

## Introduction

Dennis Schulting

One of the most frequently quoted statements from Immanuel Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason* is that "[t]houghts without content are empty, [and] intuitions without concepts are blind" (A51/B75). Ever since John McDowell's seminal book based on his Locke lectures, *Mind and World*, first published in 1994, this dictum, which can be taken as exemplifying the salient point of Kant's epistemological argument in the *Critique*, has been associated with a general Kantian approach to solving issues in the theory of knowledge that concern the justification of our beliefs about the world and the possibility of perceptual knowledge. In particular, McDowell referred to it as an apt metaphor for seeing a solution to bridging any supposed gap between our mental states or beliefs and the world of sensible objects to which our beliefs must be answerable. The intertwining of sense content (Kant's 'intuition') and conceptuality, of which this dictum appears to speak, gives us a sense of how objects constrain our judgements, thoughts and beliefs about them, without resorting to explanations that either succumb to the Myth of the Given or rest content with a form of coherentism.

McDowell interprets Kant's notion of 'intuition' as an "experiential intake", which is not "a bare getting of an extra-conceptual Given, but [...] a kind of occurrence or state *that already has conceptual content*" (emphasis added). What McDowell means by this is that an intuition has representational *content* if (and only if) it expresses a relation to a mind-independent object, for which it must already show the *capacity* to judge that "*things are thus and so*" (McDowell 1996:9). Thus, "[r]epresentational content cannot be dualistically set over against the conceptual" (1996:3); rather, the representational content of an intuition—that is, the content of a genuine experience, not just a sensation—and the conceptual are inextricably integrated. The content of the experience is that things are thus and so, and "it becomes the content of a judgment if the subject decides to take the experience at face value", to judge *that* things are thus and so. There is no discrepancy between the fact that things are thus and so and the judgement that they are thus and so (McDowell 1996:26). It

means that the content in one's taking something to be the case, in an intuition, is amenable to rational assessment for the correctness or truth of one's experiential intake; our thinking must be answerable to the world, and at the same time empirical justifications for our beliefs cannot just consist in "impingements on the conceptual realm from the outside" (1996:6). This, for McDowell, makes the representational content of an intuition already conceptual: intuitions, or sensible intakes of how the world is, are thus to be located *inside* what Wilfrid Sellars called the 'space of reasons', so that they provide genuine justifications for our beliefs about objects to which they are, in a sense, *rationally* linked, rather than merely causally—a merely causal impact from objects would merely, as McDowell puts it, "operate outside the control of our spontaneity" (1996:8). McDowell thinks—and this shows the truly Kantian spirit of his account—that the spontaneity of our thought must somehow *internally* be seen to be linked to our empirical experiences, as already operative in the deliverances of sensibility, for experiences to provide genuine justifications of our beliefs. Receptivity of sense content and spontaneity of thinking cooperate at the most fundamental level, already in sensibility, such that the "relevant conceptual capacities are drawn on *in* receptivity" (1996:9). Whereas this "expansive" spontaneity, which is not limited to the activity of thinking, is thus "subject to control from outside our thinking" (1996:11), at the same time the conceptual capacities that are operative in sensibility must be seen as *intimately* linked with the active exercise of the same capacities in judgements. In a word: "thoughts and intuitions are rationally connected" (1996:17–18). For McDowell, it is thus that Kant teaches us that "the understanding is already inextricably implicated in the deliverances of sensibility themselves" (1996:46).

