fließenden noch übrigbleibt, also sich als ein zweites völlig distinktes Element der empirischen Erscheinung und als eine jenen Formen fremde Zutat vorfindet…” (P1, 115-116;91)

194 “…nur sofern sie Vorstellung ist betrachten wir die Welt in diesem ersten Buche....nur tiefere Forschung, schwierigere Abstraktion, Trennung des Verschiedenen und Vereinigung des Identischen führen kann...eine Wahrheit...’Die Welt ist mein Wille’.” (W1, 32-33;4)
identical element in all objects: they all have the same essence, will. This kind of analytic method of consideration is reminiscent of the method of the “two-aspect” doctrine as presented with Kant, and affords an opportunity to re-evaluate that passage of Schopenhauer, which above was interpreted as supporting the “two-world” doctrine (p. 106). There, Schopenhauer spoke about an essence (the thing in itself) as different (verschieden) from the appearance. If it is acknowledged that Schopenhauer’s distinction between appearances and the thing in itself is a distinction of different aspects/sides of objects, it may be claimed that when he refers to something ‘different’ from appearances, he does not refer to something distinct from appearances, but to another/different side of appearances. In this case, Schopenhauer also does not accept the above-mentioned “two-world” claim that appearances do not have an existence without the subject of cognition (p. 22). If the distinction between appearances and the thing in itself is an analytic distinction, the nature of the dependence of appearances and the thing in itself is not a ‘relational’ dependence between two distinct entities, but what could be called an ‘intrinsic’ dependence between two aspects of objects. In this case, if the subject’s role in the constitution of appearances is removed, these appearances still exist (due to the thing in itself).

But how far does Schopenhauer’s methodological similarity with the “two-aspect” doctrine as presented in connection with Kant go? As has been seen, Schopenhauer’s consideration of objects as things in themselves is based on a contentual experience of the inner essence of one specific object in the world - that is, our own body. In the consideration of our bodies, we do not make merely a conceptual distinction between our body as an appearance and the thing in itself, but also acquire contentual knowledge of the thing in itself. Accordingly, Zöller notes that for Schopenhauer the self is not just regarded or considered in alternative ways but shows itself, prereflectively, in this twofold manner and with these two sides. While Kant’s distinction between appearances and things in themselves is a distinction between two ways of philosophically considering the same things (Zöller refers here to Prauss and Allison), Schopenhauer’s distinction is a distinction between two ways of experiencing oneself and, by extension, the world (Zöller 1999b,27.) On this basis, it can be seen that Schopenhauer’s idea of the two aspects of objects (representation/will) differs from both of the above-mentioned (negative and positive) versions of the “two-aspect” doctrine. Schopenhauer does not follow the negative version of the “two-aspect” doctrine and stop at a mere negative consideration of objects. Nor does he follow the positive version of that doctrine and think that the logical use of reason yields problematic knowledge of the thing in itself, not to mention that knowledge of the thing in itself defines the way that things might
look from the point of view a pure intelligible being (Chapter 3.2.) Hence, if it is still contended that Schopenhauer’s method of metaphysics parallels with the method of the “two-aspect” doctrine as presented in connection with Kant, the similarity between these two methods must be found somewhere else than in the descriptions of the negative and positive versions of the “two-aspect” doctrine. I find this similarity in the replacement of the distinction between the two sets of things (appearances and the thing in itself) by a distinction between two aspects of one and the same things. Though Schopenhauer’s consideration of things yields contentual claims concerning both appearances (representations) and the thing in itself (will), the distinction remains that between aspects, not between two sets of things.

In any case, there is still one matter to be considered. Acknowledging that Schopenhauer considers things from two points of view prompts the question as to what the ‘thing’ is that is being considered? Could it be an empirical object/world? If it is maintained that Schopenhauer uses an analytic method in his metaphysics, then it is possible to think that, by analytically reflecting on empirical objects, Schopenhauer forms two conceptions of these objects. First, he considers empirical objects in relation to the subject of cognition, as appearances, in which case cognition and knowledge proper can be acquired of these objects. Second, Schopenhauer considers the same empirical objects without a relation to the knowing subject, as they are in themselves. In this case, no cognition or knowledge proper can be acquired of these objects, but, on the basis of our self-knowledge, they may, analogically, be considered to be essentially will. This reading gains support, first of all, from the title of Schopenhauer’s main work, The World as Will and Representation (Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung), implying that ‘will’ and ‘representation’ form two sides of the (empirical) world. It is also in line with many passages in Schopenhauer. Above Schopenhauer spoke of the apprehension of the same object that is successively contemplated from different points of view (P1,163;130, p. 108), and said that if we set aside the objects’s existence as the subject’s representation, what remains must be, according to its inner nature, the same as what in ourselves we call will (W1, 164;105, p. 108). He also noted that, at first, we consider the world only as representation, but after a deeper investigation, we recognize that the world is will too. The world is, on the one side, entirely representation, on the other side, entirely will (W1,32-33;4, p. 107 and 109.) As noted, this kind of interpretation of the distinction between

Moreover, Schopenhauer does not speak about ‘problematic’ knowledge at all. The reason for this, I suggest, lies in Schopenhauer’s contention that metaphysics is not based on a different kind of application of the same kind of rational knowledge (of reason), but on a qualitatively different kind of knowledge. If rational knowledge has no application at all in metaphysics, it can have no ‘problematic’ application either.
appearances and the thing in itself has the problem of identifying empirical objects with one of its aspects, that is, appearances. However, this problem may be bypassed if it is maintained that the speaking of ‘appearances’ belongs to a different level of consideration than the speaking of ‘empirical objects’ (p. 33).

Such a reading of Schopenhauer’s distinction between appearances and the thing in itself is appealing. It makes sense to speak of ‘appearances’ as that aspect of empirical objects, which is open to our theoretical knowledge. It also makes sense to speak of ‘will’ as that aspect of our own body (object), which forms the essence of this body, and then analogically apply the idea of the inner aspect of one specific object to all the other objects in the world. However, clearly this version of the “two-aspect” doctrine differs from the “two-aspect” doctrine as presented in connection with Kant. First, Schopenhauer’s idea of will as the other aspect of the world is not based on the consideration of empirical objects generally, but on the consideration of one specific empirical object – that is, one’s own body. Only after this first contact with the thing in itself are we allowed to consider other empirical objects as things in themselves. Second, as noted, Schopenhauer’s idea of will as the other side of phenomena does not count as a mere negative or problematic consideration of objects as they are in themselves. For Schopenhauer, will constitutes the inner essence of objects – the “inside” of objects. Hence, the way of considering empirical objects as they are in themselves is not the same in Kant and Schopenhauer. While the Kantian concept of the thing in itself is constituted on a negative or problematic consideration/thinking of (any) empirical objects, and has no genuine content, Schopenhauer’s concept of the thing in itself is constituted on the inner self-experience relating to one specific empirical object, and has a genuine content.

With respect to the three other above-mentioned “two-aspect” readings of the distinction between appearances and the thing in itself (p. 33-34), we may note the following. Clearly, since Schopenhauer does not accept Kant’s concept of the transcendental object (see, for example, vW, 187-188;233), he also would not accept the ‘transcendental object’ as the description of the ‘thing’ that ‘appearances’ and ‘the thing in itself’ refer to. Nor can the thing in itself/will be regarded as the required ‘thing’. With respect to both Kant’s and Schopenhauer’s transcendental constraints on knowledge, it would be inconsistent to start the analysis of the different aspects of objects from something metaphysical (that is, the thing in

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196 By talking of a ‘genuine content’ I want to make a distinction between this claim and the above-mentioned argument that Kant’s so-called positive consideration of the things in themselves has a certain kind of metaphysical content (p. 30-31). Since this metaphysical content, however, is determined as ‘problematic’, it is possible to distinguish it from a ‘non-problematic’ (though perhaps yet otherwise restricted) metaphysical knowledge.
itself). However, the metaphorical interpretation, which allows a looser approach to the present distinction, could be applied to Schopenhauer. After all, Schopenhauer is not always so careful of all the possible problems related to the use of various concepts in various circumstances (as has become clear from the above notes on Schopenhauer’s way of using concepts in different meanings in different situations). Yet I prefer the idea of regarding empirical objects as the basis of the distinction between appearances and the thing in itself. This interpretation, at least, gives us more information on the details of Schopenhauer’s thinking.

