



Two New Translations of the Critique of Pure Reason

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Two New Translations of the *Critique of Pure Reason*

Immanuel Kant: *Critique of Pure Reason*. Translated by Werner S. Pluhar, Hackett Publishing Company, 1996. Pp. iv + 1030. ISBN 0-87220-257-7. £17.50 (pbk).

The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant: *Critique of Pure Reason*. Translated and edited by Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood. Cambridge University Press, 1998. Pp. xi + 785. ISBN 0-521-35402-7 (hbk). £44.00. ISBN 0-521-65729-6 (pbk).

When I was an undergraduate there was a rumour going round that German students used to consult Norman Kemp Smith's translation of the *Critique of Pure Reason* if they were in doubt about the meaning of the original. In truth, I have never been able to verify that rumour. Kemp Smith's translation has served English speakers well in the last seventy years; it is rather ironic that after waiting so long we start the new millennium with two superior translations.

The *Critique of Pure Reason* is rightly regarded as a milestone in the history of philosophy because its central message proclaimed the end of metaphysics and its replacement by an ethics-related restriction of knowledge to what Kant called 'possible knowledge'. English-speaking scholars have relied on Kemp Smith for seventy years, and generations of readers of Kant have grown up with his cadences on their lips. How many readers will not be familiar with phrases like 'I have found it necessary to deny reason in order to make room for faith.' or 'Intuitions without concepts are empty; concepts without intuitions are blind'?

Kant's *Critique* has been translated into English five times;¹ the translator has a daunting task as he has to cope with Kant's specialist vocabulary and strike a balance between accuracy and readability: the Cambridge translators put it well: 'Our intention has been to try to give the reader an experience as close as possible to that of the reader of the German original. The criterion for success in this intention is that as much interpretative work is left for the reader of the translation as is left for the reader of the original.' This admirable ideal also motivates Pluhar, who expresses it as follows: 'My foremost aims, in this translation are high degrees of both accuracy and readability.'

The problem extends from translation of individual words to the rendering of Kant's famous precision and to his notoriously long and unwieldy sentences. How, for example, to translate *erkennen*, *generatim*, *Grundsatz*, *überhaupt* and the much-disputed *Vorstellung*? And what about the the difficulties presented by his definition of, say, 'transcendental'?

I am happy to say that I found these two translations excellent as regards accuracy and readability, with varying degrees of success, as will appear in the following.

It was said of Kemp Smith that he made Kant sound like an Englishman. He tended to ‘sanitize’ Kant’s style, in places where enhancement of readability is not an issue. When Kant expresses himself in a dramatic, or witty, or deliberately casual manner, Kemp Smith usually expunges all such signs of flair by substituting standard philosophical language and erasing any hint of drama. Pluhar states (p. xviii) that Kant’s reputation as an uninspired writer is due less to the work itself than it is to this method of translation.

The first of the new translations under review here is by Werner Pluhar, who in 1989 gave us a superb translation of the *Critique of Judgement*, and the second is the fifth volume of the Cambridge edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant. The Cambridge translation is of a uniformly high standard; the general editors are Paul Guyer and Allen Wood, who are also responsible for this volume and are therefore in a position to oversee the consistency of the entire translation. Guyer and Wood are themselves authors of several books on the philosophy of Kant, but I suspect that their legacy to Kant scholarship will be this enterprise. I am pleased to note that these two translations are quite superb and I heartily recommend either as a replacement for the venerable Kemp Smith.

Kemp Smith’s translation was indeed sonorous and elegant and as accurate as could reasonably be expected, but as time went on commentators (particularly English-speakers) noted that there were some things that were inconsistent and that the fault probably lay with the translation. It was remarked that Kemp Smith was engaged in paraphrase rather than accurate translation. This was inevitable, as he had to seek to render Kant’s precise vocabulary with exact English equivalents, which he did not always find. One example is the important German word *Erkenntnis*, which causes Kemp Smith all sorts of problems. He used the word ‘know’ to translate the two terms *erkennen* and *wissen*, which are clearly distinguished by Kant and are rendered correctly by both these two new translations as ‘cognize’ and ‘know’; sometimes Kemp Smith has recourse to the circumlocution ‘a mode of knowledge’ to escape from the confusion. Thus,

Original: Auf Welche Art und durch welche Mittel sich auch immer eine Erkenntnis auf Gegenstände beziehen mag, so ist doch diejenige, wodurch sie sich auf dieselbe unmittelbar bezieht, und worauf alles Denken als Mittel abzweckt, die Anschauung.