McDowell originally specifically positioned his explicitly conceptualist reading of Kant's dictum against Gareth Evans's (1982:227) idea of nonconceptual informational states, which Evans believed are located precisely "outside the sphere of the conceptual" (McDowell 1996:56). Evans argued that perceptual content must thus be considered nonconceptual:

The informational states which a subject acquires through perception are *non-conceptual*, or *non-conceptualized*. Judgements *based upon* such states necessarily involve conceptualization: in moving from a perceptual experience to a judgement

about the world (usually expressible in some verbal form), one will be exercising basic conceptual skills. But this formulation (in terms of moving from an experience to a judgement) must not be allowed to obscure the general picture. Although the subject's judgements are *based upon* his experiences (i.e., upon the unconceptualized information available to him), his judgements are not *about* the informational state. The process of conceptualization or judgement takes the subject from his being in one kind of informational state (with a content of a certain kind, namely, non-conceptual content) to his being in another kind of cognitive state (with a content of a different kind, namely, conceptual content). (Evans 1982:227)

As McDowell notes, for Evans, perceptual experiences that are states through which the subject of experience gathers “information” about the world, have content that is nonconceptual, and is distinct from the content of a judgement, when “conceptual capacities are first brought into operation” (1996:48). This point about perceptual experience is a salient issue in the current debate on nonconceptual content, also in the Kantian variant of this debate, which was instigated by an influential article published by Robert Hanna in 2005 (Hanna 2005). It is important to note that for Evans—and McDowell (1996:48–9) makes a point of this—it is not the case that perceptual informational states are ipso facto *experiences* (Evans 1982:157). For Evans, such states only count as “conscious perceptual experience” if its nonconceptual content also “serves as the input to a *thinking, concept-applying, and reasoning system*” (1982:158). The difference between Evans and McDowell is that whereas Evans sees experiences indeed as a rational basis for judgements, he sees those experiences as outside the domain of the conceptual, where McDowell locates them explicitly inside it. It remains to be seen therefore to which extent the strong nonconceptualism endorsed by the likes of Hanna, who argue that it must be possible to have perceptual *experiences*, of some sort, that are not dependent on thought and do not necessarily form a basis for judgement, can be seen as of similar lineage as Evans’s nonconceptualism. It seems that Evans’s notion of ‘experience’ is much closer to Kant’s, who links experience strictly to an empirical cognition (B147), which thus involves, at least potentially, the capacities of the understanding and judgement. Hanna, by contrast, argues that

Nonconceptualism holds that nonconceptual content exists and is *representationally significant* (i.e., *meaningful in the 'semantic' sense of describing or referring to states-of-affairs, properties, or individuals of some sort*);

and at the same time

(a) that there are cognitive capacities which *are not determined* (or at least not *fully determined*) *by conceptual capacities*, and (b) that the cognitive capacities which outstrip conceptual capacities can be possessed by rational and non-rational animals alike, whether human or non-human. (Hanna 2005:248; emphasis added)

Hanna asserts that contemporary nonconceptualism (e.g., Heck 2000; Speaks 2005; see the further references in Hanna 2005:248)<sup>1</sup> can be directly traced back to Evans, but it seems that what is emphasised in the above quotation from Hanna, namely, that nonconceptual content is “representationally significant” in the sense of “describing or referring to states-of-affairs, properties, or individuals of some sort” might be taken as involving what Evans rather refers to as the “thinking, concept-applying, and reasoning system”, or at least the necessary availability of such a system for perceptual states to become experiences that refer to objects. And as McDowell has said, the “very idea of representational content brings with it a notion of correctness and incorrectness: something with a certain content is correct, in the relevant sense, just in case things are as it represents them to be” (1996:162), which McDowell at any rate sees as grounds for endorsing a view of conceptuality already thoroughly implicated in sensibility. Evans does not endorse the idea of conceptual capacities being endogenous to perceptual experiences, but at least he sees informational states as experiences only when they serve as input to thoughts and judgements. Hanna’s nonconceptualism seems much stronger in its emphasis on nonconceptual content as completely independent of capacities that link it to thought.

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<sup>1</sup> For an excellent discussion of contemporary nonconceptualism, see Brewer (2005) and Byrne (2005).