Finally, I return to Schopenhauer’s identification of objects with representations. In this respect, it is important to consider the “two-world” identification of empirical objects with representations/mental states, and the idea that these objects have no existence without the subject of cognition. If Schopenhauer’s theory is read from the “two-aspect” point of view as presented above, his position on these matters is the following: Schopenhauer considers empirical objects as representations/mental states, but, at the same time, considers these objects as something having a subject-independent existence in will (see also above the distinction between a ‘relational’ and an ‘intrinsic’ connection of appearances and the thing in itself, p. 110). This is a version of the “two-aspect” doctrine as presented in connection with Kant (Chapter 3.2). The Kantian part of Schopenhauer’s “two-aspect” doctrine consists of an analytic consideration of the two sides (appearances/the thing in itself) of empirical objects. The un-Kantian part consists of his contentual claims concerning these two sides: appearances are regarded as representations, the thing in itself is regarded as will. Most notably, it must be remembered that the “two-aspect” doctrine as presented in connection with Kant does not admit the identification of appearances with representations/mental states. It claims that, within Kant’s theory, representations/mental states cannot be thought of as something not based on some reality distinct from these representations themselves (things in themselves). Or, to put it otherwise, within Kant’s theory, representations cannot be thought of as something that also has a subject-independent existence. These claims give rise to an inner difficulty in Schopenhauer’s “two-aspect” doctrine. Can objects be identified with representations while maintaining that these objects have a subject-independent existence (in which case there is no need to postulate the distinct things in themselves)? On his behalf, Schopenhauer answers the question in the affirmative.

Concluding the consideration of Schopenhauer’s “two-aspect” doctrine, I still explore how he deals with the problem of affection.
5.5.1 The material basis of experience (the problem of affection)

It has been seen that Schopenhauer explicitly denies any straightforward affection between the thing in itself and the subject of cognition (Chapter 5.4). Hence there is no need to consider this problem here, but it may be concluded that, in this respect, Schopenhauer’s theory is in line with the “two-aspect” doctrine as presented in connection with Kant. Instead, in the following, I will examine how Schopenhauer’s own analysis of the basis of cognition accommodates with the “two-aspect” doctrine.

To start with, Schopenhauer clearly restricts knowledge of the basis of cognition. Nor does the law of causality or sensation yield knowledge of the world as it is in itself. Schopenhauer writes:

“The assumption that [sensation], even only in general, must have a cause rests on a law that is rooted in the form of our knowledge, in other words, in the functions of our brain. The origin of this law is therefore just as subjective as is that sensation itself...That transition from the sensation to its cause...is certainly sufficient for indicating to us the empirical presence in space and time of an empirical object, and is therefore fully satisfactory for practical life. But it is by no means sufficient for giving us information about the existence and real inner nature of the appearances that arise for us in such a way, or rather of their intelligible substratum.”

As has been seen, Schopenhauer holds that cognition of empirical objects takes place when understanding “finds” a cause for a sensation, and takes this cause as an effecting object. From this point of view, everything in cognition - sensation, the cause of sensation, empirical object - has a transcendental origin in the subject of cognition. However, within this transcendental/phenomenal level of consideration, Schopenhauer also regards empirical objects as the basis of cognition. The idea of empirical objects as the basis of cognition is present in Schopenhauer’s remarks on the principle of sufficient reason and the ground of an object. Schopenhauer says that the principle of sufficient reason combines all representations

197 “...die Voraussetzung, daß [Empfindung], auch nur überhaupt, eine Ursache haben müsse, beruht auf einem in der Form unsers Erkennens, d.h. in den Funktionen unsers Gehirns wurzelnden Gesetz, dessen Ursprung daher ebenso subjektiv ist wie jene Sinnesempfindung selbst...Jener Übergang von der Sinnesempfindung zu ihrer Ursache...ist zwar hinreichend, uns die empirische Gegenwart in Raum und Zeit eines empirischen Objekts anzuzeigen, also völlig genügend für das praktische Leben; aber er reicht keineswegs hin, uns Aufschluß zu geben über das Dasein und Wesen an sich der auf solche Weise für uns entstehenden Erscheinungen oder vielmehr ihres intelligibeln Substrats.” (W2, 21;11)
one with another, but it in no way connects these with the ground of the object (Grund des Objekts). This ground of the object (which is not any object at all) would be an absurdity (Unbegriff), since “…only objects can be the ground of objects, and that indeed always.” 198 (W1, 46:15.) The question of the ground of an object can be asked only in relation to other objects. If sensation is taken as the ground of the object, it is clear that the causal origin of this sensation can only be some other empirical object. The non-objective ground of sensation would be an absurdity; it would have no meaning. This, I suggest, is how Schopenhauer’s note above on the effect on animal bodies (p. 54-55) must be understood. Seen from an empirical point of view, it is empirical objects, which have an effect on the subject or the animal body.

Moreover, in line with the “two-aspect” doctrine as presented in connection with Kant, Schopenhauer evinces a metaphysical point of view to the basis of cognition. This, however, is a more complicated matter, and requires the consideration of Schopenhauer’s contention that there are only four forms of ground (that is, the grounds based on the four roots of the principle of sufficient reason). Schopenhauer writes:

“…every philosopher…should be required to state what kind of ground he means… But only too often we find examples in some of which the expressions ground and cause are confused and used indiscriminately, whereas in others there is talk in a general way of a basis and of something based, of principia and principiata, of condition and of what is conditioned, without further specification, possibly because there is a secret awareness of an unauthorized use of these concepts. Thus even Kant speaks of the thing in itself as the ground of the appearance. In the Critique of Pure reason, 5th ed., p. 590, he speaks of a ground of the possibility of all appearances, of an intelligible ground of the appearances, of an intelligible cause, of an unknown ground of the possibility of the sensuous series in general (p. 592), of a transcendental object as the ground of appearances, and of the ground why our sensibility should have this rather than all the other principal conditions (p. 641), and this in several places. All this does not seem to me to be in keeping with those

198 “…nur Objekte Grund sein können, und zwar immer wieder von Objekten.” (W1, 46:15)
In this passage, Schopenhauer criticizes the non-specific (confused), or general nature of the idea of metaphysical ground. Schopenhauer says that there is no more a ground in general than there is a triangle in general except in an abstract concept that is obtained through discursive thinking. Just as every triangle must be acute-angled, right-angled, or obtuse-angled, equilateral, isosceles, or scalene, so must every ground belong to one of the four possible kinds (expressed by the principle of sufficient reason) (vW, 188-189;234-235.) According to the “two-aspect” doctrine as presented in connection with Kant, however, the idea of metaphysical ground is not determined by any specific form of thinking, but allows, at least to a certain extent, a detachment from the common ways of thinking. As such, on the basis of Schopenhauer’s above note, this kind of ‘loose’ thinking of the thing in itself would be illegitimate. The idea of ground cannot be extended as desired.

