| SergKatrechko | Дата: Понедельник, 11.05.2015, 20:08 | Сообщение # 1 |
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Генералиссимус
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| В общем, трансцендентализм и есть эпистемология, поскольку занимается не вещами, а способом познания. Хотя эпистемология с элементами онтологии и философии сознания... Но все же здесь хотелось бы говорить о современной эпистемологии, учитывающей достижения трансцендентализма.
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| SergKatrechko | Дата: Понедельник, 11.05.2015, 20:14 | Сообщение # 2 |
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Генералиссимус
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| Начну с новой книги Р.Ханны (Robert Hanna): "Cognition, Content, and the A Priori (A Study in the Philosophy of Mind and Knowledge)"
http://ukcatalogue.oup.com/product....297.do
John McDowell: "In Cognition, Content, and the A Priori, Robert Hanna works out a unified contemporary Kantian theory of rational human cognition and knowledge. Along the way, he provides accounts of (i) intentionality and its contents, including non-conceptual content and conceptual content, (ii) sense perception and perceptual knowledge, including perceptual self-knowledge, (iii) the analytic-synthetic distinction, (iv) the nature of logic, and (v) a priori truth and knowledge in mathematics, logic, and philosophy. This book is specifically intended to reach out to two very different audiences: contemporary analytic philosophers of mind and knowledge on the one hand, and contemporary Kantian philosophers or Kant-scholars on the other. At the same time, it is also riding the crest of a wave of exciting and even revolutionary emerging new trends and new work in the philosophy of mind and epistemology, with a special concentration on the philosophy of perception. What is revolutionary in this new wave are its strong emphases on action, on cognitive phenomenology, on disjunctivist direct realism, on embodiment, and on sense perception as a primitive and proto-rational capacity for cognizing the world. Cognition, Content, and the A Priori makes a fundamental contribution to this philosophical revolution by giving it a specifically contemporary Kantian twist, and by pushing these new lines of investigation radically further."
TABLE OF CONTENTSPreface and Acknowledgments 2
A Note on References 13
1. Introduction: Cognition, Content, and Knowledge Revisited 14
1.0 Taking Intentionality Very Seriously 14
1.1 Intentionality and Essential Embodiment 19
1.2 Categorical Epistemology 31
1.3 The Proto-Rationality of the Body 48
1.4 Three Challengeable Assumptions in Contemporary Theories of
Cognition, Content, and Knowledge 64
1.5 Individualism and Externalism Revisited 67
1.6 Tallying Up: The Two Factor Theory Rules 82
1.7 Postscript: Twin Earth and Arthritis Revisited 86
2. The Grip of the Given: A Kantian Theory of Non-Conceptual
Content 90
2.0 Introduction 90
2.1 The Varieties of Non-Conceptualism, and Kant 95
2.2 A Dialectical Critique of the Contemporary Debate about
Non-Conceptual Content 108
2.3 The Nature of Concepts 123
2.4 A Working Analysis of the Essentially Non-Conceptual Content
of Perception, and The Handwaving Argument 136
2.5 Incongruent Counterparts Revisited: The Two Hands Argument 139
2.6 More Reasons for Accepting The LCTC and Kantian
Non-Conceptualism 155
2.7 Some Implications of The THA + Autonomy, and The Generalized
Causal Pairing Problem 161
2.8 Another Implication of The THA + Autonomy: The Deep
Consciousness Thesis 174
2.9 The Grip of the Given 187
2.10 Conclusion 197
3. Radically Naïve Realism 198
3.0 Introduction 198
3.1 Digestivism, Manifest Realism, and Disjunctivism 200
3.2 The Veridicality Relation, and an Argument for Disjunctivism 213
3.3 Molyneux’s Problem Revisited 230
3.4 The Problem of Perceptual Self-Knowledge, and a Minimalist Solution 236
3.5 Conclusion 246
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4. Truth in Virtue of Intentionality, Or, The Return of the Analytic-Synthetic
Distinction 248
4.0 Introduction 248
4.1 Two Urban Legends of Post-Empiricism 250
4.2 A Very Brief History of the A-S Distinction 258
4.3 Why the A-S Distinction Really Matters 264
4.4 Quine’s Critique of the A-S Distinction, and a Critique of Quine’s
Critique 267
4.5 Three Dogmas of Post-Quineanism 290
4.6 Back to Kant! All Over Again 321
4.7 The CAR Theory 323
4.8 Concluding Un-Quinean and also Un-Kripkean Postscript 367
5. The Morality of Logic 368
5.0 Introduction 368
5.1 Kant on the Nature of Logic 378
5.2 Pure General Logic Captures the A Priori Essence of Logic 382
5.3 Pure General Logic is a Categorically Normative Science 395
5.4 A Contemporary Kantian Moralist Solution to The Problem of
Explanatory and Justificatory Status 402
5.5 A Contemporary Kantian Moralist Solution to The Problem of
Epistemic Status and Quine’s Predicament Too 405
5.6 Conclusion 416
6. Rationalism Regained 1: The Benacerraf Dilemmas 418
6.0 Introduction 418
6.1 Rationalism Lost: The Original Benacerraf Dilemma 435
6.2 The Benacerraf Dilemma Extended 465
6.3 The Benacerraf Dilemma Generalized 466
6.4 Conclusion 478
7. Rationalism Regained 2: A Priori Knowledge and the Nature of Intuitions 480
7.0 Introduction 480
7.1 The Nature of Apriority 484
7.2 He Do the A Priori – A Posteriori Distinction in Eleven Different Voices 490
7.3 In Defense of Weak Transcendental Idealism 514
7.4 What are Intuitions? 523
7.5 Rational Intuitions and the Irrelevance of Experimental Philosophy 538
7.6 Philosophical Intuitions, Scientific Naturalism, and The
Mathematico-Centric Predicament 553
7.7 Conclusion 562
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8. Rationalism Regained 3: Kantian Structuralism and Kantian Intuitionism 563
8.0 Introduction 563
8.1 Kantian Structuralism 567
8.2 Kantian Intuitionism 596
8.3 Parsons, Kantian Structuralism, and Kantian Intuitionism 618
8.4 Why Logic Must Be Transcendental 639
8.5 How to Solve The GBD 666
8.6 Conclusion 667
BIBLIOGRAPHY 672
Доступ: https://www.uta.fi/yky....l14.pdf
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