Whatever the case may be as to Evans's position in relation to contemporary forms of nonconceptualism, it seems clear that McDowell's appeal to Kant as a chief ally of conceptualism that goes "all the way out to the impressions of sensibility themselves" (1996:69) should not be taken at face value. Hanna has made it at any rate clear in the aforementioned article, and in a series of follow-up papers (Hanna 2008; 2011a; 2011b; 2013a; 2013b),<sup>2</sup> that Kant can certainly be read as a nonconceptualist. Hanna has provided reasonable grounds for believing that, at the very least, Kant may *also* be regarded as a founder of nonconceptualism. Kant is of course manifestly a conceptualist insofar as the possibility of empirical cognition is concerned—in order for us to have objectively valid (read: cognitively significant) representations or experience of spatiotemporal objects, we need to presuppose a priori concepts, categories, which cannot be derived from empirical experience. These categories first secure a relation to an object, and in fact first enable us, by means of an a priori act of synthesis of representations, to conceive of what an object is. Apart from the categories, we do not have the means to secure a relation to an object. Any sensible content, intuition, in Kant's terminology, must be brought under the categories for it to be cognitively significant. Thus, representations that are not brought under the categories, and so are not 'conceptualised', have no cognitive relevance, they are "less than a dream", as one prominent conceptualist in the post-Kantian tradition, Robert Pippin, says, referring to a well-known phrase of Kant's in the Transcendental Deduction of the categories (henceforth TD).<sup>3</sup>

But, while not denying that Kant is a conceptualist about the possibility of knowledge, Hanna has shown that such a picture of Kant the conceptualist as portrayed above downplays the clearly nonconceptualist tendencies in the theory of knowledge that Kant advances in the *Critique*, which can be supported by arguments from other parts of Kant's corpus. Some of the very central planks of Kant's Critical philosophy show these nonconceptualist tendencies. In stark contrast to the rationalist philosophers, who saw sensory perception as just a confused presentation of what conceptual thought or reasoning represents clearly and regarded the difference between sensibility and conceptual thinking as merely one of degree

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<sup>2</sup> See also Hanna (2006; 2015).

<sup>3</sup> See Pippin (2015b:71). The passage in TD is at A112. Pippin's reading is discussed critically in Chapter 10, this volume.

in terms of more or less conceptual distinctness, Kant fundamentally differentiates between a sensible uptake of the world, by means of what he calls ‘intuition’, and category-governed acts of conceptualisation, which need to be based on these intuitions. Kant speaks of the “two stems of human cognition” (A15/B29), which must not be confused (A50–1/B75–6) and have their distinctive roles to play in establishing cognition: in sensibility we are directly acquainted with objects by means of intuitions, whereas the understanding coordinates and subsumes already given representations under concepts. Intuition is the term that indicates the *immediate* and *singular* relation to an object and the way that an object is directly *given* to us (A19–20/B33–4; A320/B377; cf. A239/B298), in contrast to a concept, which is a *mediate* way of relating to the object, namely, mediately by way of an intuition (A19/B30; A68/B93), and first gives universality and determinacy to our relation to objects. Each thus has a distinctive and distinct role in the formation of knowledge of objects. Moreover, Kant holds that intuition and concept each have a pure form. Space and time are the necessary irreducible forms of sensibility, of any empirical intuition, the so-called ‘forms of intuition’; as Kant explicates in the Transcendental Aesthetic (TAe), they are pure and a priori, but they are specifically not concepts. By contrast, what, following Aristotle, Kant calls ‘categories’ are a priori pure concepts which must be applied to given intuitions in order for conceptual cognition to arise; the categories first enable the *determinate* relation to a given object (B137).

The Kantian nonconceptualist emphasises that notwithstanding their necessary cooperation so as to enable empirical knowledge, first, sensibility and the understanding have *separate* roles to play (A50–1/B75–6), secondly, intuitions are *given* prior to thinking (B132), and, thirdly, intuitions do not need the categories or the functions of understanding, acts of a priori synthesis, to *be* intuitions. The nonconceptualist often points out that Kant emphatically says that in case they were not found to be in accord with the categories, “[a]pppearances would nonetheless offer objects to our intuition, *for intuition by no means requires the functions of thinking*” (A90–1/B123; emphasis added).<sup>4</sup> The salient point in the debate on Kantian nonconceptualism is whether it is at all required that the functions of the understanding are applied to intuitions for the latter to be representationally significant,