However, I suggest that Schopenhauer does not really keep up with his restriction of the use of the idea of ground. Instead, besides the above-mentioned idea of the ground of sensations in empirical objects, he also evinces a transcendent, metaphysical, and indeterminate idea of a ground. This is clear if it is acknowledged that, according to Schopenhauer, subjective sensations have a metaphysical origin in will as the thing in itself (see above, p. 65). Since Schopenhauer denies the applicability of any form of ground based on the principle of sufficient reason to the thing in itself, the ground of sensations in the thing in itself must be regarded as a different kind of - presumably general and indeterminate - ground. Though Schopenhauer holds that we can have theoretical knowledge of the basis of cognition only when we consider it empirically (with respect to empirical objects), he also relies on the idea of the metaphysical ground of cognition. As such, I suggest, the “two-

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199 “…dachte ich, an jeden Philosophen…die Forderung zu machen, daß er bestimme, welche Art von Grund er meine…Allein es finden sich nur gar zu viele Beispiele, teils daß die Ausdrücke Grund und Ursache verwechselt und ohne Unterscheidung gebraucht werden, teils daß im allgemeinen von einem Grund und Begründeten, Prinzip und Prinzipiat, Bedingung und Bedingten geredet wird ohne nähere Bestimmung; vielleicht eben weil man sich im stillen eines unberechtigten Gebrauchs dieser Begriffe bewußt ist. So spricht selbst Kant von dem Ding an sich als dem Grund der Erscheinung. So spricht er (‘Kritik der reinen vernunft’, 5. Auflage S. 590) von einem Grund der Möglichkeit aller Erscheinung; von einem intelligiblen Grund der Erscheinungen; von einer intelligiblen Ursache, einem unbekannten Grund der Möglichkeit der sinnlichen Reihe überhaupt (S. 592); von einem den Erscheinungen zum Grunde liegenden transzendentalen Objekt und dem Grunde, warum unsere Sinnlichkeit diese viel mehr als alle andern obersten Bedingungen habe (S. 641); und so an mehreren Stellen – welches alles mir schlecht zu passen scheint zu jenen gewichtigten…Worten (S. 591): ‘daß die Zufälligkeit der Ding selbst nur Phänomen sei und auf keinen andern Regressus führen könne als den empirischen, der die Phänomene bestimmt’. ” (vW, 187-188;233-234)
aspect” distinction of the empirical and metaphysical points of view to the basis of cognition (Chapter 3.2.1) may also be applied to Schopenhauer. Hence the above-mentioned Allison’s distinction between ‘matter’, and ‘transcendental matter’ or ‘ground’ (p. 38-39) is also valid with Schopenhauer. Schopenhauer’s ‘matter’ refers to sensations considered in their relation to empirical objects, and his ‘transcendental matter’/’ground’ refers to sensations considered in their relation to will as the thing in itself.

This kind of “two-aspect” reading of the problem of affection does not seem to be widely recognized among Schopenhauer scholars. Janaway notes that Schopenhauer seems to be committed to the view that the same object has two roles. The table I see is both the cause of sensations in me, and a mind-dependent construct which transforms sensation into cognition by featuring as an objective mental content (Janaway 1989, 160.) Patrick Gardiner notes that it is hard to see how Schopenhauer could have satisfactorily answered the question how objects can at the same time be regarded as produced by our minds operating upon sensations, and as giving rise to these sensations (Gardiner 1971, 108). Obviously, Schopenhauer’s position may seem contradictory. Janaway even says that Schopenhauer’s views about the construction of the empirical object on the occasion of our organs being affected are disastrous without the assumption that the things in themselves cause the affection of our organs (Janaway 1989,166). However, interestingly, Atwell’s consideration of the so-called intelligible object and empirical object is reminiscent of the “two-aspect” doctrine. According to Atwell, just like a human character, an object must also be conceived in a dual manner, as “intelligible” and as “empirical”. Conceived as intelligible, an object is the underlying “mode of operation” in virtue of which given changes in other objects are the causes of resultant effects in still other objects, for example, in a human body. Empirically, an object is the total complex of effects that, occurring in space and time, are caused by the changes to which the intelligible object in question is susceptible (Atwell 1995, 46.) In other words, metaphysically, an object is a characteristic (compare above, a human character, Chapter 5.2) “mode of operation”, which, in its own way, reacts to those changes to

200 Quite surprisingly, Janaway also notes that Schopenhauer himself would conceive as perfectly coherent the idea that we distinguish the subjective point of view from the objective point of view. Within the world as representation, empirical observation can confirm the effects of objects upon other objects, including the human organism; but from the subject’s point of view, the object is constructed in response to a received sensation, and this explains the nature of those objects that constitute the empirical world (Janaway 1989,160.) If Janaway would add the idea of the metaphysical basis of sensations in the thing in itself, this account would be in line with the “two-aspect” doctrine.

201 Atwell refers with the concept of a mode of operation to Schopenhauer’s concept of Wirkungsart - see, for example vW, 104,118 (Atwell 1995,46).
which it is susceptible, and, on this basis, also gives rise to changes (effects) in those objects, which, according to their own intelligible character, are susceptible to the changes of the effecting object. This is a kind of “metaphysical story” of the affection by empirical objects. Empirically, the origin of sensations (changes) refers to objects considered as empirical objects. Metaphysically, the origin of sensations refers to objects considered as intelligible objects. In this latter case, the attention is paid to the metaphysical “mode of operation” between the effecting object and the object effected upon.

Conclusively of the “two-aspect” doctrine, as noted, I regard Schopenhauer’s position as a version of the “two-aspect” doctrine as presented in connection with Kant (Chapter 3.2). Like Kant, Schopenhauer considers empirical objects analytically as appearances and as they are in themselves, and presents two points of view (empirical and metaphysical) to the question of the basis of cognition. However, Schopenhauer differs from Kant in starting his analysis from the self-knowledge of the subject’s own body, in yielding contentual claims concerning both appearances (representations) and the thing in itself (will), and (in principle, though not in practice) in denying the validity of the use of the idea of ground beyond the meanings given to it by the principle of sufficient reason.

In the next chapter, I will complete my study of Schopenhauer’s philosophy with the consideration of two specific questions: the method of philosophy (Chapter 6.1), and naturalism (Chapter 6.2).

202 Atwell notes that strictly speaking no object is the cause of sensations, just as no human character is the cause of human actions. Emerging motives are the sole causes of human actions, and emerging objective changes are the sole causes of sensations (Atwell 1995, 47). However, in a general level, the reference to objects (interpreted as empirical and intelligible) as the causes of sensations can be maintained. After all, we do refer the “emerging objective changes” to objects.

203 As has been seen, the identification of appearances with representations also gives rise to the problematic notion that representations could have a subject-independent existence (p. 113).
6. Complementary considerations

The content of this chapter, the consideration of Schopenhauer’s method of philosophy and his naturalization of the *a priori* forms of cognition, will provide a complementary insight into Schopenhauer’s approach to epistemological and metaphysical questions (as presented in Chapters 4 and 5). It will be shown that Schopenhauer’s Kantian approach in the theory of cognition is moderated by his anti-Kantian contention of the method of philosophy, and supplemented by his naturalization of the *a priori* forms of cognition. I will also present a further insight into Schopenhauer’s direct and immediate approach to metaphysical knowledge, as well as into some problems inherent in this approach.

6.1 The method of philosophy

According to Schopenhauer, there can be no specific philosophical method. Schopenhauer notes that if a philosopher tried to begin by thinking out for himself the method by which he wished to philosophize, he would be like a poet who first wrote for himself a system of aesthetics, in order afterwards to write poetry in accordance with it. The thinking mind must find its way from original inclination (*Trieb*). However, after the goal has been reached, the path followed may be considered. Aesthetics and methodology are younger in nature than poetry and philosophy, just as logic is younger than thought (W2, 158;122.) Now, in hindsight, at least two things may be said of Schopenhauer’s philosophical method. First, Schopenhauer is critical of Kantian arguments for the transcendental forms of cognition (the so-called transcendental arguments). Second, Schopenhauer’s own methodology amounts to a sort of phenomenological approach (concerning both his theory of cognition and his metaphysics of will).

