This chapter considers three key works of analytic Kantianism: Clarence Irving Lewis, *Mind and the World Order* (1929); Sir Peter Strawson, *The Bounds of Sense* (1966); and Wilfrid Sellars, *Science and Metaphysics: Variations on Kantian Themes* (1968). We begin with some characteristics of early analytic philosophy that framed analytic philosophers’ views of Kant’s *Critique of Pure Reason*.¹

Early Anglophone analytic philosophy came to focus on language. Ordinary language analysis contends that philosophical problems arise from decoupling terms or phrases from their ordinary contexts of use, in which alone they have definite use and meaning; it tends to a therapeutic approach to philosophy. What may be called “ideal language” analysis (broadly speaking) contends that philosophical problems arise through the use of the “material” mode of speech – that is, ordinary speech about persons, things, or events, to formulate philosophical problems; diagnosing and solving or dissolving these problems requires ascending to a constructed “formal” mode of speech, which restates those issues meta-linguistically as

This chapter is dedicated to the late Jay Rosenberg, with whom I dearly wished to have discussed these matters, at least once more.

I thank Graham Bird, Bob Scharff, and especially Bill deVries for helpful comments, and Paul Guyer for his kind invitation, his excellent suggested focus, and his editorial patience and assistance.

concerning sentences or statements. Though such philosophy can be therapeutic, most versions tended to more ambitious, constructive philosophical analyses. A third, not necessarily exclusive strand of analytic philosophy holds that the sole purview of philosophy is conceptual analysis, all other legitimate inquiry belonging to natural science.3

In 1922, Russell declared, “I should take ‘back to the eighteenth century’ as a battle-cry, if I could entertain any hope that others would rally to it.”4 The pinnacle of Russell’s eighteenth century was Hume’s *Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding*, according to which we can only know analytic propositions ("relations of ideas") a priori, while synthetic propositions ("matters of fact") can only be known a posteriori. Three main strategies dominated analytic epistemology: ordinary language attempts to solve or dissolve apparent epistemological difficulties; proposals for a tenable empiricism that replaces the psychological dimensions of Hume’s epistemology with purely logical analyses or constructions, centrally, of persons or physical objects out of sets of sense data; and proposals for tenable versions of meaning and verification empiricism.

From the outset, analytic philosophers rejected Kant’s contention that some synthetic propositions can be known a priori. The anti-metaphysical bent of analytic philosophy opposed Kant’s apparently metaphysical form of transcendental idealism. The anti-naturalism involved in pure conceptual analysis, especially within epistemology, opposed Kant’s cognitive psychology. Powerful new logics developed by Frege, Russell and Whitehead, and modern algebra appeared to discredit Kant’s understanding and use of logic in the first *Critique*. Einstein’s use of Riemannian geometry within Relativity Theory appeared to discredit Kant’s commitment to Euclidean geometry, its spatial constructions, and his Euclidian account of our spatial form of outer intuition. The strategy

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2 The distinction between the “material” and “formal” modes of speech is anachronistic, although it parallels well enough for present purposes the contrast between surface grammar and logical re-analysis central to Russell’s pioneering work.

3 For an account of philosophical sea-change wrought by analytic philosophy, see Graham Bird, *Philosophical Tasks: An Introduction to Some Aims and Methods in Recent Philosophy* [London: Hutchinson University Library [Hutchinson & Co.], 1972].

of dividing, isolating, and resolving philosophical puzzles piecemeal opposed Kant’s systematic approach. And especially in England, understanding of the Critique was hindered by serious misinterpretations promulgated in the nineteenth century. The reception of Kant’s Critique into analytic philosophy was fraught from the outset.

2. C. I. LEWIS; MIND AND THE WORLD ORDER

Lewis published Mind and the World Order before analytic philosophy took root in North America, within the context of American Philosophy, in the forms of Idealism [Royce], Critical Realism, and Pragmatism, especially Pierce and Dewey, though Lewis was current with work by, for example, Bergson, Russell, and Whitehead. Lewis was a logician, a pioneer in modal logic and in history and philosophy of logic. Consequently, Mind and the World Order shows affinities with later analytic developments, though its distinctively pragmatic character remains a key virtue. Like Peirce, Lewis studied Kant’s Critique over many years. In view of his criticisms of Kant, Lewis’s analysis and defense of his “conceptualistic pragmatism” shows many more points of close agreement than may be expected.

Understanding these agreements requires acknowledging Lewis’s main misunderstanding of Kant’s Critique. Lewis alleged that Kant uses “the term ‘experience’ as if experience and the phenomenally real coincide,” thus precluding any Kantian account of dreams and ascribing phenomenalism to Kant (154, 214, 221). Lewis’s allegation rests upon his apparent difficulties identifying Kant’s reasons for Transcendental

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Idealism\(^9\) and his misunderstanding of Kant’s Transcendental Deduction. Lewis held that the key to Kant’s Deduction is: “That which can not validly be thought under the categories can not be given in intuition” \(\{214\}\).\(^{10}\) To the contrary, Kant’s central problem in the Deduction is that appearances may satisfy the constraints of our forms of intuition without for that reason also satisfying the constraints of our \textit{a priori} categories of judgment \(\{A \, 89–90/B \, 122–3\}\). Attempting to prove the legitimacy of our use of our categories to judge appearances is a further, positive aim of the Deduction and indeed of Kant’s entire Analytic of Concepts.\(^{11}\)

Fortunately, our understanding of Kant’s \textit{Critique} has improved considerably, revealing how Kantian are many central features of Lewis’s epistemology in \textit{Mind}. Like Kant, Lewis too is impressed by the lesson of the scientific revolution, that “We must first be in possession of criteria which tell us what experience would answer what questions, and how, before observation or experiment could tell us anything” \(\{259\}\, \text{cf. B xii–xiv}\); both take this lesson to indicate that \textit{a priori} concepts and principles play fundamental roles in empirical, and especially in scientific, knowledge, which require philosophical examination. Both agree in rejecting non-conceptual “knowledge by acquaintance,” indirect or representationalist theories of perception, and the skeptical egocentric predication.\(^{12}\) Both take perceptual judgment to be central to epistemology. Both distinguish linguistic or conceptual meaning from cognitive significance.\(^{13}\) Both are fallibilists about empirical knowledge \(\{213\}\),\(^{14}\) although Lewis neglected this feature of Kant’s epistemology \(\{227\}\), perhaps because of his phenomenalist misreading. Both distinguish (though not in the same ways) between the \textit{a priori} and the \textit{a posteriori}, and between the analytic and the synthetic; both agree that the key question

\(^{9}\) More specifically, Lewis had difficulty identifying Kant’s reasons for his transcendental idealist account of space and time and the attendant distinction between phenomena and noumena \(\{\textit{Mind, 215–6}\}\).

\(^{10}\) In §§2–4, otherwise unattributed parenthetical page references are to the main work discussed in each section.

\(^{11}\) Various sections of Kant’s \textit{Critique} mentioned here are discussed in relevant contributions to this volume.

\(^{12}\) \textit{Mind, 117–8, 166}. The ascription of these views to Kant is complex; I summarize the main points in “Consciousness and its Transcendental Conditions: Kant’s Anti-Cartesian Revolt,” in S. Heinämaa, V. Lähteenmäki, & P. Remes, eds., \textit{Consciousness: From Perception to Reflection in the History of Philosophy} (Dordrecht: Springer, 2007), 223–43.