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<sup>4</sup> For detailed discussion of the problems surrounding the interpretation of this passage, see Schulting (2015b).

where of course a lot depends on how one interprets ‘representationally significant’, which greatly influences one’s position in the debate. Kantian nonconceptualists, or at least those who endorse what has been called *relative* nonconceptualism (Speaks 2005), do not deny that intuitions and categories are conjoined in the case of knowledge (Allais 2009:386); nonconceptualists are conceptualists about the possibility of *knowledge*, but not about the possibility of intuitions. For what they do deny is that even to *have* intuitions requires the categories or acts of a priori synthesis, a view that is often held by those who see Kant as, broadly speaking, a conceptualist about knowledge. Kantian conceptualists argue that, if not the categories as such, at least the synthesis of the imagination (or the threefold synthesis in the A-Deduction) is required to *generate* intuitions—though it is difficult to see how one can prise apart the categories and the acts of synthesis and not run into regress problems (see Schulting 2010/2012; 2015b).

There are various systematic reasons for denying that even to *have* intuitions requires the categories, or at least the a priori synthesis of the imagination. Prime among them are the arguments that Kant provides in TAe (and, *mutatis mutandis*, already earlier in his pre-Critical works, which first advance his new theory of space, such as the *Directions in Space* and the Inaugural Dissertation), which would appear to indicate that the nature of space and time, the pure forms of intuition, is such that their characterising features are incompatible with holding the view that space and time themselves are in any way products of the synthesis of the imagination, let alone the concepts of the understanding. Often it is held, by Kantian conceptualists, that the understanding, at least by virtue of the imagination, is responsible for the *unity* of space and time, and that as such, the understanding, at least by virtue of the synthesis of the imagination, *generates* space and time itself. But Onof and Schulting (2015) have shown that the *sui generis* unity of space (and analogously that of time, though they do not argue for it), as delineated in TAe, is irreducible to the unity that is bestowed on it by the understanding by means of the synthesis of the imagination.<sup>5</sup> The synthesis of the imagination, or indeed the understanding, can thus not be regarded as that which is responsible for the *sui generis* unity of space (and time), even though it is true of course to say that they are responsible for the *determinate* unity of space (and time).

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<sup>5</sup> See also McLear (2015) and, by contrast, Land (2014a) and Messina (2014).

However, in response to the Kantian nonconceptualists those Kantians who see Kant as a conceptualist have argued that to read Kant's chief argument nonconceptualistically contradicts the primary goal of TD, namely, to argue that *all* intuitions must be regarded as subject to the categories in order to refute the sceptic in showing that pure concepts are indeed objectively valid and necessarily applicable to our experience as well as the objects of our experience. There are many controversial issues involved with this claim, and it is not certain if the conceptualist has a point here, but it does seem problematic for the nonconceptualists to explain how essentially or even relatively nonconceptual representation by virtue of intuition is in fact a priori connected with conceptual content in cases of actual empirical knowledge expressible in actual judgements. Some of the problems facing Kantian nonconceptualists as well as conceptualists in view of the aims of TD are discussed in Schulting (2015b).<sup>6</sup>

The debate on Kantian nonconceptualism has meanwhile, in a very short period of time, become fairly sophisticated and factorised, and so cannot in fact be seen as simply a debate between 'the nonconceptualists' and 'the conceptualists'. Among the nonconceptualists, there are those that espouse a *strong* nonconceptualism, which seems incompatible with Kant's conceptualist aims (as indeed Hanna acknowledges), and those that espouse a *relative* nonconceptualism, which is compatible with Kant's conceptualism about the possibility of knowledge (e.g., Allais), whereas the standard distinction in the philosophy of mind between state and content nonconceptualism appears to play a less significant role in the debate on Kant's nonconceptualism. Among the conceptualists, there are those that argue, or at least seem to argue, that there is no distinction between intuitional and conceptual contents, so that intuitional content must be regarded as thoroughly conceptually laden, although that does not mean that we must always explicitly formulate *judgements* to have experience; and there are those that argue that if not the categories per se, then at least the synthesis of the imagination is required in order to *have* intuitions, or at least in order for intuition first to be a *unified* manifold of representations. And there are those that could be called 'obscurist-conceptualists', who hold that categories are required in an 'obscure' way (in the technical rationalist sense of the word) for the generation of intuitions (cf., Grüne

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<sup>6</sup> See also already my account in Schulting (2010), which was translated from the Dutch as Schulting (2012b), and forms the basis of Schulting (2016), ch. 5.