As is well known, Kant presents arguments – the so-called transcendental arguments (transcendental proofs) – for the transcendental forms of cognition. Generally, a transcendental argument starts from the acknowledgement of the existence of some thing/fact, and then aims to show that certain transcendental forms of the subject constitute the presupposition of that thing/fact. As Smith notes, Kant’s transcendental method proceeds by enquiring what conditions must be postulated in order that the admittedly given may be explained and accounted for (Smith 1999, xxxviii). The logical form of the transcendental argument (as described above) is the *modus ponens*: “If *p*, then *q*. *p*. Therefore *q.*”, where ‘*p*’
signifies the given fact and ‘q’ the transcendental condition of the fact. According to Smith, Kant puts forward two kinds of arguments. The first kind, the so-called synthetic argument starts from given, ordinary experience, to discover its conditions, and from them to prove the validity of knowledge that is \textit{a priori}. The second kind, the so-called analytic argument starts from the existence of \textit{a priori} synthetic judgments, and, assuming them as valid, determines the conditions under which alone such validity can be possible. In this case, the conditions thus revealed do not prove the validity of the \textit{a priori} knowledge, but render it conceivable (Smith 1999, 44.) According to Smith, only the first kind of argument adequately expresses the Kantian standpoint (Smith 1999, 45). In line with this, I take a Kantian transcendental argument as a synthetic argument, which aims to prove the validity of the transcendental forms of cognition. If some argument aims to (somehow) explain the existence of the already valid \textit{a priori} knowledge, without aiming to give proof to the validity of any transcendental form of cognition (analytic argument), I do not count it as a proper transcendental argument.

Schopenhauer holds that any argument for the validity of the transcendental forms of cognition is inherently circular, and, on this account, cannot be accepted. As Guyer notes, Schopenhauer thinks that it would be self-contradictory to argue for the validity of the basic forms of thought since they are the basis of all knowledge and thus of all argument (Guyer 1999, 108). With respect to the principle of sufficient reason, Schopenhauer writes:

"…the principle of sufficient reason is the \textit{principle of all explanation}. To explain a thing means to reduce its given existence or connexion to some form of the principle of sufficient reason. According to this form, that existence or connexion must be as it is. The result of this is that the principle of sufficient reason itself, in other words, the connexion expressed by it in any of its forms, cannot be further explained, since there is no principle for explaining the principle of all explanation; just as the eye sees everything except itself."

\footnote{More precisely, Smith contains that the so-called transcendental method, which has an analytic form, and which Kant uses within the complete synthetic method, constitutes the heart of Kant's method and argumentation. This transcendental/analytic method differs from the analytic method sited above in that it, like synthetic method, aims to prove the validity of the \textit{a priori} factors (Smith 1999, 45.)}

\footnote{"…der Satz vom Grunde ist das \textit{Prinzip aller Erklärung}: eine Sache erklären heißt ihren gegebenen Bestand oder Zusammenhang zurückführen auf irgendeine Gestaltung des Satzes vom Grund, der gemäß er sein muß, wie er ist. Diesem gemäß ist der Satz vom Grund selbst, d.h. der Zusammenhang, den er in irgendeiner Gestalt ausdrückt, nicht weiter erklärbar; weil es kein Prinzip gibt, das Prinzip aller Erklärung zu erklären – oder wie das Auge alles sieht, nur sich selbst nicht." (vW, 184-185, 229)}
"Now whoever requires a proof for this principle, i.e., the demonstration of a ground, already assumes thereby that it is true; in fact he bases his demand on this very assumption. He therefore finds himself involved in that circle of demanding a proof for the right to demand a proof."²⁰⁶

There can be no proof for the validity of the principle of sufficient reason or any of its forms. This is due to the fact that the principle itself is the device of every proof and every explanation. Schopenhauer seems to be thinking in the following way: if the necessary forms of thought (for which we are trying to give a justification) really are necessary for any knowledge and argument, then we also have to use these forms of thought in our proofs of these forms of thought. But this would be circular. By definition, the concept of a necessary form of thought includes an idea that it cannot be proved without getting involved into a circle. Hence, as far as Kant’s above-mentioned synthetic arguments aim to prove the validity of the fundamental and necessary conditions of cognition, Schopenhauer cannot accept them. There is no place for proper Kantian transcendental arguments in Schopenhauer’s philosophy.

Instead, it can be seen that the above-mentioned Kantian analytic arguments have a certain parallel with Schopenhauer’s argumentation. Schopenhauer also uses the idea of the validity of the \textit{a priori} knowledge as a premise in one of his important (sort of) arguments. Namely, Schopenhauer claims that valid, or, what is the same thing, \textit{a priori} knowledge is possible only on the condition that this knowledge has its basis in the subjective/transcendental forms of cognition. Schopenhauer notes, for example, that experience must be thought of as dependent on the intuition of time and space since the properties of time and space, as they are known in \textit{a priori} intuition, are valid for all possible experience as laws (W1, 35-36;7). Schopenhauer also refers here to the infallibility of mathematics (W1,36;7), and notes elsewhere that since space, time, and causality are given to us prior to all experience and are precisely known, must they lie preformed within us (P1, 110;86). Here Schopenhauer argues from the validity/apriority of something to its subjectivity/transcendentality. In this case, the explanation of the possibility of \textit{a priori} knowledge is given through the introduction of the subject of cognition as the bearer of the \textit{a priori} knowledge. This kind of thinking is something which Schopenhauer took directly from Kant. Schopenhauer notes that the fact that we are \textit{a priori} conscious of a part of our

²⁰⁶ "Wer nun einen Beweis, d.i. die Darlegung eines Grundes für ihn fordert, setzt ihn eben hierdurch schon als wahr voraus, ja stützt seine Forderung eben auf diese Voraussetzung. Er gerät also in diesen Zirkel, daß er einen Beweis der Berechtigung, einen Beweis zu fordern, fordert." (vW, 38,33)
knowledge admits of no other explanation (*Erklärung*) except that this constitutes the forms of our intellect. Indeed, this is not so much an explanation as merely the distinct expression (*Ausdruck*) of the fact itself (W1, 590;437). As stated, I do not count this kind of explanation of the possibility of something as a Kantian transcendental argument. Instead, I hold that in respect of the methodology of finding, or proving the validity of the transcendental forms of cognition, Schopenhauer is not a Kantian thinker. Though Schopenhauer’s contentions of the apriority, validity, and subjectivity are in line with Kant’s famous Copernican turn, he remains far from the rationalistic and argumentative core of Kantian thinking.207

Schopenhauer holds onto a more direct, and, what might be called, *phenomenological* approach.208 By this approach I understand a certain method of abstraction, accompanied by an intuitive cognition or “seeing”, which is supposed to yield the essential in cognition. The consideration of Edmund Husserl’s (1859-1938) phenomenology gives content to this view. Leila Haaparanta notes that for Husserl the task of phenomenological philosophy is to find the structures of consciousness without using the methods of empirical sciences. Generally, this finding may be approached through Charles Peirce's (1839-1914) conception of abstraction (or ‘precision’) as that which arises from attention to one element and neglect of the other. Through this kind of abstraction a phenomenologist aims to reveal the essential features of pure consciousness (Haaparanta 1999, 40, 42.) In this respect, Haaparanta also makes a note on Husserl’s contention of the basis of logical concepts. According to Haaparanta, Husserl holds that the logical forms are, as it were, hidden in the objects of sensible acts, but through the so-called categorial perception we can see these objects in a new way – we can see them through logical forms (Haaparanta 2002, 240). This attention to the logical side and structure of objects, and neglect of the other sides of objects, allows knowledge of the logical structure of objects. It is this focused attention to one or the other side of phenomena that is also essential to Schopenhauer’s philosophy.