\(^{14}\) The fallibilist strands in Kant’s epistemology are a central topic of my \textit{Kant’s Transcendental Proof of Reason} (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), they converge in §63.
is the *quid juris* about the respective roles of these four aspects of human knowledge and experience [A 37–8/B 116]. Both hold that our explicit awareness, judgment, and knowledge is possible only on the basis of basic, pervasive, implicit judgmental cognitive activity; hence they reject Cartesian “transparency of consciousness” theses. Both argue that experience is only possible for us if the world presents us with similarities and contrasts among the *qualia* or the objects presented to us that we can recognize by using our *a priori* categories [360]. Lewis learned from Kant’s Second Analogy that central to analyzing and justifying empirical knowledge is determining that, and how we can properly discriminate between merely subjective forms of apparent succession from objective forms of actual succession, so that we can identify spatio-temporal objects and events [16]. Both agree that identifying objective states of affairs requires time, anticipation, and bodily behavior [175, 195, 288]. Although Kant only briefly notes bodily comportment in the Second Analogy, namely, we identify the concurrent existence of various parts of a house in part by how we choose to glance in one direction or another [A 190, 192–3/B 235, 237–8, 275], Arthur Melnick has argued cogently that bodily comportment is fundamental to Kant’s theory of perceptual judgment [17]. Lewis and Kant both argue that ascribing sensory appearances to objective states of affairs requires conceptually structured perceptual judgment [18]. Indeed, Lewis contends, “Every criterion of classification is [a] criterion of reality of some particular sort. There is no such thing as reality in general; to be real, a thing must be a particular sort of real” [263], echoing Kant’s reasons for denying that being is a real predicate [A 598/B 626].

These substantial points of agreement highlight Lewis’s four central disagreements with Kant’s *Critique*. Lewis contends, first, that there are no *a priori* structures of our human forms of spatial and temporal intuiting [198, 214]. Modern algebra shows that geometry can be developed purely formally, without appeal to spatial constructions, and can be developed consistently in both Euclidean and non-Euclidean forms [241, 298]. Einstein’s Theory of Relativity rejects the requirement of simultaneity embedded in Kant’s account of spatial and especially geometrical construction [253]. Moreover, none of Kant’s *a priori* grounds for constructing Euclidean geometrical figures and proofs can address

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the application of geometry to physical objects (295–8). Lewis contends that “we most certainly could have an experience in which Euclidean-appearing things should, upon further examination, turn out to have non-Euclidean properties” (299). Hence the remaining question is which system of geometry is most successfully applicable to any empirical domain (298).

Lewis contends, second, that the lesson of the algebratization of geometry holds for conceptual systems generally. “Inference,” Lewis contends, “is analytic of systems, not of propositions in isolation.” The inferential relations that explicate and define any formal, conceptual system are developed and defined independently of any applicability of that system. The variety of such systems, the variety of bases for developing equivalent systems, the historical record of presumed axiomatic truths being exposed as false, and the change of concepts associated with the same term all show, Lewis contends, that there are no fixed categories such as Kant’s, and that the traditional ideal of justification solely by deduction from self-evident first premises [scientia] is false, in both formal and non-formal domains (84, 198, 202–5, 233–4).

Lewis further contends, third, that these general points about formal, conceptual systems hold equally of the conceptual systems we use, implicitly or explicitly, to identify objects, events, and natural regularities, including all natural-scientific systems of classification. All such systems have a formal truth in terms of logical implication within the system, independent of any reference to particular domains of application. Hence, Lewis argues, the “only knowledge a priori is purely analytic; all empirical knowledge is probable only” (309). Hence, he concludes, there is no synthetic a priori knowledge. The central case for Lewis’s view concerns our extrapolation from past and present regularities to likely future regularities. (Its centrality is explained shortly.) Especially in this case, philosophers have sought a synthetic principle, such as the uniformity of nature, to “bridge the gap between abstract ideas in the mind and the reality presented in experience” (309). Yet in this case, too, Lewis argues (in the final 100 pages) that “for the validity of empirical generalizations as ... knowledge of probabilities[,] no a priori truth other than the merely analytic is required” (310).

Finally, Lewis develops a much simpler deduction of the categories, which [if sound] renders Kant’s Transcendental Deduction otiose (37–8, 219). Indeed, the clues to Lewis’s simpler deduction are supplied by Kant. According to Lewis, “the deduction of the categories consists at bottom in this: that without the validity of categorial principles no experience is possible” (320). Indeed, “in some passages of the ‘subjective deduction’ 19 Collected Papers, 10.
the argument turns precisely upon the consideration that the only alternative to a categorized and orderly experience is a meaningless flux of mere schwärmerei” (321).²⁰

Regarding the a priori origin of our concepts, Lewis was more radical than Kant. Lewis argued that all concepts are a priori because they are all classificatory inventions of the mind. Experience only provides us sensory presentations or qualia; it is entirely up to us to classify these effectively as objective, subjective, or illusory within any one of our conceptual classifications of the real {x, 13–14, 197, 222–5}. Sensory presentations or qualia simply occur; they are not themselves representations and involve no knowledge because they involve no concepts, judgments, nor any distinction between truth and error (44, 46, cf. 275). Our categories rule nothing in or out of experience. Instead, our categories provide various specific classifications of various ways in which something can be real: “whatever is denominated ‘real’ must be something discriminated in experience by criteria which are antecedently determined” {x}. In this sense, some sensory presentation or quale may be or belong to a real mirage, or a real spurious perceptual misjudgment, or a veridical perception of a real physical object; the question “real or not?” can only be answered for specific classifications of phenomena [here using the term “phenomena” in a neutral sense]. Accordingly, “A priori principles of categorial interpretation are required to limit reality; they are not required to limit experience” (222, italics original; cf. 231). Because all classification involves ascription of reality of one or another kind, it involves expectations of future experiences; no single sensory presentation or quale suffices to verify any such classification. Moreover, which future experiences eventuate depends in part on our own decisions about how to act (356–7). Hence the a priori “represents the activity of mind itself; it represents an attitude in some sense freely taken” (196–7). More fully, Lewis states:

The necessity of the a priori is its character as legislative act. It represents a constraint imposed by the mind, not a constraint imposed upon the mind by something else.

And the a priori is independent of experience ... precisely because it prescribes nothing to the content of experience. That only can be a priori which is true no matter what. What is anticipated is not the given but our attitude toward it; it formulates an uncompelled initiative of the mind, our categorial ways of acting. Truth which is a priori anticipates the character of the real; ... The real, however, is not the given as such, but the given categorically interpreted. In determining its

²⁰ By the “subjective deduction,” Lewis apparently intends the A Deduction; see A 112, although a parallel passage occurs in the Second Analogy (A 200–2/B 246–7). Also see below on the transcendental affinity of the sensory manifold.
own interpretation – and only so – the mind legislates for reality, no matter what future experience may bring. (197)

Lewis primarily emphasizes the a priori origin of all our concepts, although careful reading of Mind reveals that Lewis rejects both concept empiricism and verification empiricism, as he explicitly argues elsewhere. Accordingly, he holds that our concepts are a priori regarding their content as well.

Lewis’s conceptualistic pragmatism analyzes the a priori in relation to experience because he argues that the independence of our a priori categories from experience is qualified: “... what is a priori and of the mind is prior to the content of the given, yet in another sense not altogether independent of experience in general” (24, cf. 21). Although no experience or set of experiences can require us to change our conceptual classifications, our own interests in devising and improving useful, informative classifications lead us to devise new systems (or sub-systems) of classification and to abandon their predecessors or alternatives (232).

Because our conceptual classifications are, in part, embedded in our practical attitudes toward classifying experiences as they occur, because more than a few experiences are required to verify any classification, and because which experiences pertaining to that classification occur depends in part upon our chosen courses of action, Lewis’s “question of the possibility of knowledge a priori” is: “How do we know in advance that if it does not conform to our principle it will not be veridical, or will not be real in the category which is in question?” Lewis’s answer is his alternative to Kant’s Transcendental Deduction; it involves four main points. First, although perception is always relative to the perceiver and his or her behavior, this relativity does not entail that perception is inherently misleading or illusory (143, 160–4). The logic of relativity shows that something can have or exhibit relative characteristics only because it has its own intrinsic or “absolute” (non-relative) characteristics (167–73). Second, we could not discriminate among qualia nor anything else in an undifferentiated experiential field (59). Third, it is confused and misleading to formulate the problem of induction as Hume does, as if we experience and identify physical objects though we cannot know laws governing their behavior. To the contrary, though distinct, the issues of whether or how we identify physical objects or events and of whether or how we identify laws governing their behavior are correlative problems requiring conjoint solution (320).