2009). These are all very complicated matters that obviously cannot be dealt with here in an introduction.

The publication of Hanna's first article on Kantian nonconceptualism in 2005, and Christian Wenzel's in the same year (Wenzel 2005), but especially Lucy Allais's paper from 2009, catalysed a veritable deluge of articles (and a handful of books) from both the nonconceptualist and conceptualist camps among Kant scholars. Let me list the most important ones that are directly connected with the debate that has been taking place in Kant studies over the last few years: Bauer (2012), Bowman (2011), Connolly (2014), Faggion (2015), Ginsborg (2008), Godlove (2011), Gomes (2014), Griffith (2012), Grüne (2008; 2009; 2011), Haag (2007), Heidemann (2013a), Kreis (2015), Laiho (2012), Land (2011; 2015a), McLear (2014b), Onof and Schulting (2015), Pereira (2013), Pippin (2005; 2013; 2015b), Schlicht (2011), Schulting (2010/2012b; 2015b), Tolley (2013), Tomaszewska (2014), and Williams (2012).<sup>7</sup> In her contribution to this volume, Allais provides an excellent survey of some of these papers, while critically engaging with conceptualist construals of Kant's theory of cognition and answering objections to her own nonconceptualist reading. The most important recent monograph published on the topic by Stefanie Grüne (Grüne 2009) is extensively and critically discussed in Land (2014b), McLear (2014a), and Vanzo (2014).<sup>8</sup> A more detailed discussion of the views of the earlier and later McDowell (1996; 1998; 2009) as well as of Hanna and Allais can be found in Schulting (2010/2012b; 2016). Lastly, Pippin's Hegelian-inspired conceptualist reading of Kant is critically addressed in Chapter 10, this volume (see below).

Prior, and parallel, to the debate on Kantian nonconceptualism strictly speaking, there has been extensive discussion of the nonconceptuality of intuition specifically in regard to Kant's philosophy of mathematics; besides the aforementioned paper by Onof and Schulting especially the work by Carson (1997), Friedman (1992; 2000; 2012), Parsons (1992), and

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<sup>7</sup> For other papers relevant to the topic of Kantian nonconceptualism, see also Gardner (2013), Heidemann (2012), McLear (2011), La Rocca (2013), Pippin (1993), Rohs (2001), Schulting (2015a), Sedgwick (1993), Stephenson (2015b), Vanzo (2012; 2013), and Watkins (2008; 2012). Heidemann (2013) collects Bowman (2011), Hanna (2011a; 2011b), Ginsborg (2008), Godlove (2011), Grüne (2011), and Schlicht (2011).

<sup>8</sup> Cf. Grüne's responses to both Land and McLear (Grüne 2014a; 2014b). For discussion of some of Grüne's views, see also Schulting (2016), ch. 6, and Chapter 9, this volume.

Patton (2011) should be mentioned in this regard.<sup>9</sup> In this volume, there are a further four papers by Stefanie Grüne, Robert Hanna, Thomas Land, and Clinton Tolley, which expand on this topic from both broadly conceptualist (Grüne and Land) and broadly nonconceptualist (Hanna and Tolley) perspectives; among other things, they particularly deal with the notion of nonconceptuality in relation to the *unity* of space (see Chapters 4, 5, 7, and 11).

For the present collection of essays, ten papers were especially commissioned from some of the most prominent participants in the debate, and I contributed a paper myself. Undoubtedly, discussions about whether Kant can or should be considered a nonconceptualist, in whatever sense, will continue unabated, but it is hoped that this volume will increase our understanding of Kant's position in the debate on nonconceptualism, and of Kant's own overall views in, among other areas, the theory of knowledge, the philosophy of mathematics, the philosophy of mind and in aesthetics. What follows is a brief summary of all eleven chapters.