As has been seen, Schopenhauer gives emphasis to the direct and intuitive basis of knowledge (concerning both the transcendental forms of cognition and the metaphysical essence of things). He notes that it must be possible in some way to know directly, even

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207 On one occasion, Schopenhauer speaks of a transcendental argument (*transzendentales Argument*) - however, in a different sense than described above. Schopenhauer notes that the cosmological proof of the existence of God is overthrown by the transcendental argument that the law of causality is demonstrably of subjective origin and is therefore applicable merely to appearances and not to the thing in itself (P1,134;107). In this case, the transcendental argument asserts that since the law of causality is of subjective origin, it does not apply to the thing in itself.

208 Guyer speaks of Schopenhauer’s phenomenological approach/method (Guyer 1999, 117;133). See below on Guyer’s contentions of Schopenhauer’s philosophy.
without proofs and syllogisms, every truth that is found through syllogisms and communicated by proofs (W1,113;65). Hence, Schopenhauer says that he is everywhere trying to go to the very root of things, to the ultimate basis of all concepts and propositions, which is at all times intuitive (anschaulich). This basis is then let to stand as the primary phenomenon (Urphänomen), or, if possible, still resolved into its elements. In any case, it is meant to express the essential nature of the matter (P1, 164;131.) Accordingly, Guyer notes that for Schopenhauer the method of philosophy must always be to base its abstractions on what is evident in cognition, and even the different forms of the principle of sufficient reason must, at least retrospectively, be understood as abstract and contracted expressions of what is evident in cognition itself (Gyer 1999,111). In this respect of methodology, Schopenhauer acknowledges his difference from Kant. Schopenhauer writes:

"An essential difference between Kant's method and that which I follow is to be found in the fact that he starts from indirect, reflected knowledge, whereas I start from direct and intuitive knowledge. He is comparable to a person who measures the height of a tower from its shadow; but I am like one who applies the measuringrod directly to the tower itself. Philosophy, therefore, is for him a science of concepts, but for me a science in concepts, drawn from intuitive knowledge, the only source of all evidence, and set down and fixed in universal concepts."209

As has been seen, Schopenhauer is critical of using abstract concepts when these concepts have no clear ground in cognition. Schopenhauer notes that a true philosophy cannot be spun out of mere abstract concepts, but must be based on observation (Beobachtung) and experience (Erfahrung), both inner and outer. Philosophy (like art and poetry) must have its source in an intuitive apprehension (anschauliche Auffassung) of the world (P2, 15;8-9.)

Regarding knowledge of the transcendent forms of cognition, Schopenhauer notes that the real foundation of abstract expressions of the necessary and universal forms of knowledge can be found not in abstract principles, but only in the immediate consciousness.

209 “Ein wesentlicher Unterschied zwischen Kants Methode und der, welche ich befolge, liegt darin, daß er von der mittelbaren, der reflektierten Erkenntnis ausgeht, ich dagegen von der unmittelbaren, der intuitiven. Er ist demjenigen zu vergleichen, der die Höhe eines Turmes aus dessen Schatten mißt, ich aber dem, welcher den Maßstab unmittelbar anlegt. Daher ist ihm die Philosophie eine Wissenschaft aus Begriffen, mir eine Wissenschaft in Begriffen, aus der anschaulichen Erkenntnis, der alleinigen Quelle aller Evidenz geschöpft und in allgemeine Begriffe gefaßt und fixiert.” (W1, 609-610;452-453)
of the forms of representation (W1, 116;67.) By analysing our representations into their elements, we acquire knowledge of the *a priori* forms of these representations. With regard to the principle of sufficient reason, Hamlyn notes that Schopenhauer thinks that if one considers what it is for something to be a knowing consciousness and what this entails, one will see that there are four ways in which something must be so for a reason (Hamlyn 1980,84). Hamlyn also notes that what Schopenhauer provides in *The Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason* is not an argument for the principle (which above was shown to be necessarily circular) but an exposition of its role, which may point towards a recognition of its truth (Hamlyn 1985, 12). The precise nature of Schopenhauer’s method is apparent in his examples of the self-examination of the faculties of understanding and reason. Schopenhauer holds that we do not know the laws of understanding and reason immediately, since the subject cannot know itself (note a different meaning of ‘immediate’ than above). However, we know these laws through experiments on objects, that is, *in concreto* by means of objects. In this way, we come to know, for example, the law of causality: if we attempt to think of a change without a preceding cause, we become aware of an objective impossibility of the business. Likewise, the four laws (judgments) expressing the formal conditions of all thought (see above, p. 49) are known by the self-examination of the faculty of reason: by making vain attempts to think in opposition to these laws, the faculty of reason recognizes them as the conditions of the possibility of all thought (vW,133;161-162.) Moreover, Schopenhauer notes that the validity of the principle of sufficient reason is so much involved in the form of consciousness that we simply cannot imagine anything objectively of which no “why” could be further demanded (for example, we cannot imagine an absolute absolute) (W1, 649;483), and that it is self-examination, which must convince us that our faculty of reason is not a faculty intended for metaphysical insight (*Einsicht*) (vW, 139;169-170). Generally, Schopenhauer thinks that this what might be called an imaginative method of philosophy gives us knowledge of the necessary, and, accordingly, transcendental in experience (something that cannot be imagined to be otherwise). As Schopenhauer notes, the fact that Locke’s primary qualities cannot be thought away indicates their subjective origin (P1, 29;18). It can now be seen that while Schopenhauer criticizes Kant’s idea of argumentation for the *a priori* conditions of cognition, he seems to approve Kant’s method of

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210 Schopenhauer makes a distinction between an immediate knowledge of the principle of sufficient reason and an indirect expression of this knowledge in the four forms of the principle. He notes that the abstract expressions of the principle of sufficient reason are derived from the immediate knowledge of it, which means that, in this sense, these expressions are indirect (W1, 647;481).
‘imagining’ as presented in the proofs of the a priori and intuitive nature of time and space. Schopenhauer holds that, in this respect, there is a crucial distinction between Kant’s Transcendental Aesthetic and Transcendental Logic. In Transcendental Logic Kant was no longer unprejudiced. He was no longer in a condition of pure investigation and observation (Beobachtung) of what is present in consciousness (W1, 604-605; 448-449.)

Schopenhauer’s phenomenological approach is also implicit in his critique of Kant’s supposedly false distinction between the faculties of intuition and understanding. Schopenhauer maintains that Kant’s introduction of concepts (understanding) to cognition is inadequate, since, as has been shown, Schopenhauer holds that there is nothing conceptual in cognition. Kant's contention is problematic if it is thought that Kant talks phenomenologically about different levels of consciousness of objects. Guyer notes that when Kant distinguishes intuitions and concepts and says that we have no cognition of objects unless we combine the two, Schopenhauer takes him to be saying that we are separately conscious of both intuitions and concepts and are then conscious of combining them into a cognition of objects that in turn represents a further state of consciousness, clearly distinct from the prior states and especially from the initial state of intuition (Guyer 1999, 115-116). From this kind of phenomenological point of view - emphasizing the actual conscious acts of cognition - it is understandable that Schopenhauer sees the idea of different levels of cognition as an odd construction. It is as if our cognition of objects would consist of distinct steps of consciousness, including both intuitive and conceptual steps. However, it is clear that Kant does not hold onto this kind of phenomenological approach. Kant's method of philosophy is a method of reflection and argumentation, the question of the different states of consciousness does not arise for him at all.