Like Kant, Lewis argues, fourth, that we can only identify physical objects (and likewise events as objective successions) by discriminating

regularities in their behavior that are partly manifest to us in how they appear to us, by distinguishing their regularities from those regularities in their appearances that depend upon our own chosen courses of action. Only because we are active beings can we at all distinguish between sensory presentations or *qualia* and the appearances of physical objects or other kinds of real occurrences ([30–1, 130, 140–1]). Making such distinctions requires that the order of sensory *qualia* be not fully predetermined or fixed; instead, that order is in part a function of our chosen courses of action ([357–8]). That these basic points hold is manifest in our experience and action; the only alternative is an experience consisting in the “mere flitting of meaningless presentations,” perhaps approximated by “the experience of an oyster with the oyster left out” ([378]). Hence, “a world without law must likewise be a world without recognizable things. The recognition of objects requires the same kind of order or reliable relatedness which law also requires” ([320]). Hence, if we have experience at all, the question is not whether there are physical objects, regularities governing their behavior, or any human knowledge of these, but rather to what extent can we identify and thereby come to know various kinds of things and the regularities governing their behavior ([351, 353]). Lewis concludes:

A certain minimal order is prescribed *a priori* in the recognition of the real. It is a regulative maxim of reason to seek further uniformities which may be stated in principles finally of maximal comprehensiveness and simplicity. But there neither is nor can be any prescription of the specific type of uniformity or correlation which is demanded in this interest of further intelligibility. ([353])

Hence “we do know with certainty and *a priori* that if *X* is a physical thing, then it will conform to certain general principles which can be laid down in advance because they constitute criteria of the physical” ([322]). All of these points are, by design, compatible with both the possibility and the social and historical facts of significant, often sudden change in our systems of classificatory concepts.23

Lewis’s alternative to Kant’s Transcendental Deduction is indeed close to an important, if controversial analysis of Kant’s.24 Kant identified and partly analyzed an important transcendental, formal, though material condition for the very possibility of self-conscious human

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22 Cf.: “The determination of reality, the classification of phenomena, and the discovery of law, all grow up together” [Mind 263, italics original].


experience, the transcendental affinity of the sensory manifold (A 113). According to this principle, unless the contents of one’s sensations have a minimum, humanly recognizable degree of regularity and variety, they would not admit of perceptual synthesis, and so would provide no basis for even putative cognitive judgments using either a priori or empirical concepts. Hence this affinity of the sensory manifold is transcendental because it is a necessary a priori condition of the possibility of self-conscious experience. It is formal because it concerns the orderliness of the matter of empirical sensations. However, ultimately it is satisfied neither by the a priori intuitive conditions of experience analyzed in the Transcendental Aesthetic nor by the a priori conceptual conditions analyzed in the Transcendental Analytic. Kant recognizes that its satisfaction is due to the “content” or the “object” of experience. Hence this transcendental condition is neither conceptual nor intuitive, but rather material.

Kant stresses that a complete sensibility and understanding, capable of associating perceptions, does not of itself determine whether any appearances to it or any of its perceptions are in fact associable. If they were not, there may be fleeting, random sensations – Lewis’sfitting Schwärmerei – but there could be no unified, and hence no self-conscious, experience. In part, this would be because those irregular sensations would disallow reproductive synthesis; they would not admit of any psychological association, and so could not afford a basis for developing empirical concepts or for using categorial concepts to judge objects. There could be no schematism and hence no use of categories in a world of chaotic sensations or appearances. In this regard, the necessity of the associability of the sensory manifold is a conditional necessity, holding between that manifold and any self-conscious human subject. Necessarily, if a human subject is self-consciously aware of an object or event via a sensory manifold, then the content of that manifold is associable. The associability of this content is its “affinity.” The fact that such affinity is necessary for the possibility of self-conscious-experience entails that this affinity is transcendental, though we cannot determine a priori how much associability our finite cognitive minds require (A 653–4/B 681–2). Above this minimal level of regularity and variety, there is then a reflective issue about the extent to which we can systematize what we experience.

Kant’s analysis of transcendental affinity is expressly tailored to our finite cognitive capacities. Accordingly, one might ask of Lewis, how much order among qualia suffices for human experience? Lewis answers optimistically that we can identify order even within “any apparently

26 A 112–13, 653–54/B 681–82.
chaotic character of experience” and “reduce it to some kind of intelligible order,” even if only to expect maximum novelty [226, 388]. Lewis’s optimism appears required to keep distinct the “equivalence of the a priori, the analytic, and the intensional, on the one hand, [and] of the a posteriori, the synthetic, and the extensional, on the other,” which have too often been confused within logic [433]. Yet recent epistemology stemming from cognitive science has made us more mindful of our computational finitude. Lewis notes that identifying order depends in part upon our degree of intelligence [351]. Lewis considers a “perverse demon,” whose sole purpose in feeding us qualia “is to mislead us and render knowledge impossible” [387]. Even if there are reasons to suppose that human beings can only discriminate a finite number of distinct sensory qualia [363, 387, 431], so that the demon must eventually repeat some [387], it is far from obvious that such repetitions must fall within the scope of regularity comprehensible to (say) average human intelligence. In this regard, Kant’s analysis, which appeals expressly to our cognitive limitations, better justifies the conclusion required by Lewis’s analysis. However much Lewis’s distinction is required in logic, this issue belongs to epistemology. How might Lewis respond?

According to Lewis, our intellect is active and embodied, otherwise it could not generate any conceptual classifications [21, 24, 27, 30–1, 92, 290–1]. Any world in which our intellect can have sensory presentations is one that contains our own physical bodies and whatever physical things condition our sensory presentations [161, 286]. Furthermore, “The human mind’ is distinctly a social product,” due to our need to cooperate within our natural and social environment, and “our categories ... reflect that fact” (238–9), not least because our classifying together various sensory qualia “with similar appearances in the past is too swift and instinctive” to be explicit. Such rapid, implicit classification, Lewis presumes, is evolutionarily basic to human [and to animal] cognition [290–1, cf. 358]. To the extent that the cognitive evolution of our species belongs to Lewis’s epistemology, there are further grounds to support his claim that any world in which we can be is one in which we can identify relevant similarities and differences among presentations, such that we can identify relevant similarities and differences among presented objects and events. Conversely, Lewis surmises, “If we were jelly-fish in a liquid world, we should probably not add at all, because the useful purposes served by such conceptions would be so slight” [252].

Such appeals to our cognitive finitude strongly suggest that augmenting Lewis’s alternative deduction in this way makes for a much more synthetic and perhaps even \textit{a posteriori} analysis than suits either Lewis’s liberal form of \textit{a priori} conceptual analysis or even his broad model of a transcendental deduction. I close this section with three brief remarks. First, genuinely pragmatic epistemology can be combined coherently and constructively with genuinely transcendental analysis and proof. Second, Lewis’s rich, multi-faceted account of conceptual meaning in \textit{Mind} compromises, if not undermines, the traditional [as well as many contemporaneous] distinctions between the \textit{a priori} and the \textit{a posteriori} and also the analytic and the synthetic. His conceptualistic pragmatism suggests that the relevant contrast here is not between the \textit{a priori} and the \textit{a posteriori}, but between the more formal and the more material. Third, those who would question Lewis’s appeal to human nature as “externalist” factors in justification that would commit a \textit{petitio principii} against the skeptic should consider carefully Lewis’s criticism of the deductivist pretensions of \textit{scientia}, which are far more central to skeptical hypotheses than their proponents typically realize. Lewis’s \textit{Mind and the World Order}, long since shunted aside by programmatic declarations by extensionalist logicians, awaits philosophical rediscovery.