(B33).

Kemp Smith: In whatever manner and by whatever means a mode of knowledge may relate to objects, intuition is that through which it is in immediate relation to them and to which all thought as a means is directed.

Pluhar: In whatever way and by whatever means a cognition may refer to objects intuition is that by which a cognition refers to objects directly and at which all thought aims as a means.

Cambridge: In whatever way and through whatever means cognition may relate to objects, that through which it relates immediately to them, and which all thought as a means is directed to an end, is intuition.

The Cambridge translators claim that ‘we have always used the same English word for any philosophically significant German word’ (Pluhar claims that ‘technical terms in the original are, as far as possible, translated by the same English term’); by and large both translations attempt to maintain this ideal so there is consistency throughout; to aid the reader both editions helpfully include a glossary, of which Pluhar’s is the longer (27 pages as opposed to 17).

The ideal of having ‘an experience as close as possible to that of the reader of the German original’ is admirable but impossible to carry out because the tone and nuances of the period are so different from today that exact equivalents are not available. The best that can be done is to try to get an approximation; as Gadamer remarked in *Wahrheit und Methode*, ‘Every translation that takes seriously its task is both clearer and flatter than the original. Even where it is a masterly reproduction, it must lack something of the overtones that reverberate in the *original*’ (*Wahrheit und Methode*, p. 364). It is my opinion that both translations succeed admirably and will become the standard for years to come, not least because they both read very well.

Let us look first at samples from both translations and compare them with Kant’s original and Kemp Smith’s version.

We start with a couple of Kant’s better-known statements in the *Critique*:

Original: Ich müste also das Wissen aufheben, um zum Glauben Platz zu bekommen

(Bxxx)

Kemp Smith: I have therefore found it necessary to deny knowledge in order to make room for faith.

Pluhar: I therefore had to annul knowledge in order to make room for faith.

Cambridge: Thus I had to deny knowledge in order to make room for faith.

While Kemp Smith is more elegant, Pluhar and Cambridge are more successful in rendering the literal sense with Pluhar shading it marginally, since ‘annul’ is more accurate as a translation of *aufheben* than ‘deny’.

Original: Weil die Hauptfrage immer bleibt, was und wie viel kann Verstand and Vernunft, frei von aller Erfahrung erkennen, und nicht, wie ist das Vermögen zu Denken selbst möglich?

(Axvii)

Kemp Smith: For the chief question is always simply this – What and how much can the understanding and reason know apart from experience: not – how is the faculty of thought itself possible?

Pluhar: For the main question is always this: what, and how much, can understanding and reason cognise independently of all experience? Rather than, how is our power of thought itself possible?

Cambridge: but the chief question always remains: ‘What and how much can understanding and reason cognise free of all experience?’ and not: ‘How is **the faculty of thinking** itself possible?’

Note that where Kant used *Sperrdruck* (spaced type) to indicate emphasis, the Cambridge translation replaces it with bold type in order to preserve Kant’s original emphasis. The original editions were set primarily in *Fraktur* (gothic type). Latin words including such frequently used words as *a priori* and *a posteriori* as well as ‘phenomena’ and ‘noumena’, which Kant did not regard as naturalized into German, were set in roman type.

In this way the Cambridge version tries to recreate the appearance of Kant’s pages. Cambridge is closer to the original in retaining the one-sentence structure. And the word *frei*? And *immer bleibt*? Here Cambridge is closer to the original.

Original: Wenn aber gleich alle unsere Erkenntnis mit der Erfahrung anhebt, so entspringt sie darum doch nicht alle aus der Erfahrung.

(B1)

Kemp Smith: But though all our knowledge begins with experience, it does not follow that it all arises out of experience.