Schopenhauer also applies the direct, intuitive method of consideration in his metaphysics. As has been seen, he holds that metaphysical knowledge is based on the immediate knowledge of ourselves as will; will constitutes what is most immediate in a man’s consciousness, it makes itself known in an immediate way (W1, 169;109). Schopenhauer also notes that in our own serious meditation and profound consideration of things we can attain absolute clearness, distinctness, and true coherence, in fact, unity. Only ourselves do we thoroughly understand (P2, 13-14;7.) This immediate contact with the essence of ourselves gives us the clearest possible understanding of will.211 However, I

211 Schopenhauer also uses the above-mentioned imaginative method in his metaphysics. He notes that since weight and the law of inertia can be thought away, they do not follow from the form of knowledge as something necessary, but are qualitas occulta (W1, 133;80). This is an example of Schopenhauer’s general way of thinking.
suggest that though we know will better than anything else, there are certain difficulties in the transformation of this (pre-cognitive) knowledge into the forms of language. Namely, Schopenhauer maintains that language is not directly related to cognition but to thought, and hence to abstract concepts, and primarily by means of these to cognition. As such, abstract concepts - and language, which consists of these concepts - have to cognition a relation that brings about an entire change of the form (W1, 645;480.) Moreover, with respect to illuminism (a sort of mystical apprehension of the essence of the world), Schopenhauer notes that language has arisen for the purpose of the intellect’s outwardly directed knowledge and is quite unsuited to expressing the inner states or conditions which are fundamentally different from it and are the material of illuminism (P2, 17;10). Since language always gives new (abstract) form to cognition, as well as making one-sided abstractions of it, it can never give a totally adequate description of (either inner or outer) cognition. This holds good for a common language describing outer experience, but it holds good even more for a language describing the subject’s inner experiences. Will, as it appears in a subject’s inner experience, having no essential relation to our abstract forms of thinking, is not quite open to a language that is bound up with outer cognition and abstract expressions. Consequently, the descriptions of will are necessarily descriptions of something that cannot properly be described. It might be said that, according to their transcendental origin, they are “transcendental”, or even metaphorical descriptions of something basically non-transcendental.

As noted, Schopenhauer also applies the idea of an interpretational, or metaphorical approach to the descriptions of the thing in itself as will (p. 98-99). Being based on the subject’s inner self-consciousness (see above), or on some transcendental/empirical concepts, the descriptions of the thing in itself cannot be accounted as direct knowledge of it. Earlier Schopenhauer noted that we interpret the inner nature and character of the thing in itself from the world of experience (W2, 238;183, p. 87), and that understanding of the world and the essence of things is a parabolic - that is, metaphorical - translation into the forms of knowledge (W2, 374;288, p. 98). Accordingly, Moira Nicholls notes that she has identified six passages in which Schopenhauer asserts that the thing in itself can be described as will only in a metaphorical sense (Nicholls 1999, 174). In line with this, James Chansky notes that, according to Schopenhauer, the noumenal side of things can be inferred through an

that if there is something in experience, which is not a matter of representation, it must relate to the thing in itself.

212 In this connection, Schopenhauer notes that our knowledge of will is not illuminism, which (illuminism) is always a non-communicable, and hence also a non-philosophical position (P2, 16-19;9-11).
interpretation of phenomena (Chansky 1992, 38). Janaway says that perhaps we should regard talk of ‘willing’, ‘wanting’, or ‘trying’ as ineliminable metaphors in the global picture, where everything is always, as it were, trying to be somewhere and in some state (Janaway 1999a, 7). This interpretational/metaphorical attitude may, up to a point, be clarified through the distinction between the concepts of understanding and explanation.\(^{213}\) Schopenhauer says that we arrive at a correct understanding (Verständnis) of the world itself without reaching an explanation (Erklärung) for its existence which is conclusive and does away with all further problems (W1, 578;428). We do not explain the world starting from some empirical, rational or metaphysical premises. Nor do we, primarily, lean on the principle of sufficient reason. Instead, we do the best we can, and put forward an interpretation of the world as will. All this is in line with the above-mentioned weaker view of Schopenhauer’s metaphysics (Chapter 5.3). Since the knowledge of the thing in itself is based on something (that is, self-consciousness of will) whose nature is not quite properly transformable into the forms of language, and since Schopenhauer acknowledges that the description of the thing in itself through the concept of will - as well as other related concepts - has a sort of interpretational status, he clearly does not allow absolute knowledge of the thing in itself.

6.2 Naturalism

Nowadays the term ‘naturalism’ has a wide and not quite clear use. Susan Haack formulates five epistemologically naturalistic positions. From the least to the most radical the content of these positions is as follows. First, epistemology includes not only the traditional philosophical theory of knowledge but also the natural-scientific studies of cognition. Second, the inquiry into human knowledge is a joint enterprise including both ‘philosophical’ and ‘naturalistic’ parts. In this enterprise, the range of epistemological problems is enlarged by new problem areas suggested by natural-scientific work. Third, some or all traditional epistemological problems may be resolved \textit{a posteriori}. Fourth, some or all traditional epistemological problems may be resolved by the natural sciences of cognition. Fifth, some or all traditional epistemological problems are illegitimate or misconceived, and should be replaced by natural-scientific questions about human cognition (Haack 2001, 118-119.)

\(^{213}\) I do not claim that Schopenhauer’s use of the concepts of \textit{Verständnis} and \textit{Erklärung} is as specific as stated in the following.
As has become clear, Schopenhauer’s epistemology is fundamentally a Kantian construction. This precludes all the above-mentioned stronger forms of naturalism (positions from 3 to 5) from Schopenhauer, but leaves the first two positions left – positions, which Haack classifies as forms of the so-called expansionist naturalism (since they extend the scope of the concept of epistemology) (Haack 2001, 119). In the following, I will not aim to give a full account of all the naturalistic tendencies in Schopenhauer’s philosophy, but will concentrate on two topics. First, I will briefly define Schopenhauer’s own understanding of the concept of naturalism, and, related to it, the concept of materialism. Second, I will consider Schopenhauer’s naturalization of the transcendental forms of cognition as brain phenomena. In this latter respect, I will also study Schopenhauer’s relation to the two above-mentioned forms of expansionist naturalism.

According to Schopenhauer, naturalism is a position which explains phenomena according to the concept of matter and the laws and forces of nature. Schopenhauer says that pure naturalism (Naturalismus) - or absolute physics - is a position which starts from the objective and at once takes as its data the many things around a subject, such as matter together with all the forces manifesting themselves therein. In this position, the absolutely real consists of the laws and forces of nature together with matter as their bearer. Pure naturalism explains how, in consequence of the absolutely existing and valid laws of nature, one appearance always produces or even supplants another. Schopenhauer refers to naturalism as ‘objective philosophising’, which is one-sided in forgetting the subjective point of view from its considerations (P2, 44-45;34-35.): naturalism gives an explanation of the world on the basis of matter and the laws and forces of nature, without philosophically considering the subjective conditions of this explanation. A relative position with naturalism is materialism (Materialismus), which, according to Schopenhauer, regards matter - and with it time, space, and causality - as existing absolutely, and passes over the relation to the subject in which alone all this exists (W1, 61-62;27). Materialism also tries to explain the phenomena of life by physical and chemical forces, and these in turn by the mechanical operation of matter, the position, form, and motion of imagined atoms. Thus it would like to reduce all the forces of nature to thrust and counter-thrust as its ‘thing in itself’ (W1, 186-187;123.) This ‘reduction of forces’ makes materialism a somewhat stronger position than naturalism. While both naturalism and materialism leave out the subject of cognition from their considerations, only materialism denies the existence of other than mechanical forces in nature.