3. PETER F. STRAWSON: \textit{THE BOUNDS OF SENSE}

\textit{The Bounds of Sense} (London: Methuen, 1966) occupies a uniquely influential position in the intersection of Kant’s \textit{Critique} and analytic philosophy. At the time of its publication, there was philosophically sensitive, textually scrupulous and in this sense “analytic” Anglophone research on Kant’s \textit{Critique} – for example, by A. C. Ewing, W. H. Walsh, Graham Bird, Manley Thompson, Charles Parsons, and Douglas Dryer. Such research, however, was regarded by mainstream analytic philosophers as a historical specialty. Hence, when a leading analytic philosopher emphatically proclaimed that Kant’s Transcendental Deduction is “one of the most impressive and exciting [passages] in the whole of philosophy” (25), that “[n]o philosopher in any book has come nearer to achieving this strenuous aim [of thinking up to the limits of thought] than Kant himself in the \textit{Critique of Pure Reason}” (44), and specifically that

Kant’s genius nowhere shows itself more clearly than in his identification of the most fundamental of these conditions [of the possibility of self-consciousness] in

\footnote{28 Or so I argue in “Can Pragmatic Realists Argue Transcendentally?,” in J. Shook, ed., \textit{Pragmatic Naturalism and Realism} (Buffalo, NY: Prometheus, 2003), 151–75.}
its most general form: viz. the possibility of distinguishing between a temporal order of subjective perceptions and an order and arrangement which objects of those perceptions independently possess – a unified and enduring framework of relations between constituents of an objective world. Almost equally important is his recognition that this distinction must be implicit in the concepts under which the contents of experience are brought, since there is no question of perceiving, as it were, the pure framework itself. These are very great and novel gains in epistemology, so great and so novel that, nearly two hundred years after they were made, they have still not been fully absorbed into the philosophical consciousness (29):

Mainstream analytic philosophers paid attention – although also because Strawson corroborated everything they disliked about Kant’s Critique while promising to extract from Kant’s text a philosophically respectable analysis.29 Strawson’s analysis was hailed as a “new and improved version of the central argument of Kant’s Transcendental Deduction,”30 and Bounds launched a new genre of analytic transcendental arguments.31

Strawson aimed to determine “how far Kant succeeds in establishing that certain features are, in the austere sense, a priori features of our conception of experience” (70). Strawson’s positive reconstruction of Kant’s analysis can be summarized in his own words. (This is important for reasons indicated later.) Strawson’s main conclusion from Kant’s Transcendental Aesthetic is:

[We] can conceive of no form of experience which does not involve a temporal ordering of the particular items of which we become aware ... (72). [Kant’s Transcendental Deduction provides] reason for entertaining favourably an exceedingly general conclusion: viz. that any course of experience of which we can form a coherent conception must be, potentially, the experience of a self-conscious subject and, as such, must have such internal, concept-carried connectedness as to constitute it (at least in part) a course of experience of an objective world, conceived of as determining the course of that experience itself. (117, cf. 118, 121)

[Kant’s Analogies of Experience and Refutation of Idealism] ... prove something important. Experience of the objective demands the possibility of determining

29 The most comprehensive response to Strawson’s criticisms of Kant’s Critique is by Robert Greenberg, Kant’s Theory of A Priori Knowledge (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2001).
objective time-relations (132). ... [O]nly if it is possible to distinguish between the subjective time-order of perceptions and the time-relations of [perceived] objects ... is it possible to give content to the general notion of experience of an objective reality, hence to make intelligible the possibility of experience itself (140–1). ... [The] key notion in this problem is that of currently unperceived objects which are nevertheless objects of possible perception ... existing at the same time as objects of actual perception. If there were no such co-existence of objects of possible with objects of actual perception, there would be no effective distinction to be drawn between objective and subjective time-orders. ... [This distinction] is effectively employed only if we think of objects encountered in experience, objects which we actually perceive, as existing not only when we perceive them, but also at other times, when we perceive, not them, but other objects. ... This notion involves that of the possession by objects which we actually perceive of a relative permanence or persistence which our perceptions of them do not possess (141, cf. 132). ... We cannot ... characterize those perceptions themselves except with the help of concepts of persistent things which we perceive the objects of those perceptions as instances of. [Hence] ... we must conceive of such objects as ordered in some system or framework of relations such as alone can give sense to the notion of particular identity of such objects. ... [T]he most natural way, and perhaps the only way, for us to conceive of a possible framework or system of relations of the kind required is to conceive of it as spatial. [Hence] ... we must conceive of ourselves, as perceivers, as having at any moment a determinable position in the system of relations to which the perceiver belongs. For only under this condition can the subjective series of our experiences be conceived as a series of perceptions of objects existing independently and enjoying their mutual relations in the system (142).

Lack or possession of order-indifference on the part of our perceptions is ... our criterion – whether we reflectively realize the fact or not – of objective succession or co-existence (134). [Distinguishing] ... between objective and subjective time-determinations (143) [requires identifying] changes in perceptions which are attributable to changes in the viewpoint of the observer. [Such changes] ... exhibit a regular correlation with change of the observer’s position and his sense-orientation-in relation to objects in the world. The possibility of this correlation in turn seems to depend upon changes and persistences in the world of objects being themselves subject to some kind and degree of order and regularity. (144)

[Hence] ... our concepts of objects, and the criteria of re-identification which they embody, must allow for changes in the objective world subject to the limitation that change must be consistent with the possibility of applying those concepts and criteria in experience. ... [T]his requirement [is] satisfied [because] our concepts of objects are linked with sets of conditional expectations about the things which we perceive as falling under them. For every kind of object, we can draw up lists of ways in which we shall expect it not to change unless ... , lists of ways in which we shall expect it to change if ... , and lists of ways in which we shall expect it to change unless ... ; where, with respect to every type of change or non-change-listed, the subordinate clauses introduce further and indefinite lists of clauses
each of which would constitute an explanatory condition of the change or absence of change in question. (145)

The point is that in contradistinction to concepts of simple sensory qualities, and in contradistinction, too, to any concepts there may be of particular sensory items which are quite fully describable in terms of simple sensory qualities (‘sense-data’, perhaps, in one sense of the term), concepts of objects are always and necessarily compendia of causal laws or law-likeness, carry implications of causal power or dependence. [These] must make up a great part of our concepts of any persisting and re-identifiable objective items. And without some such concepts of these, no experience of an objective world is possible. (145–6)

[Thus] ... we may suppose that while perceptions of the world may reveal some objective changes which we can characterize as inexplicable, quite unpredictable or utterly random, they can do so only against a background of persistence and alterations which we recognize as explicable, predictable, and regular. (144, cf. 101)

This summary of Strawson’s positive analysis reveals some important though neglected characteristics of Strawson’s enlistment of Kant into the program of descriptive metaphysics, “of determining the fundamental general structure of any conception of experience such as we can make intelligible to ourselves” (44, cf. 57, 146) through conceptual analysis.

In advance of his analysis, Strawson proposes to show that a skeptic who challenges us to reconstruct a public world of physical objects and events on the sole basis of our private sense data “demonstrates his failure to have grasped the conditions of the possibility of experience in general” (19). This result is desirable, but Strawson’s method is insufficient to this task. He contends that the various constraints Kant identifies as governing our possible experience “must somehow be reflected in the character of our concepts themselves” (144–5). Because his analysis focuses almost exclusively on our concepts and their interrelations, the strongest conclusion Strawson can justify pertains to how we must “conceive” or “think of” our experience, how we must “take” objects to be, or how we must perceive them “as” physical objects and events. This

32 Here Strawson highlights a key point of Lewis’s analysis, had Lewis better understood Kant’s analysis of this point, he might have realized that Kant did not espouse phenomenalism.