Pluhar: But even though all our cognition starts with experience, that does not mean that all of it arises from experience.

Cambridge: But although all our cognition commences with experience, yet it does not on that account all arise from experience.

The inclusion of the phrase ‘on that account’ in Cambridge seems to keep the sense of the original *darum* better than Pluhar, who ignores it; in general the Cambridge version pays more attention to these auxiliary words like *doch*, *eben*, *auch*, *so*, and *also*.

Original: Ohne Sinnlichkeit würde uns kein Gegenstand gegeben, und ohne Verstand keiner gedacht werden. Gedanken ohne Inhalt sind leer, Anschauungen ohne Begriffe sind blind.

(B 75/A50).

Kemp Smith: Without sensibility no object would be given to us, without understanding no object would be thought. Thoughts without content are empty, intuition without concepts are blind.

Pluhar: Without sensibility no object would be given to us; and without understanding no object would be thought. Thoughts without content are empty; intuitions without concepts are blind.

Cambridge: Without sensibility no object would be given to us, and without understanding none would be thought. Thoughts without content are empty, intuitions without concepts are blind.

The formulation in the three translations is similar, and there is nothing to choose between them except that with the word ‘none’ the Cambridge maintains the structure of the original better; as regards elegance, Kemp Smith has the edge.

Here is Kant’s famous definition of ‘transcendental’:

Original: Ich nenne alle Erkenntnis transcendental, die sich nicht so wohl mit Gegenständen, sondern mit unserer Erkenntnisart von Gegenständen, so fern diese a priori möglich sein soll, überhaupt beschäftigt.

(B25/A12).

Kemp Smith: I entitle transcendental all knowledge which is occupied not so much with objects as with the mode of our knowledge of objects in so far as this mode of knowledge is to be possible a priori.

Pluhar: I call transcendental all cognition that deals not so much with objects as rather with our way of cognizing objects in general insofar as that way of cognizing objects is possible a priori

Cambridge: I call all cognition transcendental that is occupied not so much with objects but rather with our manner of cognition of objects insofar as this is to be possible a priori.

Erkenntnisart and *überhaupt* cause problems here: Pluhar translates very awkwardly but Cambridge is economical and succeeds in rendering the sense of the original adequately. Pluhar takes *überhaupt* as qualifying the noun *Gegenstände*, whereas the other two ignore the difficulty or leave the ambiguity of the German intact. Is this what Cambridge means by ‘leaving as much interpretative work to the reader?’ In this case Kemp Smith gets it right and is elegant as well; Pluhar misses the nuances of the phrase *sein soll* in ‘so fern diese a priori möglich sein soll’, which both Kemp Smith and Cambridge rightly render ‘insofar as this is to be possible’.

Here is a well-known longer passage, which will enable us to see how the translators cope with Kant’s notoriously long sentences:

Original: Bisher nahim man an, alle unsere Erkenntnis müsse sich nach den Gegenstände richten; aber alle Versuche, über sie a priori etwas durch Begriffe auszumachen, wodurch unsere Erkenntnis erweitert wurde gingen unter dieser Voraussetzung zu nichte. Man versuche es daher einmal, ob wir nicht in den Aufgaben der Metaphysik damit besser fortkommen, dass wir annehmen, die Gegenstände müssen sich nach unserem Erkenntnis richten, welches schon besser mit der verlangten Möglichkeit einer Erkenntnis derselben a priori zusammenstimmt, die über Gegenstände, ehe sie uns gegeben werden, etwas festsetzen soll. Er ist hiermit eben so, als mit dem ersten Gedanken der Kopernikus bewandt, der, nachdem es mit der Erklärung der Himmelsbeswegen nicht gut fort wollte, wenn er annahm, das ganze Sterheer drehe sich um den Zuschauer, versuchte, ob es nicht besser gelingen möchte, wenn er den Zuschauer sich drehen, und dagegen die Sterne in Ruhe ließ.