With respect to the naturalization of the Kantian a priori forms of cognition as brain phenomena, Schopenhauer notes that Kantian philosophy, which ignores an objective or
empirical point of view for the intellect, is one-sided, and therefore inadequate. It leaves an immense gulf between philosophical and physiological knowledge (W2, 352-353; 272-273.) Schopenhauer claims that the *a priori* forms of the intellect - space, time and causality - are brain phenomena. He writes:

“…the brain imparts to [objects] extension, form, impenetrability, mobility, and so on, in short, all that can be represented in perception only by means of time, space, and causality.”\(^{214}\)

“This empirical point of view to the intellect gives Schopenhauer an opportunity to study the transcendental forms of cognition as brain phenomena. However, here it is worth pausing, and asking the comprehensibility of this inquiry. Namely, there seems to be an inherent circularity in this kind of naturalistic account of the conditions of cognition. If the transcendental conditions of cognition are brain phenomena, and act as a condition of every empirical object, they also act as a condition of brains and brain phenomena (which are classes of empirical objects). In this case, brains/brain phenomena would constitute themselves. Could we accept this circle? There is a certain kind of theory of the conditions of cognition, which is not bothered by the intrinsic circularity of its starting-point (that is, brains constituting brains), or of its method. In W.V. Quine’s (1908-2000) naturalism, the idea that brains constitute brains does not cause difficulties. Instead, this theory claims that in the study of the conditions of cognition of empirical objects, there is no alternative but to study these conditions empirically, for example, as brain phenomena. In what might be called a Quinean circular structure of investigation the knowledge of the conditions of cognition (for example, knowledge of brain phenomena) is also used in the examination of the conditions of cognition (brain phenomena). In this process there is no place for static, and absolutely certain knowledge of the conditions of cognition; this knowledge is always open to further corrections and improvements. As Quine notes, the naturalistic philosopher begins his

\(^{214}\) “…verleiht das Gehirn [Objekten] Ausdehnung, Form, Undurchdringlichkeit, Beweglichkeit usw., kurz: alles, was erst mittelst Zeit, Raum und Kausalität vorstellbar ist.” (W2, 32; 20)

\(^{215}\) “Wie unser Auge es ist, welches Grün, Rot und Blau hervorbringt, so ist es unser Gehirn, welches Zeit, Raum und Kausalität…hervorbringt.” (P1, 110; 86, footnote)
reasoning within the inherited world theory as a going concern. He tentatively believes all of it, but also believes that some unidentified portions are wrong. He tries to improve, clarify, and understand the system from within (Quine 1999, 72.)

Could Schopenhauer be akin to a Quinean naturalistic (empirical) and circular study of the conditions of cognition? The answer is clear: No. Since Quinean theory allows no Kantian a priori and static conditions of cognition, it cannot be applied to Schopenhauer, who, in this issue, is thoroughly Kantian. For Schopenhauer the conditions of cognition are not empirical conditions (though he describes them empirically as brain phenomena). They are a priori and static conditions of cognition (which means also that our knowledge of these conditions cannot improve, as it can in Quine’s case). The very demand for naturalizing the Kantian/Schopenhauerian transcendental conditions of cognition in this sense is a contradiction in terms. How then should Schopenhauer's consideration of the transcendental forms of cognition as brain phenomena be understood?

According to Heikki Kannisto, Schopenhauer uses two different descriptions of the transcendental conditions of cognition. The primary description gives the a priori forms of intuition (time, space) and understanding (causality). The secondary description gives empirical brain phenomena (Kannisto 2002.) Hence, Schopenhauer’s analysis of cognition consists of two parallel - but distinct – descriptions of the transcendental conditions of cognition. Accordingly, Schopenhauer writes:

“…we must also go not merely from intellect to knowledge of the world, as Kant did, but also,… from the world, taken as given, to the intellect. Then in the wider sense this physiological consideration becomes the supplement to…transcendental consideration.”

“There are two fundamentally different ways of considering the intellect, which depend on the difference of point of view…One is the subjective way, which, starting from within, and taking consciousness as what is given, shows us by what mechanism the world exhibits itself in this consciousness, and how from materials furnished by the senses and the understanding the world is built up in it…The opposite to this way of considering the intellect is the objective method. Starting from outside, it takes as

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216 “…muß man auch…nicht bloß, wie Kant getan, vom Intellekt zur Erkenntnis der Welt gehn, sondern auch…von der als vorhanden genommenen Welt zum Intellekt. Dann wird diese im weiten Sinn physiologische Betrachtung die Ergänzung jener…transzendentalen.” (W2, 375,290)
its object not our own consciousness, but the beings that are given in external experience, and are conscious of themselves and the world…The standpoint of this method of consideration is the empirical; it takes the world and the animal beings in it as absolutely given, since it starts from them. Accordingly, it is primarily zoological, anatomical, physiological…”217

In this interpretation, the agreement between the transcendental and empirical points of view is acquired by recognizing that these points of view have different spheres of application. This idea may be tested by considering it against Schopenhauer’s seemingly inconsistent statement: “It is true that space is only in my head; but empirically my head is in space.”218 I suggest that, in this excerpt, Schopenhauer takes two points of view to the intellect in respect of the concept of space. Considered from the transcendental point of view, space is a property of a knowing subject - though it (knowing subject) is described here, empirically, as a head. In this case, the first part of the sentence would, more correctly, read: “It is true that, from a transcendental point of view, space is only a property of my knowing subject…” The latter part of the sentence is coherent as such: “…empirically (that is, considered from an empirical point of view) my head is in space”. Though Schopenhauer here is confusing, it is, in principle, not inconsistent (though, certainly regrettable) to use the same concepts in different meanings, without making the transformation of meaning explicit. Julian Young’s consideration of this particular sentence is somewhat similar with mine. He speaks of the ‘empirical viewpoint’ and the ‘transcendental viewpoint’, and holds that in the second clause the word ‘head’ has literal meaning, while in the first clause it must be intended metaphorically (Young 1987,11.)219

217 “Es gibt zwei von Grund aus verschiedene Betrachtungsweisen des Intellekts, welche auf der Verschiedenheit des Standpunkts beruhen…Die eine ist die subjektive, welche, von innen ausgehend und das Bewußtsein als das Gegebene nehmend, uns darlegt, durch welchen Mechanismus in demselben die Welt sich darstellt und wie aus den Materialien, welche Sinne und Verstand liefern, sie sich darin aufbaut…Die dieser entgegengesetzte Betrachtungsweise des Intellekts ist die objektive, welche von außen anhebt, nicht das eigene Bewußtsein, sondern die in der äußern Erfahrung gegebenen sich ihrer selbst und der Welt bewußten Wesen zu ihrem Gegenstande nimmt…Der Standpunkt dieser Betrachtungsweise ist der empirische: sie nimmt die Welt und die darin vorhandenen tierischen Wesen als schlechthin gegeben, indem sie von ihnen ausgeht. Sie ist demnach zunächst zoologisch, anatomisch, physiologisch…” (W2, 352 ;272)

218 “Zwar ist der Raum nur in meinem Kopf; aber empirisch ist mein Kopf im Raum.” (W2, 31;19)

219 Wicks’ interpretation of Schopenhauer’s naturalization of the a priori forms of cognition emphasises the subject’s interfolded dual awareness of the empirical and non-empirical standpoints in his being (highly) aware of oneself in the world (in this respect, Wicks even refers to a question “What it is like to be a self-conscious human being?”) as the basis of Schopenhauer’s naturalization of the a priori forms of cognition (Wicks 1993, 191-194). Though I admit that a kind of phenomenological approach is crucial both for Schopenhauer’s epistemology and metaphysics (see Chapter 6.1), I do not agree with some of Wicks’ claims. For example,
What then could be said about Schopenhauer’s relation to the above-mentioned two forms of expansionist naturalism? Interestingly, Schopenhauer refers to the empirical/naturalistic point of view to the intellect as a topic, which constitutes some of the content of a genuine philosophical point of view to it. Schopenhauer notes that the empirical method of consideration of the intellect becomes philosophical through connection with the subjective/transcendental method of consideration, and from the higher point of view (Standpunkt) obtained thereby (W2, 352;272). From a philosophical (higher) point of view, it is recognised that, at bottom, both empirical and transcendental points of view are metaphysically grounded in will as the thing in itself (see, for example, W2, 357;276). Hence, as much as the transcendental point of view constitutes part of the content of a genuine philosophical point of view, so does the empirical/naturalistic point of view. On this basis, it may be concluded that Schopenhauer would accept, at least, the first class of expansionist naturalism: epistemological philosophy includes not only the traditional philosophical theory of knowledge but also the natural-scientific studies of cognition. The second class of expansionist naturalism also bears a close resemblance to Schopenhauer’s position. Schopenhauer would not mind, at least some kind of, ‘joint enterprise’ of the transcendental and naturalistic studies of cognition. Since, as has been seen, Schopenhauer’s philosophy has a strong phenomenological foundation in experience (Chapter 6.1), he might very well accept an idea that empirical/naturalistic studies - through their own specific phenomenological point of view to experience - can yield some distinctions or characteristics of experience which are useful in our philosophical considerations of the intellect (on this matter, see Haack 2001, 152). In this sense, Schopenhauer might also allow empirical studies as a way to reveal new problem areas to philosophy, though not those that would challenge the a priori status of the conditions of cognition.