33 Strawson’s analysis concurs here with Lewis’s.

34 “My book [Bounds] was, you might say, a somewhat ahistorical attempt to recruit Kant to the ranks of the analytical metaphysicians, while discarding those metaphysical elements that refused any such absorption” (Strawson, “A bit of Intellectual Autobiography,” in H.-J. Glock, ed., Strawson and Kant [Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 2003], 1–14]. For a thorough examination of Strawson’s positive analysis, see Grundmann, Analytische Transzendentalphilosophie.
limitation results from his frequent, characteristic use of locutions such as those underscored here:

[The] distinction ... between objective and subjective time-orders ... is effectively employed only if we think of objects encountered in experience, objects which we actually perceive, as existing not only when we perceive them, but also at other times, when we perceive, not them, but other objects. \[141\]

... we must conceive of ourselves, as perceivers, as having at any moment a determinable position in the system of relations to which the perceiver belongs. For only under this condition can the subjective series of our experiences be conceived as a series of perceptions of objects existing independently and enjoying their mutual relations in the system. \[142\]

Such locutions pervade Strawson’s analysis.\[35\] Perhaps Strawson’s analysis may counter some sense data analyses,\[36\] but because it addresses only how we must conceive our experience, it cannot address the skeptic.\[37\] To address skepticism, Strawson’s analysis would have to demonstrate not simply that we must conceive of ourselves, our experience, and the objects or events we purportedly experience in certain commonsense

\[35\] I invite the reader to identify each such locution and similar ones in the earlier summary of Strawson’s version of the Deduction, and in the constructive passages of \textit{Bounds}, Part II. Although some occurrences of terms such as “see” or “perceive” appear to be factive, suggesting veridical perception, nothing in Strawson’s analysis justifies such connotations. Instead, if they are used in such senses, they occur as independent premises. Most directly, Strawson states: “We perceive successively objects which we nevertheless know to be co-existent” \[141\]; italics original]. If we do know this, then skepticism is a dead issue, though apparently for reasons Moore already had in hand. When Strawson immediately queries, “But how can we know this?” \[141\], his answer reverts to the kinds of locutions I emphasize.

\[36\] Grundmann notes difficulties identifying what sort of sense data analysis Strawson addresses \textit{(Transzendentalphilosophie, 135–40).}

\[37\] Grundmann notes two passages that might suggest that Strawson aims to show that our conception of objectivity is linked to the world as it truly is \textit{(Transzendentalphilosophie, 132)}. Yet these passages too expressly concern how “[o]ur sensible experience may, and does in fact, exhibit that connectedness which enables us to employ empirical concepts of objects, to count our sensible representations as veridical perceptions” \textit{(Bounds, 92)}, or how “[w]hat is meant by the necessary self-reflexiveness of a possible experience in general could be otherwise expressed by saying that experience must be such as to provide room for the thought of experience itself. The point of the objectivity-condition is that it provides room for this thought” \textit{(ibid., 107)}. Provision for having such thoughts, however, does not involve – not for any reasons Strawson provides – grounds for supposing these thoughts to be either true or justified.
ways, but that we rightly, truly, and indeed justifiedly so conceive them. This task belongs to normative epistemology, not to descriptive metaphysics; knowledge requires both truth and justification. Strawson’s conceptual analyses are indeed necessary, but not sufficient, to answer basic questions in epistemology, as Kant already understood. This limit is built into Strawson’s aims and method, and these limits have been repeatedly re-confirmed in the ensuing critical discussion of his analysis.

Strawson’s analysis in Bounds remains within the ambit of Hume’s skepticism in the Treatise. Strawson’s analysis highlights issues of concept-possession and use – namely, their use to conceive of or to “take” ourselves, objects, and events in certain commonsense ways as indicated. In “Of Scepticism with regard to the senses” Hume acknowledges that we all have the concept of a physical object (“the idea of body”) and that it is central to how we conceive our experience and what we experience, and he is at pains to account for the acquisition, definition, and use of this concept in accord with his concept-empiricism. Hume there argues that, however ineliminable it may be from our beliefs, the very idea of body, the very concept “physical object,” is an utter fiction incapable of any justifiable cognitive role.

Strawson’s attention to the integration of a complex of conceptual resources within our commonsense realistic conception of experience exhibits the standard epistemological problem confronting coherence theories of justification, aired at the outset of Logical Positivism and recently re-learned by Laurence BonJour. No matter how coherent or tightly integrated a set of beliefs, propositions, or concepts may be, coherence alone cannot justify their truth. Ironically, Bounds appeared only three years after Gettier demonstrated the insufficiency of conceptual analysis for epistemology. Gettier’s counterexamples to conceptual analyses of Justified True Belief models of empirical knowledge all highlight features of a person’s actual cognitive processes and circumstances from which non-empirical conceptual analysis must prescind. Among much else, Gettier’s article ushered in a return to more naturalistic approaches to epistemology attending to our actual cognitive processes and circumstances, including developments in cognitive science

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38 See my Hegel, Hume und die Identität wahrnehmbarer Dinge [Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann, 1998], §4.


and epistemological interest in artificial intelligence, including the excellent works on relevant aspects of Kant’s cognitive functionalism by, for example, Patricia Kitcher and Andrew Brook.41

Strawson recognized deficiencies in Bounds regarding both Kant’s Critique and the core issues. He points especially to “Kant’s New Foundations of Metaphysics” and “The Problem of Realism and the A Priori” as significantly improving his view.42 To these I would add “Imagination and Perception” and “Perception and its Objects,” which attend to central issues of perceptual judgment.43 When Paul Guyer later argued that Kant’s transcendental psychology examines basic constraints on any cognitive system that synthesizes information over time, Strawson granted the point and acknowledged that his castigating “the imaginary subject of transcendental psychology” (32) was “somewhat rude.”44

Kant recognized that conceptual analysis alone is insufficient to his epistemological tasks in the Critique (A 216–18/B 263–65). Even when conceptual analysis is as liberal as Strawson’s, Kant’s point stands. Kant knew that disregarding our basic cognitive capacities and attendant incapacities grants the field to skeptics. Strawson’s tantalizing sketch inspired many philosophers to seek more detail in and more ambitious results from Kant’s Critique. The present volume and comparable recent works are, inter alia, continuing testimony to his riveting reconstruction of Kant’s Deduction.

The lack of epistemological import of Strawson’s analysis in *Bounds* poses a choice: either produce a much-improved version of Kant’s “descriptive metaphysics,” engage in normative epistemology, or make the most possible of Hume’s observation that skepticism is a creature of one’s study. In *Scepticism and Naturalism*, Strawson chose this latter option, yet in so doing he did not renege on his apparently more Kantian analysis in *Bounds*.45

4. WILFRID SELLARS, SCIENCE, AND METAPHYSICS: VARIATIONS ON KANTIAN THEMES

Unlike other analytic empiricists, Sellars realizes that issues about perceptual judgment are subtle and crucial. Sellars takes conceptual explication to be an essential, though not sufficient, strategy for understanding and resolving substantive philosophical issues. Within analytic philosophy, the important shift is from “analysis” to “explication.”46 Conceptual analysis seeks explicit, *a priori* (certainly non-empirical), exhaustive specifications (definitions or “analyses”) of key terms, claims, or principles. In contrast, conceptual “explication” is the partial and provisional specification of key terms (etc.) *in use*, so that explications, unlike analyses, are tied by actual linguistic practices to their relevant domains of thought and inquiry – and thus also to intellectual and cultural history. Like the classical Pragmatists, Sellars explicates our concepts-in-use to gain theoretical understanding (for example, 96, 98, 110).