(Bxvi)

Kemp Smith: But all attempts to extend our knowledge of objects by establishing something in regard to them a priori by means of concepts have, on this assumption, ended in failure. We must therefore make trial whether we may not have more success in the tasks of metaphysics, if we suppose that objects must conform to our knowledge. This would agree better with what is desired, namely, that it should be possible to have knowledge of objects *a priori*, determining something in regard to them prior to their being given. We should therefore then be proceeding precisely on the lines of Copernicus’ primary hypothesis. Failing of satisfactory progress in

explaining the movements of the heavenly bodies on the assumption that they all revolved round the spectator, he tried whether he might not have better success if he made the spectator to revolve and the stars to remain at rest.

Pluhar: Thus far it has been assumed that our cognition must conform to objects. On that presupposition, however, all our attempts to establish something about them *a priori*, by means of concepts through which our cognition would be expanded have come to nothing. Let us, therefore, try to find out by experiment whether we shall not make better progress in the problems of metaphysics, if we assume that objects must conform to our cognition. This assumption already agrees better with the demanded possibility of an *a priori* cognition – i.e. a cognition that is to ascertain something about them before they are given to us. The situation is the same as that of Copernicus when he first thought of explaining the motion of celestial bodies. Having found it difficult to make progress there when he assumed that the entire host of stars revolved round the spectator, he tried to find out by experiment whether he might not be more successful if he had the spectator revolve and the stars remain at rest.

Cambridge: Up to now it has been assumed that all **our** cognition must conform to objects; but all attempts to find out something about them *a priori* through concepts that would extend our cognition have, on this presupposition, come to nothing. Hence let us once try whether we do not get farther with the problems of metaphysics by assuming that the objects must conform to our cognition, which would agree better with the requested possibility of an *a priori* cognition of them, which is to establish something about objects before they are given to us. This would be just like the first thoughts of Copernicus, who, when he did not make good progress in the explanation of the celestial motions, if he assumed that the entire celestial host revolves around the observer, tried to see if he might not have greater success if he made the observer revolve and left the stars at rest.

The Cambridge translation, in this case, is marginally better because it preserves Kant's sentence structure, does justice to the auxiliary words *auch*, *hiermit*, and *eben*, and keeps the word *Gedanken* as a noun whereas Pluhar uses a verb: and it is better to keep the sense of *man versuche*, as Cambridge does, with 'let us once try' rather than with 'Let us first try to find out by experiment'; however, Pluhar does better to retain the peremptoriness of *verlangten* with 'demanded' rather than 'requested' and to

retain the structure of the long sentence. Cambridge has to include the word ‘which’ twice, and this is stylistically unacceptable.

As a final example take the long passage from Kant’s rejection of the ontological argument:

Original: S e i n ist offenbar kein reales Prädikat d.h. ein Begriff von irgend etwas, was zu einem Begriff eines Dinges hinzukommen. Es ist bloß die Position eines Dinges oder gewisser Bestimmungen an sich selbst. Im logischen Gerbauche ist es lediglich die Kopula eines Urteils. Der Satz G o t t i s t a l l m ä c h t i g enthält zwei Begriffe, die ihre Objekte haben: Gott und Allmacht; das Wörtchen i s t ist noch nicht ein Prädikat oben ein, sondern nur das, was das Prädikat beziehungsweise aufs Subjekt setzt. Nehme ich nun das Subjekt (Gott) mit allen seinen Prädikaten (worunter auch die Allmacht gehoret), zusammen, und sage: G o t t i s t, oder e s I s t e i n G o t t. So setze ich kein neues Prädikat zum Begriffe von Gott, sondern nur das Subjekt an sich mit allen Prädikaten und zwar den Gegenstand in Beziehung mit meinem B e g r i f f. Beide müssen genau einerlei enthalten, und kann es daher zu dem Begriffe, der bloss der Möglichkeit, ausdrückt darum, daß ich diesen Gegenstand als schlechthin gegeben (durch den Ausdruck: es ist,) denke, nichts weiter hinzukommen. Und so enthält das Wirkliche nichts mehr als das bloß Mögliche. Hundert wirkliche Taler enthalten nicht das mindeste mehr als hundert mögliche.

(B629).