As said, in Chapter 1, Lucy Allais provides a very helpful overview of the current debate on nonconceptualism in Kant scholarship, by drawing on those papers that represent what appear to be central argumentative possibilities. She also responds to certain objections from conceptualists, and in certain respects makes concessions to the conceptualist, whilst holding on to her original claim that Kant is committed to a kind of nonconceptualism and that our approach to Kant's central arguments such as in TD is best served by entertaining a nonconceptualist notion of intuition. She emphasises that her modestly nonconceptualist interpretation is entirely compatible with thinking that all intuitions *are* conceptualised, that conceptualisation radically transforms what is given in intuition, and that for what is given in intuition to play a role in cognition intuitions must be conceptualised.

In Chapter 2, Sacha Golob addresses the relation between the argument and goal of TD and nonconceptualism. It appears that one of the strongest motivations for conceptualist readings of Kant is the belief that TD is incompatible with nonconceptualism. But, Golob argues, this belief is simply false: TD and nonconceptualism are compatible both on an exegetical and a philosophical level. Placing particular emphasis on the case of non-human animals, Golob discusses in detail how and why his reading diverges from those of Ginsborg,

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<sup>9</sup> See also the relevant articles by Land (2015), McLear (2015), Messina (2014), and Onof and Schulting (2014).

Allais, Gomes and others. He suggests ultimately that it is only by embracing nonconceptualism that we can fully recognise the delicate calibration of the trap which the *Critique* sets for Hume.

In their article ‘On the Relation of Intuition to Cognition’, in Chapter 3, Anil Gomes and Andrew Stephenson zero in on how recent debates in the interpretation of Kant’s theoretical philosophy have focused on the nature of Kantian intuition and, in particular, on the question of whether intuitions depend for their existence on the existence of their objects. Gomes and Stephenson show how opposing answers to this question determine different accounts of the nature of Kantian *cognition* and suggest that progress can be made on determining the nature of intuition by considering the implications different views have for the nature of cognition.

In Chapter 4, Stefanie Grüne considers a challenge to the standard interpretation of Kant’s conception of the generation of intuitions, which says that for intuitions to arise, sensibility and understanding have to cooperate, because sensations only form intuitions, if they are synthesised by the understanding. This challenge has been raised by Colin McLear, for example, who argues that it follows from the Metaphysical Exposition in TAE that intuitions cannot be the result of an intellectual synthesis. In her chapter, Grüne argues that, contrary to McLear’s claim, the Metaphysical Exposition is compatible with the assumption that in order for intuitions to be produced sensations have to be synthesised by the understanding.

Robert Hanna aims to demonstrate, in Chapter 5, an essential connection between Kant’s nonconceptualism and his transcendental idealism, by tracing this line of thinking in Kant’s work directly back to his pre-Critical essay of 1768, *Concerning the Ground of the Ultimate Differentiation of Directions in Space*. Hanna concludes that the most important implication of the central argument in *Directions in Space* is that Kant’s nonconceptualism is foundational for any *philosophically defensible* version of his transcendental idealism, namely, transcendental idealism for sensibility.

Dietmar Heidemann takes a wholly novel approach, in Chapter 6, to the topic of Kant and nonconceptualism by looking at Kant’s *Critique of the Power of Judgement* for seeking confirmation of Kant’s nonconceptualism. Surprisingly, the current debate about Kantian

conceptualism and nonconceptualism has completely overlooked the importance of Kant's aesthetics. Heidemann shows how this debate can be significantly advanced by exploring Kant's aesthetics, that is, the theory of judgements of taste and the doctrine of the aesthetic genius, as discussed in the Third *Critique*. The analysis of judgements of taste demonstrates that nonconceptual mental content is a condition of the possibility of aesthetic experience. The subsequent discussion of the doctrine of the aesthetic genius reveals that aesthetic ideas must also be conceived in terms of nonconceptual mental content. Heidemann finally restricts Kant's aesthetic nonconceptualism to the way aesthetic perceivers cognitively evaluate works of art, whereas the doctrine of the genius cannot count as a viable form of aesthetic nonconceptualism.