Influenced by Carnap, a cornerstone of Sellars’s philosophy is semantic ascent to a constructed formal meta-language: All abstract entities are to be defined in and confined to the meta-language. Recourse to the formal mode of speech does not justify nominalism, though adopting it requires nominalism. Yet why expect philosophically significant confusions not to infect the formal mode of speech? This neglected issue was addressed by Sellars upon Aristotle’s advice: because these issues are so complex, elusive, and easily obscured by incautious phrasing, one must consult carefully the opinions of the many and the wise. Sellars found the wise throughout philosophical history, from the pre-Socratics to the present day,47 because core issues regarding the logical forms of thought and the connection of thought with things are perennial, arising in

47 Parmenides is mentioned thrice (62, 71, 77); the contemporary counterparts of Heraclitus are radical sense-datum theorists and causal process time-slicers, heirs to Hume all.
distinctive, paradigmatic forms in each era (67–9). One result of Sellars’s expansive research is a catalog and critical assessment of philosophical locutions – that is, of the “ordinary language” of philosophers. Only by examining these can one find the most suitable, least misleading formulations of issues, specific theses, distinctions, and their relations. Sellars knew that the anti-systematic, piecemeal method of analytic puzzle-solving was doomed in its own terms by 1950 when Carnap adopted a moderately holistic semantics in “Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology.” Thus, even when cast in the formal mode of speech, philosophy must be systematic. The interconnection among philosophical issues provides another check against inapt formulations.

Recourse to a meta-language has a further implication, also characteristic of Sellars’s views and method. Valid inferences within any language are specified in its meta-language. Hence ‘proofs’, as Lewis acknowledged, are neither more nor less than deductions which accord with the rules instituted by the meta-meta-language (for example, Carnap’s L- and P-rules). Accordingly, the “basic concepts and distinctions” of any philosophical account “are to be tested or ‘proved’ by the illumination they provide, and the coherence of the story they make possible” (1).

These features of Sellars’s method appear prominently in Metaphysics. Like Lewis, Sellars develops a distinctive conceptual pragmatism; unlike Lewis, Sellars expressly defends “synthetic necessary truths,” necessary truths that depend upon their subject matter (68–9). Like Kant and Lewis, Sellars argues that standard empiricist views of perception and sensory evidence are irreparably flawed. Unlike them, Sellars seeks to turn this critique to the advantage of an improved, decidedly


Kantian empiricism. Sellars regards Kant’s Transcendental Deduction not as a proof but rather as a sophisticated theory of judgment that would resolve both skepticism and much of epistemological debate because both depend upon seriously inadequate analyses and pictures of the mind, nature, and their relations.\(^{51}\) Rectifying these deficiencies requires a cogent philosophy of mind that dispels skeptical and epistemological quandaries. In addition to Kant’s Transcendental Analytic, such a philosophy of mind requires Sellars’s non-relational account of “meaning” and “aboutness”\(^ {ix}\) and his account of “picturing.”

Here we consider how *Science and Metaphysics* consists in *Variations on Kantian Themes*: Sellars agrees with Kant that our commonsense world is phenomenal because it only exists in our experiencings, and that appearances to us are caused by noumena. However, Sellars contends that these noumena are the objects of the ultimate, Peircean science and are thus in principle knowable rather than unknowable.\(^ {52}\) Kant defines as transcendental “all cognition ... that is occupied not so much with objects but rather with our mode of cognition of objects, insofar as this [mode] is to be possible a priori”\(^ {A 11–2/B 25}\). Although Sellars demurs about its a priori status, *Metaphysics* is an exercise in transcendental philosophy\(^ {147}\) that aims to identify and to justify various synthetic necessary truths\(^ {68}\), including those that form the core of our cognitive use of concepts\(^ {cf. 100}\). Chapter I and the Appendix aim to correct Kant’s Transcendental Aesthetic; like Lewis and Strawson, Sellars rejects Kant’s equation of space and time with our forms of intuiting. The three chapters on “The Conceptual and the Real”\(^ {60–150}\) form a contemporary counterpart to Kant’s Transcendental Analytic. *Metaphysics* develops a distinctive form of transcendental idealism; its final chapter addresses fundamental principles of Kant’s moral theory, as does Kant in parts of the


Transcendental Dialectic. Transcendental philosophy requires what Kant calls “transcendental reflection,” which, Graham Bird notes, “ascribes concepts to sense or understanding, [and] is concerned with the relation between concepts and their objects, and with the distinction between objects of the senses . . . and objects of understanding or reason.” Transcendental reflection also considers how various sensory or conceptual representations ought to be related in cognitive judgments. These are central issues in Metaphysics.

Sellars stresses the normativity of conceptual systems. The considerations Sellars brings to bear on his topics must be neutral between the commonsense or “manifest” image we have of ourselves in our everyday world (analyzed pre-eminently by Aristotle and Strawson; 15, 170–1) and the natural-scientific image of nature we have developed since Galileo; it must also be neutral between knowledge and morality. To assess neutrally the judgmental resources of each of these domains, Sellars’s overarching transcendental standpoint cannot be an outgrowth of any one of these (sub)domains, though it must be deeply informed within each and by them all. Where Kant examines our cognitive – specifically sensory, conceptual, and judgmental – capacities to form legitimate cognitive judgments and to distinguish these from illegitimate forms, Sellars examines specific sorts of propositions, all of which express the content of various kinds of judgment. In their respective ways, Kant and Sellars both examine the logical forms of thought, the feeling for which Sellars finds, prior to Kant, in Ockham’s disciples and in Leibniz, although it is “almost totally lacking in Descartes and his British successors” (35). Sellars’s critique of philosophical and of commonsense locutions serves both as a phenomenology of various domains of human experience, as reflected in our talk within and about them, and as a basis for identifying the canonical forms of propositions (or forms of judgment) within each. This aspect of Sellars’s endeavor is a sustained examination and regimentation of forms of classification, through which he defends intensions and their roles in our acts of representing and our claims to truth. Both Kant and Lewis are committed to intensions and to their roles in classifications and true judgments; Sellars shows how central such systems are to human thought and how they can be defended against recent extensionalist

53 The transcendental character of Sellars’s philosophy is highlighted by Haag, Erfahrung, esp. 52–60, 359–422.
54 A 261–3, 269, 295/B 317–9, 325, 351.
55 Revolutionary, 540, cf. 540–3. 56 Kant’s Proof, §§1.2, 1.3.
57 See O’Shea, Sellars, 176–90; cf. DeVries, Sellars, index under “normative” and “norms.”
Sellars’s transcendental analytic in the three chapters on “The Conceptual and the Real” lacks the strong a priori character of Kant’s, yet his frequent and incisive explications of common philosophical confusions are exercises in impure a priori analyses of propositions, a neglected theme central to Kant’s *Critique*. Because Sellars’s critique includes our concepts of sensing and sensation, it assumes some of the role of Kant’s Amphiboly and catalogs many dialectical fallacies. If Kant’s target in the Transcendental Dialectic is traditional metaphysics, Sellars’s target is traditional and contemporary philosophy of mind, both areas purport to be non-empirical philosophical domains, and Kant’s Paralogisms contribute significantly to anti-Cartesian philosophy of mind.

Although highly formalized, Sellars’s transcendental logic is not formalist for four key reasons: It uses conceptual explication rather than analysis; its synthetic necessary truths are deeply informed by empirical inquiry and scientific methodology; its formal notion of truth, “S-assertability,” means “correctly assertible” in accord with “the relevant semantical rules, and on the basis of such additional … information as these rules may require” (101), where such information is often empirical; and Sellars insists on the mutual irreducibility of the orders of being, of knowing (including picturing, representation, method, and explanation), and of obligation (145, 147, 164, 172). These non-formalist features of Sellars’s analysis align it significantly with Kant’s Transcendental Logic.