Kemp Smith: ‘Being’ is obviously not a real predicate; that is, it is not a concept of something that could be added to the concept of a thing. It is merely the positing of the thing or of certain determinations, as existing in themselves. Logically, **it** is merely the copula of a judgement. The proposition, ‘God is omnipotent’ contains two concepts, each of which has its subject – God and omnipotence. The small word ‘is’ adds no new predicate, but only serves to posit the predicate in its relation to the subject. If now, we take the subject (God) with all its predicates (among which is omnipotence), and say ‘God is’ or ‘There is a God’, we attach no new predicate to the concept of God, but only posit the subject itself with all its predicates and indeed posit it as being an object that stands in relation to my concept. The concept of both must be one and the same; nothing can have been added to the concept, which expresses what is merely possible, by my thinking the object (‘through the expression “it is”’) as given absolutely. Otherwise stated, the real contains no more than the merely possible. A hundred real dollars do not contain the least coin more than a hundred possible dollars.

(B 627).

Pluhar ‘*Being*’ is obviously not a real predicate, i.e. it is not the concept of anything that can be added to the concept of a thing. It is merely the positing of a thing (in itself) or of certain determinations in themselves. In its logical use it is merely the copula of a judgement. The proposition God is omnipotent contains two concepts that have as their objects: God and omnipotence. The little word is not a further predicate over and above these two, but is what posits the predicate in reference to the subject. If I now take the subject (God) together with all its predicates (to which belongs also omnipotence), and say God is – or, There is a God – then I posit no new predicate as added to the concept of God but posit only the subject **in** itself with all its predicates; viz. I posit the object in reference to my concept. Both contain exactly the same; and hence nothing further can be added to the concept – which expresses only the (object’s) possibility merely because (through the expression it is) I think the object as given absolutely. And thus the actual contains no more than the merely possible. A hundred actual thalers do contain the least more than a hundred possible thalers.

Cambridge: **Being** is obviously not a real predicate, i.e. a concept of something that could add to the concept of a thing. It is merely the positing of a thing or of certain determinations in them. In its logical use it is merely the copula of a judgement. The proposition **God is omnipotent** contains two concepts that have as their objects: God and omnipotence; the little word **is** is not a predicate in it, but only that which posits the predicate in relation of the subject. Now if I take the subject (God) together with all his predicates (among which omnipotence belongs) and say that God is, or there is a God, then I add no new predicate to the concept of God, but only posit the subject in itself with all its predicates, and indeed posit the object in relation to my concept – Both must contain exactly the same, and hence when I think this object as given absolutely (through the expressions ‘**it is**’), nothing is thereby added to the concept, which expresses merely its possibility. Thus the actual contains nothing more than the merely possible. A hundred actual dollars do not contain the least bit more than a hundred possible ones.

The two translations succeed in rendering the nuances of the original: Cambridge retains the positive sense ‘Begriff von irgend etwas’ with ‘a concept of something’, whereas Pluhar is content to have ‘is not the concept of anything.’ Cambridge give the correct emphasis to the phrase ‘God is omnipotent’ by putting it in bold while Pluhar rather loses it. However, I feel that Pluhar succeeds in getting the emphasis in ‘ist noch nicht ein Prädikat oben ein’ with ‘is not a further predicate above and

beyond', whereas Cambridge overlooks it in 'is not a predicate in it'. There is nothing to choose between them in the translation of 'so setze ich kein neues Prädikat von Gott, nur das Subjekt an sich mit allen Prädikaten una zwar den Gegenstand in Beziehung mit meinem Begriff', which is rendered as 'then I posit no new concept as added to the concept of God but posit only the subject in itself with all its predicates, viz, I posit the object in reference to my concept' (Pluhar) and 'that I add no new predicate to the concept of God, but only posit the subject in relation to my concept' (Cambridge). Of course, one regrets having to drop Kemp Smith's memorable 'not the least coin more than.'

Both translations have an editorial introduction. The one for the Pluhar translation is contributed by Dr Patricia Kitcher in the form of a twenty-eight-page introduction and synopsis of the text which is very good; the Cambridge translation has an equally good and much longer synopsis-introduction which includes a useful lengthy section on the history of the evolution of the *Critique* and an account two pages on 'The message of the Critique' which is the best that I have read anywhere. Both have a bibliography, of which Pluhar's is the more detailed, and more user friendly, dividing the items according to the major sections of the *Critique*.