In conclusion, Schopenhauer’s naturalization of the a priori forms of cognition is modest. Though it is not sure that Kant would have accepted this kind of approach to the transcendental conditions of cognition, Schopenhauer is not challenging the Kantian transcendental point of view in any drastic manner.

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Wicks holds that in the dual awareness of the empirical and non-empirical standpoints, we are aware of both the world as our construction, and of ourselves as part of that world (Wicks 1993,192). In my view, the first part of the claim is wrong. Schopenhauer does not claim that in our self-conscious (phenomenological) awareness of ourselves we are aware of the world as our construction. This kind of philosophical claim of the nature of the constitution of cognition comes only after we have recognized that there is something universally valid, or a priori, in experience. On the basis of this recognition, we may then claim that all a priori must have a transcendental origin (see Chapter 6.1).
7. Conclusion

Schopenhauer has an ambivalent relation to Kant’s transcendental idealism. While Schopenhauer’s theory of cognition is basically a Kantian construction, his metaphysics takes a different turn.

With respect to the theory of cognition, both Kant and Schopenhauer abandon the validity of human intellect as an organon for explaining the metaphysical nature of the world. On the basis of the distinction between the form and the matter of cognition, Schopenhauer follows Kant in restricting the validity of the principle of sufficient reason, and with it, all the laws of explanation, to the level of experience. This yields a version of formal idealism: only the formal part of the world is of subjective origin, the content of the world being given by the thing in itself. These constraints on knowledge are also apparent in Schopenhauer’s critique of the traditionally idealistic and realistic philosophies, as well as in Schopenhauer’s own theory of cognition, especially in the contention of the subject’s role in cognition, the correlative relation of subject and object, and the constraints on epistemic considerations and epistemic concepts. The un-Kantian features in Schopenhauer’s theory of cognition concern more certain specific matters. By introducing a kind of phenomenological approach, Schopenhauer retracts from Kant’s more rationalistic method of philosophy (including transcendental arguments). Moreover, it is an open question how Kant would have responded to Schopenhauer’s identification of objects with representations (mental states), and to his description of the \textit{a priori} forms of cognition as brain phenomena.

In his metaphysics, Schopenhauer does not follow Kant's transcendental approach and attach himself merely to a negative, or problematic consideration of the thing in itself. Instead, by extending knowledge of a subject’s self-consciousness of will to the whole world, Schopenhauer evinces a (genuinely contentual) metaphysical explanation of the world. Though it is an exaggeration to say that Kant’s transcendental idealism totally neglects the question of metaphysics, Schopenhauer’s statements of the inner essence of the world are un-Kantian. In this respect, one might want follow White, and contend that Schopenhauer’s disagreements with Kant over the knowability of the thing in itself and over the true nature of metaphysics are about as fundamental as one could conceive of (White 1992,177). However, I would not be so strict. There is also something similar in Kant’s and Schopenhauer’s attitudes to metaphysical matters. Both set their metaphysics against rationalistic philosophy.
and its illegitimate claims regarding the world as it is in itself. Moreover, Schopenhauer makes genuine efforts to qualify his metaphysical claims in a manner that would be in accordance with the Kantian constraints on knowledge. This is apparent in what I have called the “transcendental” nature of Schopenhauer’s metaphysics.

Finally, there is the question of the two main strands of Kant scholarship: the “two-world” doctrine and the “two-aspect” doctrine. It has been seen that there are elements of both of these doctrines in Schopenhauer’s theory – most notably, Schopenhauer both speaks of the two aspects/sides of objects and identifies objects with representations. Yet I hold that Schopenhauer is clearly opposed to the “two-world” doctrine. His critique of the distinct thing in itself, which has a causal effect upon the subject of cognition, strikes at the very core of that doctrine. On a more general level, Schopenhauer does not accept any kind of inferential knowledge of the thing in itself, or approve the idea, which Strawson attributes to Kant, that the transcendental distinction between appearances and the things in themselves has the same starting-point as a scientifically minded philosopher’s distinction between empirical objects and sensible appearances of these objects (Strawson 1966, 40). The understanding of the relation between appearances and the thing in itself as a causally effective relation between the independently existing reality and subjective appearances does not accommodate with Schopenhauer’s anti-scientific way of thinking this relation. However, as noted, Schopenhauer’s identification of objects with representations (mental states) prompts the question if there is any other way to understand ‘representations’ than as something having their basis in distinct reality (things in themselves). If this is the only way to understand ‘representation’ in Schopenhauer’s theory, then Schopenhauer would, after all, have to be seen as giving rise to a (scientifically minded) distinction between appearances and the distinct thing in itself. In my view, however, this would be too much in contradiction with the above-mentioned Schopenhauer’s critique of just this kind of thinking. On this basis, I choose not to focus my main attention on this theoretical problem in Schopenhauer’s theory, but contend that in most important respects Schopenhauer is opposed to the “two-world” doctrine.

I also contend that Schopenhauer’s position has a noteworthy likeness to the “two-aspect” doctrine as presented in connection with Kant (Chapter 3.2). Schopenhauer speaks of representation and will as the two sides/aspects of one and the same empirical objects, describes the method of the consideration of objects in analytic terms, and evinces the idea of a non-causal understanding of the material basis of experience. Generally, Schopenhauer aims to present a new kind of (not scientifically-minded) approach to philosophy, and to the
distinction between appearances and the thing in itself. However, as has been seen, Schopenhauer’s theory differs from the “two-aspect” doctrine as presented in connection with Kant in its identification of objects with representations, in making genuinely contentual claims of the thing in itself, and in criticizing the non-specific idea of a ground. Despite these matters, I take Schopenhauer’s position as a version of the “two-aspect” doctrine. Though Schopenhauer, partly, replaces Kant’s epistemological distinction between appearances and the thing in itself with ontological claims concerning the essence of appearances and the thing in itself, he nevertheless refers by that distinction to the two ways of considering (empirical) objects. This, in my view, constitutes the core of the “two-aspect” doctrine.
Bibliography

I have used Kant’s and Schopenhauer’s emphases in their texts in the following manner: italics as italics (Vernunft – Vernunft), bold as bold (Vernunft-Vernunft), and thinning as bold (Vernunft – Vernunft). All the English translations of the German quotations are from the editions cited below. With respect to Kant, all the references follow the pagination of Kant’s gesammelte Schriften, herausgegeben von der Königlich Preußischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, Berlin: Walter de Gruyter (so-called “Akademie” edition). With respect to Schopenhauer, the first page number given refers to the German edition and the second to the English translation. Only occasionally have I slightly modified the translations.

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**Ak. X**  

**OP**  

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**Works by Schopenhauer**

**vW**  

**W1**  

WN  

W2  

P1  

P2  
Other works


Haaparanta, Leila, "On the possibility of naturalistic and of pure epistemology", *Synthese* 118,1999, p. 31-47.


**Dictionaries, Encyclopedias:**


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