The key to Sellars’s transcendental logic is Kant’s “thesis of the primacy of judgmental content and judgmental form,” that judgmental content is irreducible to non-judgmental content (61). [Sellars speaks of “logical contents” to distinguish between logical operators and their counterpart occurrences as configurations of elements within pictures; 60–1, 121.] Sellars’s list of judgmental contents implicitly follows Kant’s

58 Quine’s “Two Dogmas of Empiricism” assumed rather than proved extensionalist logic was the only tenable logical point of view, despite both Lewis’s detailed criticisms of *Principia Mathematica*’s extensionalism and Carnap’s non-Platonist intensions, “meaning postulates.” “The analytic-synthetic distinction” is not a definite description because there are distinct analyses of “the analytic,” each of which provides a distinctive contrast with “the synthetic.” That so few of Quine’s readers noticed his petitio principii deserves both historical and philosophical reflection. See Jay Rosenberg, “Sellars and Quine: Compare and Contrast,” in *Fusing the Images*, 33–46.

Table of Judgments; it includes logical connectives, quantifiers, subject-predicate connections, and modalities such as “necessary,” “the content true,” “the content actual.” Sellars suggests, may appear in Kant’s Table “under the guise of ‘actuality’” (93n). In the contemporary context, Sellars cannot begin with a Table of Judgments, but he argues in detail that “extensions are limiting cases of intensions and cannot be understood apart from them. Thus classes, in the logistic sense, cannot be understood apart from properties, nor truth apart from propositions” (77, cf. 110, 113). Within recent philosophy of language and semantics, these are decidedly Kantian theses.

One key question of Kant’s Critique concerns intentionality: how (if at all) are we able to be aware of objects or events without the mind? This is Sellars’s key question about “The Conceptual and the Real,” which he addresses in three stages: intentionality, truth, and picturing. The first key to intentionality is intensions pertaining to individuals, universals, and states of affairs (64). The key to intensions is “a dualism of two modes of in-esse, the in-esse of attributes in representings and the in-esse of attributes in things” (92). Sellars contends that the actual existence of individuals and their characteristics in the world can be recognized or otherwise thought about because our sensory states, our thoughts, and our language are structured by functional counterparts to individuals, their attributes, and our experiences of them (25–6). In their respective ways, conceptual episodes and linguistic episodes stand for their senses “by virtue of the patterns they make … with other designs, with objects (in a suitably broad sense) and with actions” (76). Sellars takes seriously Wittgenstein’s notion of language games, likening these patterns to moves of pieces in a game, such as chess: the material constitution of the piece is secondary to its role or function and its actual moves or uses (79, 94, 107–8).

Within Sellars’s metalanguage, attributes are treated as classifications of characteristics of things; individuals are treated as instances of various characteristics. Our classificatory intensions function something like Fregean senses (literally, “ways of being given,” “Arten des Gegebenseins”), within actual or possible acts of representing (63–5). To

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60 Long-standing criticisms of Kant’s Table of Judgments have been answered by Michael Wolff, Die Vollständigkeit der kantischen Urteilstafel [Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann, 1995], Abhandlung über die Prinzipien der Logik [Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann, 2004, rev. ed. 2009], and in a series of intervening articles.

61 A 197/B 242; to Herz, 21 Feb. 1772, 10:130.

62 To make this point, Sellars alludes to the Texas version of chess, a joke in which the counties of Texas serve as the chess board, the pieces are a rich Texan’s Cadillacs, and a move involves driving a Cadillac to another county.
characterize these counterpart functions, Sellars treats abstract singular terms (for example, “the pawn,” “the triangle”) as distributive singular terms [80–1, 95–6]. He introduces dot quotes to abstract from differences among natural languages, thus highlighting the logical forms of thought at a transcendental level. This approach affords a flexible, functional account of logical operators (which have senses though not intensions) as well as other abstract singular terms, the senses of which are intensions. Thus any occurrence of “not” in English, “nicht” in German, or “niet” in Russian (and so on), is an occurrence of ‘the neg’ [81], where “the criteria for the application of dot-quoted expressions (‘This is a neg’, ‘This is a triangular’) consist in being subject to the same semantical correctnesses as the expressions within the dot quotes” [87]. This strategy affords perspicacious contrasts between such fraught notions as “stands for,” “connotes,” “denotes,” “refers to,” and “names” [81]. Sellars summarizes retrospectively:

The general strategy was to construe the in-esse of contents in representings on the model of standing for as a relation between linguistic expressions and their senses. Intensions were construed to be a sub-class of senses, consisting of those which can meaningfully be contrasted with extensions, as triangularity can be contrasted with the class of triangular things. … in addition to intensions, in this technical sense, the class of senses includes the items which were originally introduced as ‘logical contents’ and, perhaps, … ‘contents’ pertaining to practical thought. (93)

“Extensions” are individuals who or which exemplify characteristics classified in intensions. Sellars seeks to provide a functional role semantics that relieves the explanatory itch or the apparent queerness of how properties of things exemplify various kinds (classifications) we identify, in part by obviating the search for “objects” which are supposed to be attributes [103, 104–5, 110]. This too is part of Sellars’s clarificatory philosophy of mind regarding judgment. He contends that exemplification, like truth, “is a matter of the semantical correctness of a certain performance – roughly the de-quoting of a quoted expression” [110].

Sellars replaces the concept of truth with “S-assertibility,” according to which a proposition is “correctly assertible … in accordance with the relevant semantical rules, and on the basis of such additional … information as these rules may require” [101]. S-assertibility is universal in scope, although it takes specific forms depending upon the semantical rules governing different types of propositions [101, 116]. Thus, in brief, does Sellars defend the “primacy of classification and the truth performance” [113] against competing contemporary views that seek to eliminate them or reduce them to other functions.

Because Sellars’s analysis of truth is intensional and semantic in these regards, it does not itself pertain directly to relations between our
representations and the world of individuals who or which are the extensions of all the intensions so far considered. To account for factual truth, Sellars further explicates S-assertability \(107^n\) in terms of “picturing.” His account of picturing is a subtle elaboration of Wittgenstein’s insight in the *Tractatus* that “one can only say of two objects that they stand in a certain relation by placing the corresponding referring expressions in a counterpart relation” \(108\). In accord with the irreducible primacy of judgmental form, the relations among pictured elements cannot themselves be represented as elements within the picture \(\text{cf.} 111\). Instead, the elements within a picture must stand in counterpart relations to the relations among the elements of whatever is pictured. Picturing is thus a relation between two relational structures, such as some worldly situation \(137\) and our linguistic, perceptual, or conceptual representing of it. Subject to the normative constraints of proper picturing, this affords either correct or incorrect picturing. Accordingly, referring expressions are ineliminable \(109\) and the primary concept of factual truth is truth as correct picture \(119\). Very roughly, atomic statements constitute “‘linguistic pictures’ of the world” \(119, \text{cf.} 124\). Sellars subtly elaborates this basic model, though details must be omitted here, except to note Sellars’s emphatic claim that “Wittgenstein’s insight [about picturing] provides the keystone that can keep philosophical semantics from collapsing ever anew into a ruble of fruitless discussion” \(110\).

This brief sketch of the structure of Sellars’s analysis of intentionality shows its Kantian character in several of Sellars’s results. One of these is his distinguishing between existential quantification and definite descriptions \(124\) because referring expressions function within semantical uniformities that are tied to an agent’s activities regarding relevant referents; this requires propositions that describe the relative mutual locations of these referents and of the agent that suffice to identify the location “here and now” of those referents \(125–6\). This view is tantamount to Kant’s semantics of singular cognitive reference. Briefly, Kant recognized through his critique of Leibniz in the Amphiboly that descriptions, no matter how specific, cannot themselves determine whether they are empty, definite, or ambiguous. Hence, however useful for semantics of meaning, definite descriptions are insufficient for cognitive reference; to be even a candidate for knowledge, a description, proposition, or judgment must be referred to a particular or particulars localized by the subject within space and time through singular sensory presentation.\(^{63}\) Kant thus anticipates Gareth Evans’s analysis in “Identity and

\(^{63}\) Essentially the same account of Kant’s semantics of singular cognitive reference is ascribed to Kant by Westphal, *Kant’s Proof*, §§7, 8, 63.2, and by Bird, *Revolutionary*, 255–6, 267–8, 525–30.
Predication,“ although he also supercedes it by analyzing its rich epistemological implications. Kant’s semantics provides excellent grounds for rejecting verificationist theories of meaning, while insuring that genuine cognitive claims about particulars require locating them in time and space. In one stroke, Kant refutes the transcendent cognitive pretensions of rationalism and theology, “knowledge by acquaintance,” description theories of reference, and deductivist models of justification (scientia) in empirical domains, and proves the cognitive irrelevance of merely logical possibilities to the justificatory status of empirical claims (fallibilism).