Both have included a glossary of the main German terms (Pluhar's is slightly longer). The index in Pluhar runs to 186 pages and for all its completeness is just too detailed to be serviceable, whereas that in the Cambridge translation, 10 pages, I found more user-friendly. Pluhar's way of indicating a page-reference in the index is also very confusing and renders the excellent work of compiling the index practically useless. Thus I looked in vain in Pluhar for help to locate the phrase about abandoning knowledge to make room for faith, whereas I found it immediately in the Cambridge translation. The problem of notes has been solved in different ways: Pluhar puts them at the foot of the page and gives Kant's own notes together with editorial notes, distinguishing them by using a different type size. The Cambridge solution is to leave Kant's notes at the bottom of the page and consign the editor's footnotes to the end. The two methods work equally well.

Lest the reader think I have selectively chosen the above passages to strengthen my case, I now turn briefly to the transcendental deduction in the B edition, which is regarded as the crucially strategic section of the whole *Critique*.

Here are two passages chosen at random:

Original: Das ich denke, muß alle meine Vorstellungen begleiten können: denn sonst würde etwas in mir vorgestellt werden, was gar nicht gedacht werden könnte, welches eben so viel heißt, als die Vorstellung würde unmöglich, oder wenigstens für mich nichts sein.

Diejenige Vorstellung, die vor allem Denken gegeben sein kann, heißt Anschauung. Also hat alles Mannigfaltige der Anschauung eine notwendige Beziehung auf das: Ich denke, in demselben Subjekt, darin diese Mannigfaltige angetroffen wird.

(B131)

Kemp Smith: It must be possible for the 'I think' to accompany all my representations: for otherwise something would be represented in me which could not be thought at all, and that is equivalent to saying that the representation would be impossible or at least would be nothing to me. That representation which can be given prior to all thought is entitled intuition. The entire manifold has, therefore, a necessary relation to the 'I think' in the same subject in which this manifold is found.

Pluhar: The *I think* must be capable of accompanying all my presentations. For otherwise something would be presented to me that could not be thought at all – which is equivalent to saying that the presentation either would be impossible, or at least would be nothing to me. Presentation that can be given prior to all thought is called intuition. Hence everything manifold in intuition has a necessary reference to the *I think* in the same subject in whom this manifold is found.

Cambridge: The **I think** must be **able** to accompany all my representations; for otherwise something would be represented in me that could not be thought at all, which is as much as to say that the representation would either be impossible or else at least would be nothing for me. That representation that can be given prior to all thinking is called **intuition**. Thus all manifold of intuition has a necessary relation to the **I think** in the same subject in which this manifold is to be encountered.

Here all three translations are almost equally good, but Cambridge has the edge with 'represented in me' (for 'in mir vorgestellt werden') and 'that representation' (for 'Diejenige Vorstellung'). 'Alles mannigfaltige' also causes Pluhar trouble: he renders it 'everything manifold in intuition' while Cambridge is more literal with 'all manifold of intuition'.

Original: Hier ist nun der Ort, das Paradoxe, was jedermann bei der Exposition der Form des inneren Sinnes (§6) auffallen mußte, verständlich zu machen: nämlich wie dieser auch so gar uns selbst, nur wie wir uns erscheinen, nicht wie wir an uns selbst sind, dem Bewusstsein darstelle, weil wir nämlich uns nur anschauen, wie wir innerlich affiziert werden, welches widersprechend zu sein scheint,

indem wir uns gegen uns selbst als leidend verhalten müßten; daher man auch lieber den innern Sinn mit dem Vermögen der Apperzeption (welche wir sorgfältig unterscheiden) in dem Systemen der Psychologie für einerlei auszugeben pflegt (B151–153).