Thomas Land argues, in Chapter 7, that Kant's theory of spatial representation supports a moderately conceptualist view of his theory of intuition. In making the case for this, Land focus on three aspects of the theory of spatial representation: the distinction Kant draws between the original representation of space and the representations of determinate spaces, the doctrine of the productive imagination and the doctrine of the a priori determination of sensibility by understanding. Land explains why these three aspects support a moderately conceptualist view of intuition and considers a number of objections.

In Chapter 8, entitled 'Getting Acquainted with Kant', Colin McLear focuses his attention on the central question whether Kant thinks that experience has nonconceptual content, or whether, on his view, experience is essentially conceptual. McLear argues that in a certain sense this question is ill-conceived. He presents an alternative means of framing what is at issue in terms of a debate about the dependence relations, if any, that exist between different cognitive capacities. According to McLear, we should distinguish between Intellectualism, according to which all objective representation (understood in a particular way) depends on acts of synthesis by the intellect, and Sensibilism, according to which at least some forms of objective representation are independent of any such acts (or the capacity for such acts). He also articulates a challenge to Intellectualist interpretations based on the role that Kant indicates alethic modal conditions play in achieving cognition.

By examining relevant texts and considering the systematic coherence of Kant's position, Christian Onof asks, in Chapter 9, whether there is at all a place for nonconceptual

content in the Critical philosophy. Starting with representations with conceptual content, Onof successively examines, (i) whether there is more to representations whose conceptual content is well established than is captured by means of concepts, and (ii) the possibility of representations with *merely* nonconceptual content. With these questions answered in the affirmative, Onof addresses the issue of the dependence of representations with *merely* nonconceptual content upon those with conceptual content. Onof thereby distances himself from standard nonconceptualist views. He concludes with some broader considerations about the functions of the limited notion of nonconceptual content that his paper identifies.

In my own contribution, in Chapter 10, I am interested in how, following Hegel's critique of Kant, recent Hegelians have interpreted Kant's claims in TD, in particular. Hegelians such as Robert Pippin think that in TD Kant effectively compromises or wavers on the strict separability between concepts and intuitions he stipulates at A51/B75. For if the argument of TD, in particular in its B-version, is that the categories are not only the necessary conditions under which I *think* objects, by virtue of applying concepts, but also the necessary conditions under which *anything is first given in sensibility*, the fixed separation of concepts and intuitions seems incompatible with the very aim and conclusion of TD. I want to examine these charges by looking more closely at Pippin's reading of TD and his more general approach to Kant's strategy. Pippin believes the orthodox Kant cannot be retained, if we want to extract something of philosophical value from TD. He defends a Kantian conceptualism shorn of the remaining nonconceptualist tendencies, which are in his view antithetical to the spirit of Kant's Critical revolution. I believe, however, that we must retain the orthodox Kant, including its nonconceptualist tendencies, in order not to succumb to an intemperate conceptualism.

Finally, in Chapter 11, Clinton Tolley argues, first, for a sharper distinction between three kinds of representations of the space of outer appearances: (i) the original intuition of this space, (ii) the metaphysical representation of this space via the a priori concept 'expounded' in TAe, and (iii) the representation of this space in geometry, via the construction of concepts of spaces in intuition. Tolley then shows how more careful attention to this threefold distinction allows for a conservative, consistently nonconceptualist and non-intellectualist, interpretation of the handful of suggestive remarks Kant makes in TD about

the dependence of various representations of space on the understanding—against recent interpretations which argue that TD’s remarks require that Kant revise the impression given in TAc (and elsewhere) that intuition in general, and the original intuition of space in particular, enjoys a priority to, and independence from, all acts and representations of the understanding.<sup>10</sup>

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