Like Kant, Sellars holds a sensationist account of (outer) sensations, according to which sensations themselves are not objects of self-conscious awareness; instead, they are components of acts of awareness, typically of particulars in our surroundings {cf. 10}. Kant, Lewis, and Sellars are direct realists about our perception of spatio-temporal particulars and critical realists about perceptual knowledge.

Because synthetic necessary connections can be either statistical or universal, Sellars’s attention to legitimate versus illicit forms of judgment and inference reveals that “the sceptic, when he is not arguing invalidly from the absence of contradiction to physical possibility, is arguing invalidly from the consistency of ‘exceptions’ with statistical necessity to the consistency of the latter with a hypothetical ‘universal exception’” [69n]. Not only Kant’s modal theory in the Postulates, but his entire Critical method, predicated on the insufficiency of conceptual analysis for substantive epistemology, rejects any conflation of logical with physical possibility, just as the Transcendental Analytic blocks generalizing from the universal possibility of perceptual error to possibility of universal perceptual error.

Sellars’s account of the distinction between conceptual and non-conceptual (sensory) states of consciousness {10} and his basic model of counterpart functional roles that partially constitute the content of overt speech and of both conceptual and sensory episodes {18–9, 26–7, 63} are

65 Including the verificationist “Principle of Significance” Strawson ascribes to Kant [Bounds 16].
directly indebted to Kant’s distinction between forms of sensibility and forms of judgment, between empirical intuitions and spatio-temporal-forms of intuiting, and between phenomenal space and time and a logically possible noumenal counterpart duration and presence (38, citing A 770–1/B 149, 798–9). His observation that “basic factual predicates come in families of competing predicates, one or other of which must be satisfied by every object that can satisfy a predicate of that family” (119–20), reflects Kant’s account of disjunctive and infinite negative judgments (A 71–4/B 97–9), which are central to Kant’s discriminative account of causal judgments. Even Sellars’s Ryleans who can only think by speaking aloud echo Kant, who in the Anthropology (7:332) highlights our human moral character by contrasting us with extra-terrestrial rational beings who can only think by speaking aloud.

More significantly, Sellars’s meta-linguistic analysis of modality reflects Kant’s thesis that the modal categories only concern the cognitive value of a judgment’s copula, not the content of the judgment (A 74–6/B 99–101). Sellars’s nominalism places all modality in the meta-language. Both the commonsense and the scientific images of the world are rife with modal discourse, all of which accordingly must be transcendentally ideal, even though, Sellars contends, increasingly accurate natural science can correctly identify physical particulars and their spatio-temporal relations. Accordingly, much of the conceptual framework of final science is transcendentally ideal, though its objects are transcendentally real and known in and through that framework.

Sellars agrees with Kant that our commonsense spatio-temporal world of physical objects and all their perceptual qualities, delightful or unpleasant as they may be, are transcendentally ideal phenomena, though not due to Kant’s idealist account of our spatio-temporal forms of intuiting. Sellars holds that ultimately commonsense physical objects do not exist as they are conceived within the manifest, commonsense image of the world; as thus conceived, commonsense objects and events exist only in our actual or potential representings of them (42, 48, 49, 53, 56n). The final science, should we survive to achieve it, presents us with a radically different, though far more accurate conception and specification of what we commonsensically take to be physical objects, and those scientifically described and certified particulars are the true causes of commonsense (though transcendentally ideal) appearances (49, 148, 150). Objects and events as described by the ultimate science are the genuine noumena, though they are ultimately knowable. Science and Metaphysics is deeply Kantian, much more so than Sellars’s critique of Kant’s transcendental idealism may suggest.

67 See Kant’s Proof, §36.3.
There are five truly great theories of particulars and universals, their relations and our knowledge of them. Four are those of Plato, Aristotle, Kant, and (do not be incredulous) Hegel. As accounts of those issues, these theories converge very significantly, thus throwing their subtle and profound differences into illuminating relief. Historically, the fifth such theory would be Ockham’s, although because Sellars is a modern philosopher deeply concerned with the relations of mind and world, rendered so problematic by the rise of natural science, Sellars’s nominalism is the fifth such theory. Anyone seeking to ascertain the cogency of an interpretation of the *Critique*, not only philosophically but also textually and historically, can do little better than consider how well it fares against Sellars’s writings on and through Kant’s philosophy.

5. CONCLUSION

Scholarship on Kant’s *Critique of Pure Reason*, when conjoined with historical sensitivity and textual scruple, has certainly benefitted from engagement with analytic philosophy and has often produced findings with broad philosophical significance to analytic philosophy. Some themes from Kant’s thinking are abroad in analytic philosophy, though they tend to be rather bland appeals to framework principles for structuring inquiry or analysis, notions more neo-Kantian than Kantian. Regrettably, the philosophical results of Kant’s *Critique* do not appear even yet, as Strawson notes, to have been “absorbed into the


69 For example, Haag, *Erfahrung*, argues that Kant’s theory of intentionality is superior to Sellars’s.

70 Two excellent examples of such research are Robert Howell, *Kant’s Transcendental Deduction* [Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1992], and Jay Rosenberg, *Accessing Kant: A Relaxed Introduction to the Critique of Pure Reason* [New York: Oxford University Press, 2005]. My remarks should not be misunderstood to suggest that the great historical works on Kant’s *Critique* have become irrelevant, nor that non-analytic scholarship on the *Critique* has not progressed. This chapter has a specific scope; for a balanced account of recent scholarship see Paul Natterer, *Systematischer Kommentar zur Kritik der reinen Vernunft: Interdisziplinare Bilanz der Kantforschung seit 1945* [Berlin: de Gruyter, 2003].

philosophical consciousness” ([*Bounds* 29]). Barry Stroud observes, “it is not easy to incorporate the depth and power of Kant’s transcendental deduction into present-day philosophical attitudes and preconceptions.”72 Indeed so: Kant delivered what he promised, an “altered method of our way of thinking” ([B xviii]).73 Understanding, appreciating, and assessing Kant’s *Critique* certainly requires a changed way of thinking. For historical reasons, self-critical methodological reflection on one’s own way of philosophizing has been subdued in much of analytic philosophy. Consider Comte’s primary use of his cyclical three-stage law of human intellectual development (mythological, theological, and scientific eras) to prompt reflection on one’s own historical and philosophical position within one of those stages. In Comte’s case, this meant reflecting on why the proper scientific outlook is positivist. In contrast, Mill always took positivism for granted. Thus was Comte’s rich kind of philosophical reflection lost to the Anglophone tradition in their correspondence.74 Consequently, few analytic philosophers recognize how firmly Russell planted the analytic tradition back into the eighteenth-century-framework of Hume’s first *Enquiry*. Likewise, few discussants recognize how deeply Cartesian is Stroud’s apparently innocuous presentation of global perceptual skepticism – a feature thrown sharply into relief by Kant’s widely neglected anti-Cartesianism.75

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73 See Adrian Moore’s contribution to this volume, Chapter 13.
75 *Kant’s Proof*, §63.