Kemp Smith: This is a suitable place for explaining the paradox which must have been obvious to everyone in our exposition of the form of inner sense (§6): namely, that this sense represents to consciousness even our own selves only as we appear to ourselves, not as we are in ourselves. For we intuit ourselves only as we are inwardly affected, and this would seem to be contradictory, since we should then have to be in a passive relation [of active affection] to ourselves. It is to avoid this contradiction that in systems of psychology inner sense, which we have carefully distinguished from the faculty of apperception, is commonly regarded as being identical with it.

Pluhar: Now this is the place to clarify something paradoxical that must have struck everyone in reading the exposition of the form of inner sense (§6): viz. how this sense exhibits to consciousness even ourselves only as we appear to ourselves, not as we are in ourselves. For we intuit ourselves only as we are inwardly *affected*; and this seems contradictory, because we [despite being active] would then have to relate to ourselves as passive. And this is the reason why people in their systems of psychology usually prefer to pass *inner sense* off as being the same as the power of *apperception* (which we carefully distinguish from inner sense).

Cambridge: Here is now the place to make intelligible the paradox that must have struck everyone in the exposition of the form of inner sense (§6): namely how this presents even ourselves to consciousness only as we appear to ourselves, not how we are in ourselves, since we intuit ourselves only as were internally **affected**, which seems to be contradictory, since we would have to relate to ourselves passively; for this reason it is customary in the systems of psychology to treat **inner sense** as the same as the faculty of **apperception** (which we carefully distinguish).

Pluhar gets the meaning of the original at the beginning of the sentence, as do the Cambridge translators, and they both do better with ‘struck’ (which is better than ‘have been obvious’); Cambridge seem to have opted to retain the uninterrupted sentence, whereas Pluhar prefers to break it up. The effect is that Pluhar has to introduce a parenthesis (as he does frequently), whereas Cambridge achieves an equally good rendering with

fewer words; furthermore, 'it is customary in the systems of psychology' is less cumbersome than Pluhar's 'people in their systems of psychology', and 'pass off' seems an unwarranted version of 'lieber ausgebenpflegt'; Pluhar's preference for the abbreviation *viz.* (which he uses constantly) is mildly irritating; the more common 'namely' would do just as well. Finally, the proper translation of *Vermögen* is a matter of dispute, some preferring 'power', some 'faculty', some 'capacity'. Generally 'power' seems preferable, unless the context dictates otherwise; in the present case Pluhar gets my vote here (and he defends it plausibly on p. 8).

I have examined the text of the transcendental deduction in detail, and it seems to confirm the same pattern, so I shall spare the reader further examples.

Finally, I was curious to see the translation of a favourite of mine, the word *Vorstellung*, which has become a crucial term in German idealism: 'presentation' and 'representation' are the usual alternatives. My preference is for 'representation'; it is the favoured choice in the best translation of Hegel; indeed Kant himself seems to have preferred 'representation' as he indicated the Latin 'representatio' as the best equivalent.² The Cambridge translation gives 'representation', and Pluhar chooses, 'presentation', which he justifies on p. 22, but I do not find his explanation convincing.

These translations of the *Critique of Pure Reason* are an important publishing event. There is practically nothing to choose between them, and if I have seemed to indicate a preference for Cambridge this is because it is more faithful to the original in terms of sentence structure and a desire to do justice to the use of auxiliary words. However, I am in no doubt that both are superior to Kemp Smith except when it comes to elegance, and I would gladly swap elegance for accuracy and faithfulness to Kant's at times awkward formulations.

So, I have no hesitation in saying that it is time to discard your copy of Kemp Smith and replace it with one of the recent translations. No library and no serious student of Kant can afford to be without one, and wiser students would do well to get both. I shall retain my copy of Kemp Smith – for nostalgic reasons!

Milltown Institute, Ireland

Paul Lennon

Notes

- 1 Namely by Heywood (London: Pickering, 1838); by J. M. D. Meikeljohn (London: Dent, 1855) (re-edited by Vasilis Politis (London: Everyman, 1931)); Max Müller (London: Macmillan, 1881); and by Wolfgang Schwarz (Aalen: Scientia, 1982). Norman Kemp Smith's translation was first published by Macmillan, London, in 1929.
- 2 'The genus is representation in general (*representatio*)' (B376).